Managerial incentives, market power and bank risk taking

We investigate the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (i.e. 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk while bank shareholders have preference for ‘excessive’ risk. Likewise, the market power is the centre piece of any bank regulation. However, the literature is inconclusive as to the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking. Our results reveal a U-shape relation between bank risk and CEO ownership (proxy for managerial incentives) and between bank risk and charter value (proxy for market power). Particularly, we find that bank risk initially decreases and then increases with both CEO ownership and charter value. These convex relations are robust to various bank risk proxies, different estimation approaches to account for endogeneity and several bank specific control variables

Market Discipline and Bank Charter Value: The Case of Two Safe Banking Industries

This paper analyses the relationship between market discipline and bank charter value using a panel dataset of publicly-listed domestic banks in Australia and Canada over the 1995-2011 periods, with particular focus on the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (GFC). Overall, our results show a positive relationship between market discipline and bank charter value, although this has reduced in the post-GFC period. Furthermore, our findings reveal that in the presence of market discipline, bank capital, contingent liabilities, and non-interest income are important sources of charter value. These findings have important policy implications related to bank safety and soundness. The results are robust to model specification

Factors determining European bank risk

We investigate bank capital, charter value, off-balance sheet activities, dividend payout ratio and size as determinants of bank equity risk (systematic risk, total risk, interest rate risk and idiosyncratic risk) and credit risk. Using information for 117 financial institutions across 15 European countries over the period 1996–2010, we find evidence of a convex (U-shaped) relation between bank capital and bank systematic risk and credit risk. We find mixed evidence on the relation between charter value and our measures of bank risk. The results also show a positive association between off-balance sheet activities and bank risk. It is also evident that dividend payout ratio is negatively related to all risk measures. We find large banks reflect higher total risk and lower credit risk. Following the creation of the Economic Monetary Union, we also observe an increase in bank risk sensitivity to both bank capital and off-balance sheet activities and a decrease in the sensitivity of bank risk to charter value. Finally, with regard to the impact of the recent global financial crisis, we find that the largest decline in the coefficient value is observed for bank capital relative to credit risk. These results are robust to various model specifications

Does bank capital reduce liquidity creation?

This paper investigates the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation against the backdrop of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Analyzing an unbalanced panel of 11,617 U.S. commercial banks from 1996 to 2016, we find a negative association between regulatory capital and on-balance-sheet liquidity creation, but positive associations for small banks and after the financial crisis. Further, we observe lower liquidity creation among banks that participated in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The results are largely robust to several alternate variable proxies and model specifications. Our findings suggest that “one-size-fits-all” policy may have some unintended consequences for banks

European bank equity risk: 1995-2006

We examine changes in bank equity risk following the formation of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. With the exception of Germany, we observe a decline in bank risk across euro-zone countries. Total risk decreased for 70% of the euro-zone banks in our sample with a statistically significant decrease in total risk observed for 51% of the sample. Similar results are found for idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. These results are robust to financial crisis effects and test specification. Moreover, we find some evidence of a decrease in bank equity risk for a sample of neighbouring non-euro-zone European countries, consistent with the existence of some spill over effects.Economic Monetary Union (EMU) Banks Total risk Systematic risk Idiosyncratic risk

Market discipline and bank risk taking

This paper explores the impact of market discipline on bank risk taking. We examine a broad sample of financial institutions from the G7 nations over the period 1996-2010. We apply System Generalized Method of Moments estimation to control for endogeneity and other unobserved heterogeneity in a dynamic panel setting. Our analysis suggests that market discipline helps reduce bank risk (both equity and credit risk). Moreover, we find that this negative impact of market discipline is stronger: (a) in the presence of a risk-adjusted insurance premium; and (b) during the post-global financial crisis period. However, the disciplinary effect of market discipline is not enhanced in the presence of bank capital. We highlight the policy implications of these findings

Does Market Discipline Impact Bank Charter Value? The Case for Australia and Canada"

This paper analyses the relationship between market discipline and bank charter value using a panel dataset of publicly-listed domestic banks in Australia and Canada over the 1995-2011 periods, with particular focus on the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (GFC). Overall, our results show a positive relationship between market discipline and bank charter value, although this has reduced in the post-GFC period. Furthermore, our findings reveal that in the presence of market discipline, bank capital, contingent liabilities, and non-interest income are important sources of charter value. These findings have important policy implications related to bank safety and soundness. The results are robust to model specification