Competition and Financial Stability in European Cooperative Banks

Cooperative banks are a driving force for socially committed business at the local level, accounting for around one fifth of the European Union (EU) bank deposits and loans. Despite their importance, little is known about the relationship between bank stability and competition for these small credit institutions. Does competition affect the stability of cooperative banks? Does the financial stability of banks increase/decrease when competition is higher? We assess the dynamic relationship between competition and bank soundness (both in the short and long run) among European cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009. We obtain three main results. First, we provide evidence in line with the competition-stability view proposed by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). Bank market power negatively “Granger-causes” banks’soundness, meaning that there is a positive relationship between competition and stability. Second, we find that this fundamental relationship does not change during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Third, we show that increased homogeneity in the cooperative banking sector positively affects bank soundness. Our findings have important policy implications for designing and implementing regulations that enhance the overall stability of the financial system and in particular of the cooperative banking sector

Probability of default and efficiency in cooperative banking

Cooperative banks are small credit institutions, and they are more likely than commercial banks to default in periods of financial stability. Focusing on Italy (one of the largest cooperative banking markets), we analyse the contribution of efficiency to the estimation of the probability of default of cooperative banks. We estimate several measures of bank efficiency, and we run a discrete-time survival model to determine whether different managerial abilities play different roles in predicting bank failures. We show that higher efficiency levels (both in cost minimization and revenue and profit maximization) have a positive and statistically significant link with the probability of survival of cooperative banks. We also find that capital adequacy reduces the probability of default, supporting the view that higher capital buffers provide additional loss absorbency and reduce moral hazard problem

Formal and informal household savings: how does trust in financial institutions influence the choice of saving instruments?

We investigate whether trust in different financial institutions influences the choice of saving instruments. Is trust a significant determinant of household saving behavior? How does trust in different financial institutions affect the composition of household savings? Using unique survey data for ten emerging market economies in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, we show that trust in the financial system increases the probability of holding formal savings and the diversification among formal saving instruments. Trust in the financial system and in foreign banks are significantly associated with holding contractual and capital market saving instruments. Trust in the safety of deposit has the largest positive effect on bank savings. Trust in domestic banks increases the likelihood of holding formal savings the most and trust in foreign banks decreases holdings of informal savings the most