A Risk Analysis Tool for Estimating the Risk of Electrical Failures Due to Human Induced Defects

Aerospace electrical systems are required to withstand and adequately operate in extremely harsh environments that include, for example, high radiation exposure, temperature extremes, intense vibrational stress and drastic temperature cycling. The nature of aerospace electronics also demands high reliability since, with very few exceptions, there is no chance for hardware servicing or repairs. Common risk mitigation techniques for this type of situation are to perform a Reliability Analysis of the system throughout the development cycle, and to use electrical components that are regarded as high reliability because of additional controls and requirements applied in their design, manufacturing and testing. Unfortunately, studies have shown that even though these techniques are used, many systems fail to meet mission requirements well before the predicted lifetimes. This paper presents the analysis of failures of electrical parts, experienced during various stages of system development, at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, between the years 2001 and 2013. These components were subjected to qualification, screening and testing in which the goal was to ensure that the components would survive the stresses of the mission. The analysis categorizes failures by part type and failure mechanisms. One of the results of the analysis was the realization that a surprising proportion of failures experienced during system integration and testing were caused by human error (i.e. human induced defect). Further analysis included the determination of root failure mechanisms and any influencing factors contributing to these failures. The major causes of these defects were attributed to electrostatic damage (ESD), electrical overstress (EOS), mechanical overstress (MOS), and thermal overstress (TOS). Finally, the study proposes a risk analysis tool which incorporates these major causes for the failures, termed error-producing conditions (EPCs), and a proportionality factor representing the number of each type of failure that has occurred at the facility under study. These factors are quantified and used to communicate the risk of human induced defects for the assembly, integration and testing of space hardware based on the systems electrical parts list. The new risk identification can trigger risk-mitigating actions more effectively, based on the presence of component categories or other hazardous conditions that have a history of failure due to human error

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program: Overview and Technology Focus Areas - Responsive Technology Assurance for Civil Space

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Overview and Technology Highlights The NEPP Program provides NASA's leadership for developing and maintaining guidance for the screening, qualification, test, and reliable use of electrical, electronic, and electromechanical parts by NASA, in collaboration with other government agencies and industry. The NASA Electronic Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG) is a core portion of NEPP. This presentation highlights key focus areas for 2019

NASA EEE Parts and NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Update 2018

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program and NASA Electronic Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG) are NASAs point-of-contacts for reliability and radiation tolerance of EEE parts and their packages. This presentation includes an FY18 program overview

Implementation of a Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor (CFTP) using Internal Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)

The environment of space is challenging to digital equipment due to the interaction between electrical systems and the radiation of space. One such effect is the Single Event Upset (SEU), which occurs when radiation causes a logical bit value to change. These effects are magnified in reconfigurable digital systems that utilize Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) because both the configuration and the data are susceptible to SEUs. Several techniques have been developed in order to mitigate these effects. One such technique, called Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), is an architecture where three identical systems perform the same operation in parallel. The three outputs are applied to a voter circuit which would eliminate an SEU caused error. This thesis develops a five-stage pipelined Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) microprocessor. A TMR architecture is then instantiated on an FPGA based circuit board. Instead of voting the processor outputs, the voting function is distributed and votes the outputs of all the internal pipeline registers. Even in the event of an SEU caused error, correct data is applied to the next pipeline stage. Finally this thesis describes and analyzes test data from radiation testing of the TMR system.http://archive.org/details/implementationof109451743Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Sea TENTACLE: Track, Engage, & Neutralize Threats - Asymmetric & Conventional - in the Littoral Environment

Includes supplementary materialSea TENTACLE is a proposed afloat platform whose primary mission is to utilize the state-of-the-art technology of unmanned vehicles to monitor and neutralize all subsurface enemy threats in the littorals. This mission can be specified further as anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and maritime surveillance. The design philosophy of Sea TENTACLE embodies the ideal of providing a multi-mission capable sea frame extending network-centric warfare into the littorals. The design goals of the TSSE team were first to develop a platform to deploy, recover, and maintain unmanned vehicle (e.g. UUVs, USVs, UAVs) and second to enableto ship to act as an afloat network operations center for distributed assets. Allowing all units to work together seamlessly to conduct focused missions in the littorals makes the Sea TENTACLE a creitical component within the network-centric environment. The versatility of its cargo hold and modular design allows Sea TENTACLE to be outfitted dynamically to complete a veriety of secondary missions including humanitarian aid, salvage and spacial operations support. Sea TENTACLE's combat management and operations system will employ the Enterprise architecture design enabling C4ISR capabilities that will meet emerging network centric warfare needs.US Navy (USN) authorsTunisian Navy authorTurkish Navy authorsApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Compendium of Total Ionizing Dose, Displacement Damage Dose, and Single-Event Effects Test Results

Total ionizing dose, displacement damage dose, and single-event effect testing were performed to characterize and determine the suitability of candidate electronics for NASA space utilization. Devices tested include optoelectronics, digital, analog, bipolar devices, and FPGAs