The levels problem in psychopathology

Psychiatric disorders are studied at multiple levels, but there is no agreement on how these levels are related to each other, or how they should be understood in the first place. In this paper, I provide an account of levels and their relationships that is suited for psychopathology, drawing from recent debates in philosophy of science. Instead of metaphysical issues, the focus is on delivering an understanding of levels that is relevant and useful for scientific practice. I also defend a pragmatic approach to the question of reduction, arguing that even in-principle reductionists should embrace pluralism in practice. Finally, I discuss the benefits and challenges in integrating explanations and models of different levels

Psychopathology and Truth:A Defense of Realism

Recently Kenneth Kendler and Peter Zachar have raised doubts about the correspondence theory of truth and scientific realism in psychopathology. They argue that coherentist or pragmatist approaches to truth are better suited for understanding the reality of psychiatric disorders. In this article, I show that rejecting realism based on the correspondence theory is deeply problematic: It makes psychopathology categorically different from other sciences, and results in an implausible view of scientific discovery and progress. As an alternative, I suggest a robustness-based approach that can accommodate the significance of coherence and pragmatic factors without rejecting scientific realism and the correspondence theory of truth

Quantifying proportionality and the limits of higher-level causation and explanation

Supporters of the autonomy of higher-level causation (or explanation) often appeal to pro- portionality, arguing that higher-level causes are more proportional than their lower-level realizers. Recently, measures based on information theory and causal modelling have been proposed that allow one to shed new light on proportionality and the related notion of specificity. In this article we apply ideas from this literature to the issue of higher versus lower-level causation (and explanation). Surprisingly, proportionality turns out to be irrel- evant for the question of whether higher-level causes (or explanations) can be autonomous; specificity is a much more informative notion for this purpose

The Theory Crisis in Psychology:How to Move Forward

Meehl argued in 1978 that theories in psychology come and go, with little cumulative progress. We believe that this assessment still holds, as also evidenced by increasingly common claims that psychology is facing a “theory crisis” and that psychologists should invest more in theory building. In this article, we argue that the root cause of the theory crisis is that developing good psychological theories is extremely difficult and that understanding the reasons why it is so difficult is crucial for moving forward in the theory crisis. We discuss three key reasons based on philosophy of science for why developing good psychological theories is so hard: the relative lack of robust phenomena that impose constraints on possible theories, problems of validity of psychological constructs, and obstacles to discovering causal relationships between psychological variables. We conclude with recommendations on how to move past the theory crisis

Networks, intentionality and multiple realizability:Not enough to block reductionism

Borsboom et al. propose that the network approach blocks reductionism in psychopathology. We argue that the two main arguments, intentionality and multiple realizability of mental disorders, are not sufficient to establish that mental disorders are not brain disorders, and that the specific role of networks in these arguments is unclear

Philosophy of science and the formalization of psychological theory

One of the original aims of this journal was to promote theory in psychology. Nowadays more and more psychological researchers are calling for more theory development, and articles on the "theory crisis" have also found their way into mainstream journals. In this article, we provide a further perspective to this theory debate. Over the past century, philosophy of science has staged extensive discussions on the mathematization of nature and on the role of mathematics in the development of theory and the connection of theory to empirical facts. We show that these discussions are highly relevant for the current debate in psychology. In particular, we emphasize the importance of conceptual work in the process of mathematization, and the role of mathematics in co-ordinating theory and observations. We then discuss the implications that these points have for statistically oriented psychology in general and for the recent theory debate in psychology

Hypothetical identities: Explanatory problems for the explanatory argument

Recently, several philosophers have defended an explanatory argument that supposedly provides novel empirical grounds for accepting the type identity theory of phenomenal consciousness. They claim that we are justified in believing that the type identity thesis is true because it provides the best explanation for the correlations between physical properties and phenomenal properties. In this paper, I examine the actual role identities play in science and point out crucial shortcomings in the explanatory argument. I show that the supporters of the argument have failed to show that the identity thesis provides a satisfactory explanation for the correlations between physical and phenomenal properties. Hence, the explanatory argument, as it stands, does not provide new grounds for accepting the type identity theory

Levels of organization: a deflationary account

The idea of levels of organization plays a central role in the philosophy of the life sciences. In this article, I first examine the explanatory goals that have motivated accounts of levels of organization. I then show that the most state-of-the-art and scientifically plausible account of levels of organization, the account of levels of mechanism proposed by Bechtel and Craver, is fundamentally problematic. Finally, I argue that the explanatory goals can be reached by adopting a deflationary approach, where levels of organization give way to more well-defined and fundamental notions, such as scale and composition