Uniting the opposition in the run-up to electoral revolution: lessons from Serbia 1990-2000

'Dieser Beitrag widmet sich denjenigen Elementen, die dazu dienen, politische Parteien angesichts von durch autoritäre Regime gesteuerten Unterdrückungsmaßnahmen zu vereinen. Er untersucht die Faktoren, die zur Kooperation prodemokratischer Kräfte beitragen oder diese behindern. Dazu dienen die vergleichende Analyse sowie die Gegenüberstellung erfolgreicher wie erfolgloser Ansätze, die eine solche Koalition im post-kommunistischen Serbien hervorbrachten. Die Autorin sieht dabei die Wechselwirkung von sieben Hauptfaktoren als besonders wichtig an: einen geschärften Sinn von der Notwendigkeit des Wandels; die Wahrnehmung eines kritischen Moments; öffentliche Unterstützung für die Einheit (der Opposition); Druck und Unterstützung durch die Zivilgesellschaft; Unterstützung durch die internationale Gemeinschaft; eine klare, interne Hierarchie sowie die Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit.' (Autorenreferat

Serbia’s parties on the mend? That state of intra-party democracy in before and after regime change

Has the onset of democracy in Serbia facilitated the democratization of the country’s main political parties? By most accounts, the answer is no. Robert Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’ thus appears all too relevant in a Serbian context. This paper seeks to understand whether and to what extent this remains the case in a post-Milosevic context. Have Serbia’s political parties evolved organizationally since the early 1990s? Are parties’ organizational structures uniformly undemocratic or do differences exist with respect to different parties? To answer these questions this paper relies on domestic media coverage, interview with party members, as well as party statutes.Est-ce que l'apparition de la démocratie en Serbie a facilité la démocratisation des principaux partis politiques du pays? Selon la plupart des constats, la réponse est non. La «loi d'airain de l'oligarchie» de Robert Michels apparaît donc tout aussi pertinente dans un contexte serbe. Cet article cherche à comprendre si et dans quelle mesure cela reste le cas dans un contexte post-Milosevic. Est-ce que les partis politiques de Serbie ont évolué sur le plan organisationnel depuis le début des années 1990? Les structures organisationnelles des partis sont-elles antidémocratiques de manière uniforme ou bien existe-t-il des différences en fonction des partis? Pour répondre à ces questions, cet article s'appuie sur les médias locaux, des entretiens réalisés avec des membres de partis politiques, ainsi que les statuts de ces mêmes partis

Serbia’s parties on the mend? That state of intra-party democracy in before and after regime change

Has the onset of democracy in Serbia facilitated the democratization of the country’s main political parties? By most accounts, the answer is no. Robert Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’ thus appears all too relevant in a Serbian context. This paper seeks to understand whether and to what extent this remains the case in a post-Milosevic context. Have Serbia’s political parties evolved organizationally since the early 1990s? Are parties’ organizational structures uniformly undemocratic or do differences exist with respect to different parties? To answer these questions this paper relies on domestic media coverage, interview with party members, as well as party statutes.Est-ce que l'apparition de la démocratie en Serbie a facilité la démocratisation des principaux partis politiques du pays? Selon la plupart des constats, la réponse est non. La «loi d'airain de l'oligarchie» de Robert Michels apparaît donc tout aussi pertinente dans un contexte serbe. Cet article cherche à comprendre si et dans quelle mesure cela reste le cas dans un contexte post-Milosevic. Est-ce que les partis politiques de Serbie ont évolué sur le plan organisationnel depuis le début des années 1990? Les structures organisationnelles des partis sont-elles antidémocratiques de manière uniforme ou bien existe-t-il des différences en fonction des partis? Pour répondre à ces questions, cet article s'appuie sur les médias locaux, des entretiens réalisés avec des membres de partis politiques, ainsi que les statuts de ces mêmes partis

Hidden politics of power and governmentality in transitional justice and peacebuilding:The problem of ‘bringing the local back in’

This paper examines ‘the local’ in peacebuilding by examining how ‘local’ transitional justice projects can become spaces of power inequalities. The paper argues that focusing on how ‘the local’ contests or interacts with ‘the international’ in peacebuilding and post-conflict contexts obscures contestations and power relations amongst different local actors, and how inequalities and power asymmetries can be entrenched and reproduced through internationally funded local projects. The paper argues that externally funded projects aimed at emancipating ‘locals’ entrench inequalities and create local elites that become complicit in governing the conduct and participation of other less empowered ‘locals’. The paper thus proposes that specific local actors—often those in charge of externally funded peacebuilding projects—should also be conceptualised as governing agents: able to discipline and regulate other local actors’ voices and their agency, and thus (re)construct ideas about what ‘the local’ is, or is not

Activation-dependent modulation of B lymphocyte migration to chemokines

In this study we have examined the migration responses of human peripheral blood or tonsillar B lymphocytes to a selection of 27 chemokines. Freshly isolated (CD19(+)) B lymphocytes show greatly impaired in vitro chemotaxis which is overcome by overnight culture. The best responses of cultured B lymphocytes were observed with BCA-1, SLC, ELC and SDF-1, reaching 19-26% of total input cells that have migrated, followed by LARC and TECK with 5-10% of migrated cells, whereas no other chemokine was found to be active. Stimulation of B lymphocytes with lipopolysaccharide or anti-CD40 plus IL-4 resulted in marked enhancement of the migration response to BCA-1, SLC, ELC and SDF-1, reaching 30-60% migrated cells at 12 or 36 h of culture respectively. The activation-dependent increase in the migration efficacy was transient and declined to base level responses after 72 h of culture. Under no circumstances did we detect B lymphocyte chemotaxis to inflammatory chemokines. Also, mobilization of intracellular calcium ([Ca(2+)](i)), an otherwise typical response of leukocytes to chemokines, was not observed. The transient increase in B lymphocyte migration did not correlate with changes in chemokine receptor expression, as evidenced by cell surface staining with antibodies to CXCR4, CXCR5 and CCR6, and by receptor transcript analyses. BCA-1, SLC, ELC and SDF-1 are typical 'housekeeping' chemokines with prominent expression at discrete locations in lymphoid tissues. Modulation of migration to these chemokines may be a critical mechanism for the proper positioning of B lymphocytes during humoral responses in secondary lymphoid tissues.publishe

Does political party aid compensate for the limitations of international elections observation?

International elections observation cannot make an election free and fair. In any case this would not guarantee well-institutionalised political parties and party competition or the consolidation of liberal democracy. Parties influence elections. Could international assistance to parties help compensate for the limitations of elections observation? The reality is that party aid has limitations of its own. Closer coordination of elections and party support may offer a partial solution but is not unproblematic