The Politics of Oil Nationalizations

This dissertation is about the institutional choices governments make to manage their petroleum wealth. It is about the determinants of these choices, but more importantly, their consequences for effective governance and how they explain variations in political outcomes in oil-producing countries. I begin by describing several different institutional pathways -- involving national oil companies (NOCs) and their varying characteristics -- that governments can take in extracting petroleum and regulating its production. My goal, then, is to show how these seemingly technical institutional choices can have profound impacts on governance, ranging from effects on state revenue collection to incentives for corruption to ultimately the survival of the regime itself. To this aim, I collected original longitudinal data on the formation of NOCs in 62 countries since 1900; data from U.S. Department of Justice transcripts on the prosecution of corrupt practices in the energy sectors of 80 countries in the 2006-12 period; and existing cross-national data on government revenue capture from the sale of oil and natural resources. I analyze the determinants of NOC formation in the first empirical chapter, where I use Bayesian analysis informed with interview-based data from oil consultants to test and confirm leading theories of state revenue-maximization as the primary determinant of expropriation. In the following chapter, I analyze the process of extortion in the oil sector where I show cross-nationally how NOC institutional design influences bribery to high-level government officials. In the penultimate chapter, I expand on the governance consequences of NOCs by showing that nationalization ultimately increases state resource revenues, creating pathways for regime stability and duration. In the last chapter, I discuss the theoretical implications of my argument and findings. I make two broad claims in this dissertation. First, while there is much agreement that oil is not always and everywhere a curse for political development, there is little consensus about the specific conditions or institutions that do and do not matter. I help turn the ``institutions matter'' phrase from a vague stylized fact into a well-measured, clearly-specified phenomenon. Second, when it comes to the production of natural resources, classical economics theories would suggest that state intervention will lead to inefficiency, lower outputs and therefore lower revenues. In contrast, I argue and show evidence that some forms of state intervention -- that is, certain types of NOCs -- actually increase both production levels and revenues when compared to periods of no state intervention. Taken together, my dissertation applies novel ways to measure and test theories about oil's conditional effects on politics that are widely circulated but often assumed rather than tested

The Politics of Oil Nationalizations

This dissertation is about the institutional choices governments make to manage their petroleum wealth. It is about the determinants of these choices, but more importantly, their consequences for effective governance and how they explain variations in political outcomes in oil-producing countries. I begin by describing several different institutional pathways -- involving national oil companies (NOCs) and their varying characteristics -- that governments can take in extracting petroleum and regulating its production. My goal, then, is to show how these seemingly technical institutional choices can have profound impacts on governance, ranging from effects on state revenue collection to incentives for corruption to ultimately the survival of the regime itself. To this aim, I collected original longitudinal data on the formation of NOCs in 62 countries since 1900; data from U.S. Department of Justice transcripts on the prosecution of corrupt practices in the energy sectors of 80 countries in the 2006-12 period; and existing cross-national data on government revenue capture from the sale of oil and natural resources. I analyze the determinants of NOC formation in the first empirical chapter, where I use Bayesian analysis informed with interview-based data from oil consultants to test and confirm leading theories of state revenue-maximization as the primary determinant of expropriation. In the following chapter, I analyze the process of extortion in the oil sector where I show cross-nationally how NOC institutional design influences bribery to high-level government officials. In the penultimate chapter, I expand on the governance consequences of NOCs by showing that nationalization ultimately increases state resource revenues, creating pathways for regime stability and duration. In the last chapter, I discuss the theoretical implications of my argument and findings. I make two broad claims in this dissertation. First, while there is much agreement that oil is not always and everywhere a curse for political development, there is little consensus about the specific conditions or institutions that do and do not matter. I help turn the ``institutions matter'' phrase from a vague stylized fact into a well-measured, clearly-specified phenomenon. Second, when it comes to the production of natural resources, classical economics theories would suggest that state intervention will lead to inefficiency, lower outputs and therefore lower revenues. In contrast, I argue and show evidence that some forms of state intervention -- that is, certain types of NOCs -- actually increase both production levels and revenues when compared to periods of no state intervention. Taken together, my dissertation applies novel ways to measure and test theories about oil's conditional effects on politics that are widely circulated but often assumed rather than tested

