Allelic Frequency of DPYD Genetic Variants in Patients With Cancer in Spain: The PhotoDPYD Study

Genetic variants; Cancer; SpainVariants genètiques; Càncer; EspanyaVariantes genéticas; Cáncer; EspañaIntroduction Identifying polymorphisms in the dihydropyrimidine dehydrogenase (DPYD) gene is gaining importance to be able to predict fluoropyrimidine-associated toxicity. The aim of this project was to describe the frequency of the DPYD variants DPYD*2A (rs3918290); c.1679T>G (rs55886062); c.2846A>T (rs67376798) and c.1129-5923C>G (rs75017182; HapB3) in the Spanish oncological patients. Material and Methods Cross-sectional and multicentric study (PhotoDPYD study) conducted in hospitals located in Spain designed to register the frequency of the most relevant DPYD genetic variants in oncological patients. All oncological patients with DPYD genotype were recruited in the participant hospitals. The measures determined where the presence or not of the 4 DPYD previously described variants. Results Blood samples from 8054 patients with cancer from 40 different hospitals were used to determine the prevalence of the 4 variants located in the DPYD gene. The frequency of carriers of one defective DPYD variant was 4.9%. The most frequently identified variant was c.1129-5923C>G (rs75017182) (HapB3), in 2.9%, followed by c.2846A>T (rs67376798) in 1.4%, c.1905 + 1G>A (rs3918290, DPYD*2A) in 0.7% and c.1679T>G (rs55886062) in 0.2% of the patients. Only 7 patients (0.08%) were carrying the c.1129-5923C>G (rs75017182) (HapB3) variant, 3 (0.04%) the c.1905 + 1G>A (rs3918290, DPYD*2A) and one (0.01%) the DPYD c.2846A>T (rs67376798, p.D949V) variant in homozygosis. Moreover, 0.07% were compound heterozygous patients, 3 carrying the DPYD variants DPYD*2A + c.2846A>T, 2 the DPYD c.1129-5923C>G + c.2846A>T and one the DPYD*2A + c.1129-5923C>G variants. Conclusions Our results demonstrate the relatively high frequency of DPYD genetic variants in the Spanish patient with cancer population, which highlights the relevance of their determination before initiating a fluoropirimidine-containing regimen

Employees' satisfaction as explanatory factor of business failure : an inter-sectorial analysis for Spain

International journal of engineering and industrial management . - ISSN 1647-578X. - N. 5 (2013). - p. 11-38.The events in recent years have pushed many companies to extreme situations, testing their ability to adapt them to a changing and turbulent environment. Especially, if we consider the effect of "firm death" or "cessation of business activities" on numerous socio-economic stakeholders. Based on the ideas of the Stakeholder Theory, and emphasizing social aspects related to employment, this paper verifies empirically the link between "employee job satisfaction" and the rate of failure in an specific activity sector , understood as cessation of activity. Also, we analyze the capability of job satisfaction as a variable to predict a future business failure. For this purpose, we examine a sample of nine activity sectors from 2007 to 2010. The results show the importance of information on "employee job satisfaction" as a useful tool for judging the risk of a future situation of cessation, so that it may be useful to researchers and managers

Corporate Governance And Accuracy Level Of Financial Distress Prediction Models

This investigation verifies the impact of corporate governance measure on the likelihood of financial distress on the Spanish Stock Exchange for the time period from 2007 to 2012. The authors applied an empirical study with panel data and conducted regression logistic models with the objective to calculate different measures of goodness of fit. The results of this study show that the prediction power of the financial distress models improves with the incorporation of some corporate governance measures

Relationship Between Job Satisfaction And Firms Death

This paper verifies empirically the link between employee job satisfaction and the rate of failure, understood as cessation of activity. The authors examine a sample of nine industrial sectors during the period 2007-2010. The results show that job satisfaction reduces the failure rate in the business sector and they highlight the importance of employees attitudes regarding working conditions, especially in difficult economic and financial situations

Bank power, block ownership, boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms

