Understanding Terrorist Network Topologies and Their Resilience Against Disruption

This chapter investigates the structural position of covert (terrorist or criminal) networks. Using the secrecy versus information tradeoff characterization of covert networks it is shown that their network structures are generally not small-worlds, in contradistinction to many overt social networks. This finding is backed by empirical evidence concerning Jemaah Islamiyah’s Bali bombing and a heroin distribution network in New York. The importance of this finding lies in the strength such a topology provides. Disruption and attack by counterterrorist agencies often focuses on the isolation and capture of highly connected individuals. The remarkable result is that these covert networks are well suited against such targeted attacks as shown by the resilience properties of secrecy versus information balanced networks. This provides an explanation of the survival of global terrorist networks and food for thought on counterterrorism strategy policy

Monitoring and Disrupting Dark Networks A Bias toward the Center and What It Costs Us

The goal of this article is to explore this analytic bias--how it is manifested, why it appears so extensive, and what unwitting limitations it imposes on our strategic options to counter terrorism. We use data from a study of the Syrian opposition network that was conducted in the CORE Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California (Lucente and Wilson 2013). The original study sought to provide a window into the armed opposition units against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. This article proceeds as follows: We begin by reviewing the various strategies that can be used for disrupting dark networks. These can be broken down into two broad categories -- kinetic and non-kinetic. The former uses coercive means for disruption while the latter seeks to undermine dark networks using with subtler applications of power. Drawing on a previous analysis, we illustrate how some of these strategies can be implemented, while at the same time highlighting our own bias in that study toward central actors. We then turn to an analysis of the Syrian opposition network, highlighting how a central focus can blind analysts to other important aspects of a network; in this case, elements that ultimately aligned themselves with the Islamic State of Syria (ISIS). We conclude with some implications for the future use of SNA to monitor and disrupt dark networks

Understanding Terrorist Network Topologies and Their Resilience Against Disruption

This article investigates the structural position of covert (terrorist or criminal) networks. Using the secrecy versus information tradeoff characterization of covert networks it is shown that their network structures are generally not small-worlds, in contradistinction to many overt social networks. This finding is backed by empirical evidence concerning Jemaah Islamiyah's Bali bombing and a heroin distribution network in New York. The importance of this finding lies in the strength such a topology provides. Disruption and attack by counterterrorist agencies often focuses on the isolation and capture of highly connected individuals. The remarkable result is that these covert networks are well suited against such targeted attacks as shown by the resilience properties of secrecy versus information balanced networks. This provides an explanation of the survival of global terrorist networks and food for thought on counterterrorism strategy policy.