Why the Transition from Communism Is So Difficult

After the defeat of fascism, there were economic miracles, but after the collapse of communism, economic performance has been poor. This address develops a theory of power that explains this difference and other puzzles. When those with power have an encompassing stake in society, they have an incentive to make it productive. When those with power have only a narrow interest in society, their incentive is to seek redistributions without concern for social costs. After fascism, the encompassing interests of majorities prevailed, whereas after communism narrow interests, such as large and uneconomic state enterprises, have had disproportionate political influence.Communism

A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collection action

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45510/1/11127_2005_Article_BF01725793.pd

Seeding Science, Courting Conclusions: Reexamining the Intersection of Science, Corporate Cash, and the Law

Social scientists have expressed strong views on corporate influences over science, but most attention has been devoted to broad, Black/White arguments, rather than to actual mechanisms of influence. This paper summarizes an experience where involvement in a lawsuit led to the discovery of an unexpected mechanism: A large corporation facing a multibillion-dollar court judgment quietly provided generous funding to well-known scientists (including at least one Nobel prize winner) who would submit articles to "open," peer-reviewed journals, so that their "unbiased science" could be cited in an appeal to the Supreme Court. On balance, the corporation's most effective techniques of influence may have been provided not by overt pressure, but by encouraging scientists to continue thinking of themselves as independent and impartial

The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force

If the leader of a bandit gang in an anarchy can hold a territory, he gains from becoming a public-good-providing autocrat. His monopoly over crime gives him an "encompassing" stake in the productivity of his domain that limits his tax-theft and makes him pay for public goods. We prove that a democracy run by an optimizing majority earning incomes in the market necessarily redistributes less than an autocrat and that a majority that earns a sufficient fraction of market income to be a "super-encompassing" interest redistributes no income and provides an ideal level of public goods.