The Choice of Interactive Control Systems under Different Innovation Management Modes

This paper contributes to the recent levers of control(LOC) literature on the relationships between innovation and management accounting and control systems (MACS) by emphasising the importance of the choice by which individual MACS are selected for interactive use. Using data from a survey-based study on innovation and control practices in 57 medium-sized Spanish firms, we find evidence supporting that 1) the choice of individual MACS selected for interactive use is associated to a firm’s innovation management mode (IMM), and 2) the level of product innovation output is influenced by whether or not IMM and interactive MACS present similar cognitive models and whether the sophistication of the information contents provided by the interactive MACS responds to the priority needs perceived in the IMM. Our findings further indicate that similarity in patterns between IMM and MACS does not lead to a beneficial impact on the level of innovation outputs, suggesting instead that it may induce the replication of dysfunctional existing trends caused by strategic momentum regarding innovation

Board attributes and companies’ choice of sustainability assurance providers

We study whether and how the monitoring quality of the board of directors is associated with the choice of providers of assurance for sustainability disclosures. We also examine whether this relation depends on companies’ economic, legal, and social environment. In an international empirical study considering five categories of assurance providers, we find that key board attributes, including board size, frequency of board meetings, CEO separation, proportion of women on the board, and the existence of a sustainability committee affect the type of assurance provider chosen by companies. Overall, companies with higher board monitoring quality are more likely to appoint a Big 4 assurer for their sustainability disclosures. Companies with a sustainability committee are more likely to engage an engineering firm, while firms with more board meetings are more likely to appoint an expert assurer. Moreover, we find that companies based in countries with strong environments are more likely to engage an external assurance provider, particularly a Big 4 assurer or an engineering firm. Overall, our results indicate that international sustainability disclosure assurance choices depend on corporate governance practices, as well as countries’ economic, social, and legal environment

A cross‐country perspective on professional oversight, education standards and countries' perceived level of corruption

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the existence of a professional oversight body and certain country‐specific education regulations in auditing are associated with a country's perceived level of corruption.Design/methodology/approachDrawing on data from the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) database, the authors used the Mann‐Whitney U analysis technique to test the difference between countries' perceived level of corruption based on whether they have or have not developed professional oversight bodies and licensing regulations.FindingsResults suggest that countries that have established an audit profession oversight body are, indeed, perceived to be less corrupt. Similarly, countries that require practical experience, academic study, and a licensing examination in order to practice auditing are perceived to be less corrupt. On the other hand, the analysis shows that requiring auditors to fulfil continuing education requirements is not significantly related to a perception of lower levels of corruption.Practical implicationsThe paper provides important insights for policy makers, business leaders, education and the audit profession as a whole.Originality/valueThis paper provides some of the first empirical support for the relationship between corruption and the use of oversight bodies and licensing regulations in professional auditing at a country level.</jats:sec

How to Stop Management Controls Leading to Misconduct

Management controls, such as performance management or compensation systems, used to align strategies and employee performance, are too often perceived as threatening. We examine how employees who consider those controls to be restrictive and punitive could develop dysfunctional and negative responses to their place of work including observable and unobservable forms of misconduct

Radiografía del Controller de la empresa española:Transformacion digital y automatizacion

Global Chartered Controller Institute - Repor