Informed Consent: No Longer Just What the Doctor Ordered? Revisited, 52 Akron L. Rev. 49 (2018)

The law of informed consent in medicine has evolved from the original doctrine which required the physician\u27s disclosure of the risks, benefits, and complications of (and alternatives to) a proposed procedure or treatment. The doctrine now implicates the disclosure of matters personal to the physician. Questions regarding the breadth of the doctrine in other respects have developed as well. This paper represents the author\u27s second examination of the unconventional aspects of the law of informed consent

Beyond Canterbury: Can Medicine and Law Agree About Informed Consent? And Does It Matter?, 45 J.L. Med. & Ethics 106 (2017)

For those of us whose scholarship focuses on medico-legal jurisprudence, the law of informed consent is a gift. It has been a fertile topic of discussion for decades, with no end in sight. Although it is not difficult to acknowledge that patient autonomy is at the core of informed consent, the doctrine is not static - it has evolved in scope and continues to engage courts in thought provoking analysis

An Evidentiary Oddity: “Careful Habit” – Does the Law of Evidence Embrace This Archaic/Modern Concept?, 43 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 293 (2017)

The concept of the “careful habit”[i] is intriguing. The law of evidence vigorously distinguishes between character evidence (largely inadmissible)[ii] and habit evidence (presumptively admissible).[iii] Character is understood as a propensity to act in a certain fashion[iv]—a person’s disposition. Habit is understood as non-volitional, repetitive specific conduct, in response to stimuli, over a rather lengthy period of time.[v] “Carefulness” is known by the law as a character trait.[vi] Carefulness should not be confused with habit, yet this confusion has occurred in multiple jurisdictions, many years ago and recently. This paper seeks to explore the development of the curious and anomalous concept of the “careful habit” in the law of evidence and, ultimately, recommends its elimination. [i]See e.g., Powell v. Dean Foods Co., 7 N.E.3d 675 (1st Dist. 2013). [ii]Fed. R. Evid. 404. [iii]Fed. R. Evid. 406. [iv]See Sharpe v. Bestop, 730 A.2d 285 (1999). [v]Id. [vi]See Woodson v. Porter Brown Limestone Co., 916 S.W.2d 896, 908 (Tenn. 1996) (referring to “trait of carefulness”); Ring v. Rogers, 927 P.2d 152, 153-54 (1996); State v. Higbie, 847 A.2d 401, 402, 404 (2004); State v. Enakiev, 29 P.3d 1160, 1163 (2001)

The Illinois Medical Studies Act: A Practical Guide to Its Understanding and Application

Medical negligence lawsuits are fairly considered occupational hazards. Illinois is not a tort reform state; therefore, physicians and hospitals here are rather routinely confronted with this litigation. During the pre-trial discovery process, defendant physicians and hospitals (and non-party discovery respondents) are required to respond to discovery requests seeking information that the respondents may believe is confidential, pursuant to the Illinois Medical Studies Act (MSA). This Article endeavors to explore the legislative history of the MSA and its jurisprudence. The Article also cautions the reader that the MSA is subject to contradictory interpretations by Illinois courts insofar as Illinois does not recognize horizontal stare decisis. The Article concludes with a discussion of the process to invoke the MSA and closing comments regarding the scope of MSA coverage