Risk Aversion and Reservation Wages

This study examines the relationship between individual risk aversion and reservation wages using a novel set of direct measures of individual risk attitudes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). We find that risk aversion has a significantly negative impact on the level of reservation wages. Moreover, we show that the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to unemployment benefits is remarkably lower for risk-averse job seekers than for risk-loving job seekers. The results are consistent with an interpretation that risk-averse job seekers set their reservation wage levels sufficiently low, so that they accept almost every job offer.Risk Aversion, Reservation Wages, Survey Data

Long-Term Effects of Unpaid Overtime

Why do people work unpaid overtime? We show that remarkable long-term labor earnings gains are associated with unpaid overtime in West Germany. A descriptive analysis suggests that over a 10-year period workers with unpaid overtime experience on average at least a 10 percentage points higher increase in real labor earnings than their co-workers. Applying panel data models this result generally holds. Furthermore, we find evidence for gender specific differences with respect to the effects of cumulative average unpaid overtime work. Our results point to the importance of investment in current working hours beyond the standard work week to enhance real earnings prospects.Overtime, Overtime Compensation, Labor Earnings, Linear Panel Data Models

Severance Pay and the Shadow of the Law: Evidence for West Germany

Due to the complexity of employment protection legislation (EPL) in Germany, there is notable uncertainty about the outcomes of dismissal conflicts. In this study we focus on severance pay and inquire whether its incidence and level varies in a systematic manner with the legal rules as defined by labour as well as tax law. We start with a theoretical model that generates the main observable outcomes of dismissal conflicts as potential equilibrium situations. Using German panel data (GSOEP), we put our theoretical model to an empirical test. Our main result is that the shadow of the law matters. Criteria regarding the validity of dismissals either found in respective legislation or defined by labour courts significantly affect the incidence and magnitude of severance pay. Moreover, restrictive changes in the taxation of severance pay have a negative causal impact on its incidence.Severance pay; Labour law; Taxation; Sample selection; Survey data

GEE Estimation of a Two-Equation Panel Data Model: An Analysis of Wage Dynamics and the Incidence of Profit-Sharing in West Germany

We propose a generalized estimating equations approach to the analysis of the mean and the covariance structure of a bivariate time series process of panel data with mixed continuous and discrete dependent variables. The approach is used to jointly analyze wage dynamics and the incidence of profit-sharing in West Germany. Our findings reveal a significantly positive conditional correlation of wages and the incidence of profit-sharing. Furthermore, they indicate that permanent unobserved individual ability is comparatively more important in the profit-sharing than in the wage equation and show that shocks have a long-lasting effect on transitory wages but not on the incidence of profit-sharing. Hence, the results support theoretical predictions that selection into profit-sharing is mostly due to unobservable ability and that profit-sharing ties wages more closely to productivity.Generalized estimating equations, covariance structure, longitudinal data, real wages, variable pay

Trade Union Membership and Dismissals

In Germany, there is no trade union membership wage premium, while the membership fee amounts to 1% of the gross wage. Therefore, prima facie, there are strong incentives to free-ride on the benefits of trade unionism. We establish empirical evidence for a private gain from trade union membership which has hitherto not been documented: in West Germany, union members are less likely to lose their jobs than non-members. In particular, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel we can show that roughly 50% of the observed raw differential in individual dismissal rates can be explained by the estimated average partial effect of union membership.dismissal, free-riding, trade union membership, survey data

Risk Aversion and Trade Union Membership

In an open-shop model of trade union membership with heterogeneity in risk attitudes, a worker's relative risk aversion can affect the decision to join a trade union. Furthermore, a shift in risk attitudes can alter collective bargaining outcomes. Using German panel data (GSOEP) and three novel direct measures of individual risk aversion, we find evidence of a significantly positive relationship between risk aversion and the likelihood of union membership. Additionally, we observe a negative correlation between bargained wages in aggregate and average risk preferences of union members. Our results suggest that an overall increase in risk aversion contributes to wage moderation and promotes employment.Employment, membership, risk aversion, trade union

Trade Union Membership and Dismissals

In Germany, there is no trade union membership wage premium, while the membership fee amounts to 1% of the gross wage. Therefore, prima facie, there are strong incentives to freeride on the benefits of trade unionism. We establish empirical evidence for a private gain from trade union membership which has hitherto not been documented: in West Germany, union members are less likely to lose their jobs than non-members. In particular, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel we can show that roughly 50% of the observed raw differential in individual dismissal rates can be explained by the estimated average partial effect of union membership.free-riding, trade union membership, survey data

'Take it or Go to Court' - The Impact of Sec. 1a of the German Protection against Dismissal Act on Severance Payments -

In 2004, a section was added to the German Protection against Dismissal Act, establishing a new procedure to dismiss an employee, given a predetermined severance payment. Most legal scholars presume the change to be without impact, while a minority of experts claims it to be either beneficial or unfavourable to employees. Our theoretical model suggests that firms will use the new procedure, but that the change in payoffs is indeterminate and, therefore, an empirical issue. Exploiting the fact that collective dismissals are not directly affected by the amendment, difference-in-differences estimates based on panel data for West Germany indicate that the legal change did have a negative effect on severance pay.panel data, Protection against Dismissal Act, severance pay

Trade union membership and work councils in West Germany

The fraction of works councillors belonging to a trade union in Germany is much higher than union density among employees. If works councils represent the face of unions, union membership of employees should be related positively to the existence of works councils and their proximity to unions. Using data from the German Socio-Economic-Panel SOEP we find that (a) works councillors exhibit a higher probability of being a union member, (b) the mere existence of a works council within an establishment has no impact on union membership and (c) a 10 % decrease in the average share of unionised works councillors coincides with a 10 % fall in the probability of being a union member. Hence, the decline in the unionisation of works councillors and the fall in union density in West Germany are closely linked. --panel data,trade union membership,works council