We investigate the effects of bank power, block ownership and board independence on the likelihood of financial distress. Using a matched sample design, we find that firms in which banks have power are more likely than their counterparts to enter financial distress. However, the bank power effects are moderated by block ownership and board independence. Specifically, on the one hand, financial distress due to bank power is lower for firms with greater ownership by pressure resistant blockholders and such blockholders appear to be the largest blockholder in the firm. The bank power effects are also lower in firms with greater outside directors and this appears to be primarily driven by proprietary directors than independent directors. On the other, we document evidence suggesting that the bank power effects are magnified for firms in which the board chair is a proprietary director aligned to non-financial blockholders or CEO/Chair, suggesting that banks might partly influence decisions via board chairs. Overall, the findings are consistent with bank power actions being detrimental to the firm, but the extent to which such actions harm the firm depends on the monitoring intentions of blockholders and/or board of directors. These findings have important implications for policymakers

Corporate governance effect on financial distress likelihood: Evidence from Spain

The paper explores some mechanisms of corporate governance (ownership and board characteristics) in Spanish listed companies and their impact on the likelihood of financial distress. An empirical study was conducted between 2007 and 2012 using a matched-pairs research design with 308 observations, with half of them classified as distressed and non-distressed. Based on the previous study by Pindado, Rodrigues, and De la Torre (2008), a broader concept of bankruptcy is used to define business failure. Employing several conditional logistic models, as well as to other previous studies on bankruptcy, the results confirm that in difficult situations prior to bankruptcy, the impact of board ownership and proportion of independent directors on business failure likelihood are similar to those exerted in more extreme situations. These results go one step further, to offer a negative relationship between board size and the likelihood of financial distress. This result is interpreted as a form of creating diversity and to improve the access to the information and resources, especially in contexts where the ownership is highly concentrated and large shareholders have a great power to influence the board structure. However, the results confirm that ownership concentration does not have a significant impact on financial distress likelihood in the Spanish context. It is argued that large shareholders are passive as regards an enhanced monitoring of management and, alternatively, they do not have enough incentives to hold back the financial distress. These findings have important implications in the Spanish context, where several changes in the regulatory listing requirements have been carried out with respect to corporate governance, and where there is no empirical evidence regarding this respect

Efecto del gobierno corporativo en la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial: evidencia española: Corporate governance effect on financial distress likelihood: Evidence from Spain

The paper explores some mechanisms of corporate governance (ownership and board characteristics) in Spanish listed companies and their impact on the likelihood of financial distress. An empirical study was conducted between 2007 and 2012 using a matched-pairs research design with 308 observations, with half of them classified as distressed and non-distressed. Based on the previous study by Pindado, Rodrigues, and De la Torre (2008), a broader concept of bankruptcy is used to define business failure. Employing several conditional logistic models, as well as to other previous studies on bankruptcy, the results confirm that in difficult situations prior to bankruptcy, the impact of board ownership and proportion of independent directors on business failure likelihood are similar to those exerted in more extreme situations. These results go one step further, to offer a negative relationship between board size and the likelihood of financial distress. This result is interpreted as a form of creating diversity and to improve the access to the information and resources, especially in contexts where the ownership is highly concentrated and large shareholders have a great power to influence the board structure. However, the results confirm that ownership concentration does not have a significant impact on financial distress likelihood in the Spanish context. It is argued that large shareholders are passive as regards an enhanced monitoring of management and, alternatively, they do not have enough incentives to hold back the financial distress. These findings have important implications in the Spanish context, where several changes in the regulatory listing requirements have been carried out with respect to corporate governance, and where there is no empirical evidence regarding this respect.Este trabajo analiza algunos mecanismos de gobierno corporativo (propiedad y características del Consejo de Administración) en las empresas cotizadas españolas y su impacto sobre las probabilidades de fracaso empresarial. Usando la técnica del emparejamiento, se lleva a cabo un estudio empírico con 308 observaciones, la mitad de ellas fracasadas y la otra mitad no fracasadas entre 2007 y 2012. Sobre la base del estudio de Pindado et al. (2008), se ha usado un concepto amplio de fracaso empresarial. Empleando modelos logísticos condicionales, y adicionalmente a otros estudios previos sobre fracaso empresarial, nuestros resultados confirman que en situaciones de dificultad previas a la quiebra, la propiedad de los consejeros y la proporción de consejeros independientes ejercen un impacto similar sobre la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial a otras situaciones de fracaso más extremas. Nuestros resultados van más allá al evidenciar una relación negativa entre el tamaño del consejo y la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial. Interpretamos estos resultados como una forma de creación de diversidad y mejorar el acceso a la información y a los recursos, especialmente en contextos donde la propiedad está altamente concentrada y los grandes accionistas tienen un gran poder de influencia en la composición de la estructura del consejo. Sin embargo, los resultados confirman que la concentración de la propiedad no tiene un efecto significativo sobre la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial en el contexto español. Interpretamos que los accionistas mayoritarios son pasivos con respecto a una mayor vigilancia de la gestión y alterativamente, no tiene suficientes incentivos para frenar las dificultades financieras. Estos resultados tienen importantes implicaciones en el contexto español donde se han propuesto cambios en los requerimientos relativos al gobierno corporativo y donde no hay evidencia empírica a este respecto

