Policy Toolkits on Employment and Ageing: A Conceptual Framework

Policy toolkits provide useful information and can be drawn upon as guidance in different stages of the policy-making process. This chapter reviews existing policy toolkits on employment and ageing, aiming to distil a conceptual categorisation intended to inform research uptake strategies. As a basis, we develop a clear definition of policy toolkits and propose a typology of policy tools that consists of four types: (1) good practice, (2) social indicators, (3) programme evaluation and (4) forecasts, projections and simulations. We also describe the underlying relationship between research and policy-making, and provide a synthetic overview of toolkits available for ageing-related issues in the area of employment and pensions. We conclude with the observation that effective policy toolkits hinge on the prior formulation of clear policy goals and that different policy goals may not always be congruent with each other or be simultaneously achieved

The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games

It is well documented that people are reluctant to switch from a default option. We experimentally test the robustness of this behavioral inertia in a collective decision-making setting by varying the default option type and the decision-making environment. We examine the impacts of automatic-participation and no-participation default options on subjects’ participation in a public goods provision and their contributions. Two variants of public goods game are employed: the linear and the threshold public goods games. The study shows the evidence of partial stickiness rather than complete stickiness of default options as indicated in empirical studies. Our experimental results square with the evidence of behavioral inertia only when the automatic-participation default is used. This default boosts contributions in the linear public goods game but not in the threshold public goods game. The evidence of partial stickiness is robust to the variation of the game employed, but the effect on contribution is sensitive to it

Employer Health Insurance Mandates and the Risk of Unemployment

Employer health insurance mandates form the basis of many health care reform proposals. Proponents make the case that they will increase insurance, while opponents raise the concern that low-wage workers will see offsetting reductions in their wages and that in the presence of minimum wage laws some of the lowest wage workers will become unemployed. We construct an estimate of the number of workers whose wages are so close to the minimum wage that they cannot be lowered to absorb the cost of health insurance, using detailed data on wages, health insurance, and demographics from the Current Population Survey (CPS). We find that 33 percent of uninsured workers earn within $3 of the minimum wage, putting them at risk of unemployment if their employers were required to offer insurance. Assuming an elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wage increase of -0.10, we estimate that 0.2 percent of all full-time workers and 1.4 percent of uninsured full-time workers would lose their jobs because of a health insurance mandate. Workers who would lose their jobs are disproportionately likely to be high school dropouts, minority, and female. This risk of unemployment should be a crucial component in the evaluation of both the effectiveness and distributional implications of these policies relative to alternatives such as tax credits, Medicaid expansions, and individual mandates, and their broader effects on the well-being of low-wage workers.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73099/1/j.1540-6296.2008.00133.x.pd

Public health insurance and entry into self-employment

We estimate the impact of a differential treatment of paid employees versus self-employed workers in a public health insurance system on the entry rate into entrepreneurship. In Germany, the public health insurance system is mandatory for most paid employees, but not for the selfemployed, who usually buy private health insurance. Private health insurance contributions are relatively low for the young and healthy, and until 2013 also for males, but less attractive at the other ends of these dimensions and if membership in the public health insurance allows other family members to be covered by contribution-free family insurance. Therefore, the health insurance system can create incentives or disincentives to starting up a business depending on the family’s situation and health. We estimate a discrete time hazard rate model of entrepreneurial entry based on representative household panel data for Germany, which include personal health information, and we account for non- random sample selection. We estimate that an increase in the health insurance cost differential between self-employed workers and paid employees by 100 euro per month decreases the annual probability of entry into selfemployment by 0.38 percentage points, i.e. about a third of the average annual entry rate. The results show that the phenomenon of entrepreneurship lock, which an emerging literature describes for the system of employer provided health insurance in the USA, can also occur in a public health insurance system. Therefore, entrepreneurial activity should be taken into account when discussing potential health care reforms, not only in the USA and in Germany

Applying strategies from libertarian paternalism to decision making for prostate specific antigen (PSA) screening

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Despite the recent publication of results from two randomized clinical trials, prostate specific antigen (PSA) screening for prostate cancer remains a controversial issue. There is lack of agreement across studies that PSA screening significantly reduces prostate cancer mortality. In spite of these facts, the widespread use of PSA testing in the United States leads to overdetection and overtreatment of clinically indolent prostate cancer, and its associated harms of incontinence and impotence.</p> <p>Discussion</p> <p>Given the inconclusive results from clinical trials and incongruent PSA screening guidelines, the decision to screen for prostate cancer with PSA testing is an uncertain one for patients and health care providers. Screening guidelines from some health organizations recommend an informed decision making (IDM) or shared decision making (SDM) approach for deciding on PSA screening. These approaches aim to empower patients to choose among the available options by making them active participants in the decision making process. By increasing involvement of patients in the clinical decision-making process, IDM/SDM places more of the responsibility for a complex decision on the patient. Research suggests, however, that patients are not well-informed of the harms and benefits associated with prostate cancer screening and are also subject to an assortment of biases, emotion, fears, and irrational thought that interferes with making an informed decision. In response, the IDM/SDM approaches can be augmented with strategies from the philosophy of libertarian paternalism (LP) to improve decision making. LP uses the insights of behavioural economics to help people better make better choices. Some of the main strategies of LP applicable to PSA decision making are a default decision rule, framing of decision aids, and timing of the decision. In this paper, we propose that applying strategies from libertarian paternalism can help with PSA screening decision-making.</p> <p>Summary</p> <p>Our proposal to augment IDM and SDM approaches with libertarian paternalism strategies is intended to guide patients toward a better decision about testing while maintaining personal freedom of choice. While PSA screening remains controversial and evidence conflicting, a libertarian-paternalism influenced approach to decision making can help prevent the overdiagnosis and overtreatment of prostate cancer.</p