Accountability in the EU's para-regulatory state: the case of the Economic and Monetary Union

This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.Horizon 2020(H2020)716923Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Forms in search of substance: quality and evaluation in Romanian universities

Romania's integration into the European Union is fraught with cultural stereotypes. One dominant narrative is that the country creates 'forms without substance': meaningless institutions without adequate personnel or intellectual capital. In this paper, we investigate whether this popular stereotype adequately describes higher education reforms in recent years. We ask, 'what is the meaning of "quality" in the reforms of Romanian universities?' We present our findings based on an analysis of policy documents and 186 semi-structured interviews with administrators, professors and students in five universities. The results show that people in universities have engaged in a process of interpretation and negotiation with the new quality standards. They are 'forms in search of substance', as meaning is created within and around the new institutional structures. We argue that 'quality' has come to mean ` scoring high in evaluations'. This is not without problems for the actors in universities; the evaluation standards contain many contradictions, while evaluations themselves have important limitations. Such findings reflect earlier studies on the 'audit culture' in university life.Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Opening Pandora’s Box? Joint Sovereignty and the Rise of EU Agencies with Operational Tasks

This article problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational tasks as a new phenomenon capturing the exercise of joint sovereignty in European integration. While joint decision-making has been a feature of EU politics for decades, joint sovereignty is a broader category that additionally involves the creation of EU bodies able to intervene ‘on the ground’ alongside national public actors. We argue that the choice for joint sovereignty opens a Pandora’s box of implementation deficiencies which undermine the ability of both national and supranational actors to conduct operational activities effectively. We subsequently identify two frequent dysfunctions in policy implementation and connect them to ambiguity and conflict at the decision-making stage. Empirically, we illustrate the systemic link between decision-making and implementation problems in the functioning of two agencies with operational tasks active in the fields of border management (Frontex) and police cooperation (Europol).The Institutions of Politics; Design, Workings, and implications ( do not use, ended 1-1-2020)Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Opening Pandora’s box?: Joint sovereignty and the rise of EU agencies with operational tasks

This article problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational tasks as a new phenomenon capturing the exercise of joint sovereignty in European integration. While joint decision-making has been a feature of EU politics for decades, joint sovereignty is a broader category that additionally involves the creation of EU bodies able to intervene ‘on the ground’ alongside national public actors. We argue that the choice for joint sovereignty opens a Pandora’s box of implementation deficiencies which undermine the ability of both national and supranational actors to conduct operational activities effectively. We subsequently identify two frequent dysfunctions in policy implementation and connect them to ambiguity and conflict at the decision-making stage. Empirically, we illustrate the systemic link between decision-making and implementation problems in the functioning of two agencies with operational tasks active in the fields of border management (Frontex) and police cooperation (Europol).NWOInstitutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Different narratives, one area without internal frontiers: why EU institutions cannot agree on the refugee crisis

This article contextualizes contemporary institutional responses of the European Union (EU) to the refugee crisis within the historical setting in which EU migration and asylum policies emerged namely during the implementation of the border-free Schengen Area (1984-1995). Using the analytical framework of 'policy narratives', it argues that EU institutions have used the creation of the 'area without internal frontiers' to build coherent narratives about the nature and scope of EU action and of their own role in it. Such narratives became locked into the institutional discourse and influenced the subsequent evolution of EU politics on the topic.Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Contesting the European Central Bank in banking supervision: accountability in practice at the European Parliament

The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) raised expectations regarding the ability of the European Parliament (EP) to hold the European Central Bank (ECB) accountable for its decisions. This article examines the accountability interactions between the two institutions in the first years of the functioning of the SSM (2013-18). The focus is on the extent to which the EP contests ECB supervisory decisions in practice through letters and public hearings. The analysis shows a frequently-used infrastructure of political accountability that is however limited in ensuring the contestation of ECB conduct in banking supervision. The study identifies problems with the performance of the EP as an accountability forum and with the tight confidentiality rules of the SSM, which allow the ECB to silence contestation on many politically salient issues. The findings are based on an innovative analytical framework on the study of accountability interactions.Horizon 2020(H2020)716923Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

With and without supranationalisation: the post-Lisbon roles of the European Council and the Council in justice and home affairs governance

'Integration without supranationalisation' is a recent phenomenon in European Union (EU) politics characterising new areas of policy activity which emerged on the EU agenda at Maastricht or beyond. Among fields like economic governance, foreign and security policy or social and employment coordination, the domain of justice and home affairs (JHA) appears to deviate from the pattern. While being a new area of EU activity which originally evolved on the basis of policy coordination arrangements, JHA has been gradually supranationalised in respect to decision-making procedures. However, given the political sensitivity of the issues it covers, JHA is far from functioning as a standard field of EU legislative decision-making, even after the Lisbon Treaty. By examining the active role of the European Council in setting the JHA agenda and the continuous centrality of the JHA Council in decision-making, this article demonstrates an important blend of supranationalisation and intergovernmentalisation in post-Lisbon JHA governance.Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

The dynamics of institutional behaviour in EU justice and home affairs: roles, representative claims, and varying policy positions

This article investigates the reasons behind varying institutional positions in the European Union's (EU) area of justice and home affairs (JHA). It argues that such instances of institutional behaviour cannot be fully understood without examining how each institution seeks to legitimize its role in the EU political system. A novel theoretical framework on institutional behaviour is advanced, connecting individual policy positions and governance choices to (1) institutional roles developed within different types of organizational structure, and (2) the representative claims made by officials involved in decision-making. The framework draws on insights from organizational theory regarding institutional role expectations and a constructivist approach to representation borrowed from the work of Michael Saward. Using three cases of JHA legislation from the post-Lisbon period, it is shown that the framework can explain varying patterns of institutional behaviour by exploring lines of justification present in the institutional discourse.Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Deciding on the European Semester: the European Council, the Council and the enduring asymmetry between economic and social policy issues

This contribution investigates the asymmetrical relationship between economic and social aspects under the European Semester by looking at the roles of the European Council and the Council between 2010 and 2016. Drawing on the theories of deliberative and new intergovernmentalism, this asymmetry is associated with an uneven evolution of the co-ordination infrastructure, notably the varying degree to which key policy issues are subject to informal policy dialogue. Not only are finance ministers better placed to conduct policy dialogue, they also control the European Semester policy priorities more effectively than their colleagues in the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO). Finance ministers also are more closely linked to discussions at the highest political level, the European Council. Social affairs committees and the Commission managed to gain a greater role at the expert level and to integrate more social issues into policy recommendations. Yet, these successes are not matched by higher level political endorsement.Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

EU politicization beyond the Euro crisis: immigration crises and the politicization of free movement of people

This article explores the applicability of democratic functionalism as a theoretical framework explaining mechanisms of European Union (EU) politicization during immigration crises. Since most existing studies on the politicization of EU crisis situations focus on the Euro crisis, it is unclear if and how the politicization of EU immigration crises differs. Drawing on a 2011 crisis with legislative implications for the free movement of people in the Schengen Area, the article illustrates that immigration crises are politicized along exclusionary identities rather than along pro-/anti-European lines-as expected by democratic functionalism. Moreover, unlike in the Euro crisis, the 2011 case illustrates how the media can be instrumentalized by governments during immigration crises, with little political mobilization from the public. This case is relevant given the widespread politicization of the 2015 refugee crisis, which conversely attracted close media attention and caused serious public concern. As it stands, democratic functionalism is shown to lack a conceptualization of how much and for how long an issue needs to be contested in the European public sphere for the mechanisms of EU politicization described by the theory to hold.Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou