Applied Epistemology and Argumentation in Epidemiology

On other occasions I have argued that ‘informal logic’ should not really be seen as a kind of ‘weak’ form of logic, but rather as ‘applied epistemology.’ This categorization is intended to create an analogy with applied ethics. Applied ethics has created a robust research project and stimulated ethical thinking both in and outside philosophy. As with applied ethics, I believe that as philosophers explore the actual application of their principles and theories (ethical or epistemological) they will discover new insights into the powers and limitations of their theories. Application is not just about philosophy being ‘useful,’ it is also an intellectual and theoretical challenge and to a discipline that often suffers from undo abstraction

Commentary on: Robert H. Ennis\u27 Critical thinking across the curriculum (CTAC)

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Enhancing Rationality: Heuristics, Biases, and The Critical Thinking Project

Enhancing people’s reasoning abilities or rationality is a long and central tradition in philosophy and is the dominant concern of the critical movement. The research by cognitive psychologists has contributed considerably to our understanding of human irrationality and can enhance critical thinking instruction. The critical thinking/informal logic movement has not devoted sufficient attention to the decision making aspect of rationality. Unfortunately the norms used in the heuristics and bias literature to identify biases in decision making derive from the theory of rational choice used in neo-classical economic theory. These norms identify rational decision making with the efficient pursuit of individual satisfaction. This model is an inadequate account of decision making rationality. Such norms narrow and distort the concept of rationality, legitimate the single minded pursuit of self interest and their influence is a significant contributor to the economic and environmental problems of our day. The identification of deviations from the norms of rational choice theory should not generally be accepted as biases. In addition, key elements of rational decision making are simply ignored by the rational choice model

A Commentary on Tracy Bowell’s “Whataboutisms, Arguments and Argumentative Harm”

A commentary on Tracy Bowell\u27s Whataboutisms, Arguments and Argumentative Harm summarizing her arguments and suggesting that the use of argumentative harm is not a helpful way to identify fallacious uses of whatabout questions

Practical Rationality: Critical Questions for Rational Decision Making

Critical thinking should be conceived as instruction in applied rationality providing guidance for deciding what to believe and do. The latter has not gotten the attention it deserves, but in expanding its ambit, critical thinking instruction must avoid using the dominant “rational choice” model inherited from economics. This paper argues for an alternative model of rational decision making that is appropriate for critical thinking courses

Beyond the Boundaries: The Epistemological Significance of Differing Cultural Perspectives

This paper explores the issue of the epistemological significance of taking into consideration alternative perspectives, particularly those from other cultures. We have a moral duty to respect the beliefs and practices of other cultures, but do we have an epistemological duty to take these beliefs and practices into consideration in our own deliberations? Are views that are held without exposure to alternatives from other cultures less credible than those that have undergone such exposure