Replication Data for: "Scraping public co-occurrences for statistical network analysis of political elites"

Collecting network information on political elites using conventional methods such as surveys and text records is challenging in authoritarian and/or conflict-ridden states. I introduce a data collection method for elite networks using scraping algorithms to capture public co-appearances at political and social events. Validity checks using existing data show the method effectively replicates interaction-based networks but not networks based on behavioral similarities; in both cases, measurement error remains a concern. Applying the method to Nigeria illustrates that patronage---measured in terms of public connectivity---does not drive national-oil-company appointments. Given that theories of elite behavior aim to understand individual-level interactions, the applicability of data using this technique is well-suited to situations where intrusive data collection is costly or prohibitive

Google Correlations: New approaches to collecting data for statistical network analysis

This thesis introduces a new method for data collection on political elite networks using non-obtrusive web-based techniques. One possible indicator of elite connectivity is the frequency with which individuals appear at the same political events. Using a Google search scraping algorithm (Lee 2010) to capture how often pairs of individuals appear in the same news articles reporting on these events, I construct network matrices for a given list of individuals that I identify as elites using a variety of criteria. To assess cross-validity and conceptual accuracy, I compare data from this method to previously collected data on the network connectedness of three separate populations. I then supply an application of the Google method to collect network data on the Nigerian oil elite in 2012. Conducting a network analysis, I show that appointments to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation board of directors are made on the basis of political connectivity and not necessarily on technical experience or merit. These findings lend support to hypotheses that leaders use patronage appointments to lucrative bureaucratic positions in order to satisfy political elites. Given that many political theories on elite behavior aim to understand individual- and group-level interactions, the potential applicability of network data using the proposed technique is very large, especially in situations where collecting network data intrusively is costly or prohibitive

Replication data for: Explaining the Oil Advantage: Effects of Natural Resource Wealth on Incumbent Reelection in Iran

Why does natural resource wealth prolong incumbency? Using evidence from parliamentary elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the author shows that natural resource revenues boost incumbent reelection rates because this revenue is used to provide public or private goods to constituents, which incentivizes voters to reelect incumbents over challengers. To test this hypothesis, the author employs originally assembled data on five parliamentary elections in Iran (1992–2008) in longitudinal hierarchical regression analysis at the district and province levels. By leveraging Iran's mixed-member electoral system, the author shows that the resource-incumbency mechanism works primarily in single-member districts with little evidence of an incumbency advantage for politicians in resource-rich multimember districts. Building on the rentier theory of natural resource wealth, the results suggest that voting for the incumbent is attributable to patronage and public goods distribution. The findings offer new insights into the understudied context of Iranian legislative elections, illustrate the mechanisms driving the relationship between resource wealth and incumbency advantage at the subnational level in a nondemocratic setting, and highlight the mediating effects of electoral institutions on the resource-incumbency relationship

Examining the effect of cost information and framing on support for methane regulations in Europe

Methane abatement policies will play an important role in mitigating climate change given the high global-warming potential of methane compared to carbon dioxide. Yet evidence on public attitudes and support for methane regulations is lacking. In partnership with the Clean Air Task Force, we develop an original nationally representative survey of four European countries ( N  = 5629) to show variation in public opinions about methane emissions and policy to reduce them. Using a framing experiment, we test variation in these preferences as a function of policy impacts on cost, global climate change, local pollution, or energy security. We find largely null effects across the board: attitudes are remarkably durable to varying treatments, suggesting that support for methane regulations is not sensitive to cost information and policy framing. The results from this survey provide a much-needed baseline for public attitudes about methane abatement and will inform existing debates on what information is and is not effective in generating support for ambitious methane policy

The Political Economy of Hydrocarbon Wealth and Fuel Prices

All governments either tax or subsidize the consumption of fossil fuels. These pricing policies have far-reaching consequences not only for the environment, but also for governance and economic development. In this state-of-knowledge paper, we examine previous research on fossil fuel subsidies, noting areas that are understudied in the context of determinants of price policies and causes for policy reform. We then describe new data on implicit gasoline taxes and subsidies, report global trends, and explore the relationship between oil wealth and government policies. We conclude with actionable ideas for future research projects