Voluntary disclosure under imperfect competition: Experimental evidence

This study investigates disclosure behavior when a manager has incentives to influence the actions of a product market competitor in a Cournot duopoly. Theoretical research suggests that under various conditions the manager has incentives to withhold some signals and disclose others. Using an experimental economics method, we find support for partial information disclosure. Our results suggest that when the manager receives private information about industrywide cost, unfavorable (favorable) information is disclosed (withheld) and the competitor adjusts production accordingly. In contrast, when the manager receives private information about firm-specific cost, disclosure behavior is not affected by the favorableness of the information and the competitor's production decision is invariant to the disclosure choice.Information theory ; Microeconomics

Corporate voluntary disclosures of pre-decision information

This dissertation consists of two essays in the area of corporate voluntary disclosure of predecision information. The first essay entitled, "Disclosure Choice in a Duopoly", focusses on the phenomenon of partial disclosure, where the manager of the firm discloses selected signals and withholds the rest. The manager may or may not receive private information which is related to both firm-specific and industry-wide common factors. The motivation for disclosure (non-disclosure) is derived from the proprietary nature of the manager's private information. The cost (benefit) of disclosure is modelled in an imperfectly competitive product market, where an uninformed opponent’s reaction to a disclosure affects the manager's expected profit. Our results indicate that the nature of the manager's optimal disclosure policy is crucially dependent on whether the signal is more informative about firm-specific or industry-wide common factors. Unfavourable news is disclosed and favourable news withheld if the signal is more informative about common factors. On the other hand, favourable news is disclosed and unfavourable news is withheld if the signal is more informative about firm-specific factors. Comparative statics show that the sensitivity of the optimal disclosure policy and the probability of disclosure to some key parameters are also dependent on this characteristic of a signal. The empirical implications of our results suggest that when testing hypotheses involving voluntary disclosures, failure to take the above characteristic into account may confound the results. The second essay entitled, "Disclosure and Reputation in Credit Markets", deals with a different aspect of voluntary disclosures. A reputation game is modelled in the absence of credible disclosure. The manager's ability with respect to obtaining predecision information is of interest to the firm's creditors. The manager's future nominal interest charges depend on the creditors' belief about the manager's ability, i.e., on his reputation. Hence, the manager attempts to communicate this ability through sub-optimal production choice and creditors learn about the manager by observing the end of period revenue realization. If credible disclosures are possible the manager may make direct disclosures to communicate his information gathering ability to the creditors. This alternative mechanism avoids the cost of reputation building incurred by selecting a suboptimal project. However, it is shown that if these two mechanisms for reputation acquisition are not "independent", then the possibility of disclosure increases the manager's incentive to select a sub-optimal action.Business, Sauder School ofGraduat

Switch to Phosphoresce: S-winged Terrylene Diimide Exhibits Switching between Red TADF and Near-IR Room Temperature Phosphorescence

Herein, we report the first example of a terrylene diimide derivative that switches emission between thermally activated delayed fluorescence (TADF) and room temperature phosphorescence (RTP) in the red region. By design, the molecule TDI-cDBT boasts a symmetrical, consecutively fused nine-ring motif with a kite-like structure. The rigid core formed by the annulated dibenzothiophene moiety favoured efficient intersystem crossing and yielded a narrow-band emission with a full-width half maxima (FWHM) of 0.09 eV, along with high colour purity. A small DES1-T1 of 0.04 eV facilitated a thermally activated delayed fluorescence, enhancing the quantum yield to 88% in the red region. Additionally, it also prefers a direct triplet emission from the aggregated state. The room temperature phosphorescence observed from the aggregates has a longer emission lifetime of 1.8 ms, which is further prolonged to 8 ms at 77 K in the NIR region. Thus, the current strategy is successful in not only reducing DES1-T1 to favour TADF but also serves as a novel platform that can switch emission from TADF to RTP depending upon the concentration