Efecto del gobierno corporativo en la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial: evidencia española

The paper explores some mechanisms of corporate governance (ownership and board characteristics) in Spanish listed companies and their impact on the likelihood of financial distress. An empirical study was conducted between 2007 and 2012 using a matched-pairs research design with 308 observations, with half of them classified as distressed and non-distressed. Based on the previous study by Pindado, Rodrigues, and De la Torre (2008), a broader concept of bankruptcy is used to define business failure. Employing several conditional logistic models, as well as to other previous studies on bankruptcy, the results confirm that in difficult situations prior to bankruptcy, the impact of board ownership and proportion of independent directors on business failure likelihood are similar to those exerted in more extreme situations. These results go one step further, to offer a negative relationship between board size and the likelihood of financial distress. This result is interpreted as a form of creating diversity and to improve the access to the information and resources, especially in contexts where the ownership is highly concentrated and large shareholders have a great power to influence the board structure. However, the results confirm that ownership concentration does not have a significant impact on financial distress likelihood in the Spanish context. It is argued that large shareholders are passive as regards an enhanced monitoring of management and, alternatively, they do not have enough incentives to hold back the financial distress. These findings have important implications in the Spanish context, where several changes in the regulatory listing requirements have been carried out with respect to corporate governance, and where there is no empirical evidence regarding this respect.Este trabajo analiza algunos mecanismos de gobierno corporativo (propiedad y características del Consejo de Administración) en las empresas cotizadas españolas y su impacto sobre las probabilidades de fracaso empresarial. Usando la técnica del emparejamiento, se lleva a cabo un estudio empírico con 308 observaciones, la mitad de ellas fracasadas y la otra mitad no fracasadas entre 2007 y 2012. Sobre la base del estudio de Pindado et al. (2008), se ha usado un concepto amplio de fracaso empresarial. Empleando modelos logísticos condicionales, y adicionalmente a otros estudios previos sobre fracaso empresarial, nuestros resultados confirman que en situaciones de dificultad previas a la quiebra, la propiedad de los consejeros y la proporción de consejeros independientes ejercen un impacto similar sobre la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial a otras situaciones de fracaso más extremas. Nuestros resultados van más allá al evidenciar una relación negativa entre el tamaño del consejo y la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial. Interpretamos estos resultados como una forma de creación de diversidad y mejorar el acceso a la información y a los recursos, especialmente en contextos donde la propiedad está altamente concentrada y los grandes accionistas tienen un gran poder de influencia en la composición de la estructura del consejo. Sin embargo, los resultados confirman que la concentración de la propiedad no tiene un efecto significativo sobre la probabilidad de fracaso empresarial en el contexto español. Interpretamos que los accionistas mayoritarios son pasivos con respecto a una mayor vigilancia de la gestión y alterativamente, no tiene suficientes incentivos para frenar las dificultades financieras. Estos resultados tienen importantes implicaciones en el contexto español donde se han propuesto cambios en los requerimientos relativos al gobierno corporativo y donde no hay evidencia empírica a este respecto

“Board independence” and compensation structure of directors

This paper examines the relationship between board independence and the level and structure of directors´ compensation to determine whether this “independence” exerts a moderating effect on the different systems of remuneration granted to directors. We have developed several models based on linear panel data regression. The sample included 76 listed companies on the Spanish Continuous Market for the period 2004–2009. The results reveal that the moderating effect of board independence on directors´ compensation depends on the type of remuneration, being especially significant in the case of variable remuneration but not for fixed remuneration. This is significant for the study context because the fixed remuneration is the most important retribution concept. The results of this paper reveals that the inefficient of the board as mechanisms of control on fixed remuneration could be translated into an insufficient control of wealth extraction from the shareholders by the management. Our results contribute to the existing debate on the appropriate norms of corporate governance control over the directors’ compensation. These results offer additional evidence about the impact of board independence over the structure of compensation granted to directors, issue shortly studied so far.</p