239 research outputs found
Aspaturian, Vernon V.; Valenta, Jiri et Burke, David P., Eurocommunism East and West, Bloomington Ind., Indiana University Press, 1980, 383 p.
Irving, R.E.M., The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe, Londres, Royal Institute of International Affairs, George Allen and Unwin, 1979, 358 p.
Rothschild, Joseph. Enthnopolitics : A conceptual Framework, New York, Columbia University Press, 1981, 302 p.
Le Japon, sa politique de dĂ©fense et l'avenir de son alliance avec les Ătats-Unis
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War have forced Japan to question its defence policy. In the past this policy has been firmly based on a purely defensive posture which relied totally on Japan's alliance with the United States. Because the Cold War dragged on in East Asia for much longer than in Europe, Japan could carry on the same defence policy as before. Japanese defence planners found it convenient to emphasize the « Soviet threat » as a way to maintain annual increases in the military budget, and refusing to normalize their relations with the Soviets, until the question of the Northern Territories had been settled. They can no longer ignore the various signs of détente in East Asia. Yet they have had limited effects on Japan's defence policy. The Americans have called on Japan to play a role more commensurate with its economic power but want to avoid any hint of an autonomous Japanese defence policy. They pressured Japan into playing a more active part in the Gulf crisis and the ensuing war, but the government failed to muster sufficient support, at home and amongst the other countries of East Asia, for any role for its military outside Japan, even in a non combat capacity.So Japan has sought other regional and global security policies to compensate for this handicap and has met with mixed success. The recent failure to pass legislation allowing its Self-defence Forces to participate in UN peacekeeping operations has seriously jeopardized Japan 's search for a more active role in regional affairs. But will the Japanese continue for much longer to play a second role in the United States' System of bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region which that country can afford less and less ? This is the real dilemma of Japanese defence policy : it can neither remain as it is nor can it easily change direction
La France: les institutions internationales au service du rang?
Si la volontĂ© d'affirmer son rang reste toujours fondamentale pour la politique Ă©trangĂšre de la France, elle n'explique pas seule une politique qui se concentre de plus en plus sur les institutions internationales depuis la fin de la guerre froide. D'autres motivations doivent entrer en ligne de compte, notamment : la reconnaissance des insuffisances de ses propres ressources, l'Ă©valuation des limites d'une approche bilatĂ©rale, le dĂ©sir de contenir les tendances unilatĂ©ralistes des Ătats-Unis, et le besoin d'affirmer son rĂŽle de puissance de premier plan. En outre, la France cherche Ă faire adopter des normes de conduite internationale que seules les institutions peuvent imposer. Les trois cas choisis - la rĂ©forme de VONU, les sanctions contre l'Irak et le terrorisme - dĂ©montrent toute la complexitĂ© de la dĂ©cision française de privilĂ©gier dorĂ©navant une action internationale Ă travers les institutions.If the mil to assert Us international status still remains vital to France's foreign policy, it cannot explain by itself a policy which has put more and more emphasis on international institutions since the end of the Cold War. Other motives must also betaken into account, notably : admitting its own lack of resources, evaluating the limits of a bilateral approach, wanting to contain us tendencies to unilateral actions and needing to assert its role as a first-class power. France is also attempting to have adopted norms of international conduct which only international institutions can impose. The three cases chosen - reform of the UN, sanctions against Iraq and terrorism -demonstrate the full complexity of the French decision to privilege international action through institutions from now on
Les approches critiques de la sécurité
Au moment oĂč les Etats-Unis ont rĂ©ussi Ă imposer le « terrorisme international » comme sujet prioritaire de lâordre du jour sĂ©curitaire, le besoin dâaborder lâanalyse de la sĂ©curitĂ© sous une optique critique ne sâest jamais autant fait sentir. Depuis une vingtaine dâannĂ©es, les Ă©tudes de sĂ©curitĂ© ont cherchĂ© Ă se libĂ©rer du carcan de la Guerre Froide oĂč seules les questions de dĂ©fense militaire et de sĂ©curitĂ© dite nationale avaient droit de citĂ© dans le monde des Ă©tudes de sĂ©curitĂ©. Depuis le..
La culture populaire visuelle : un espace à explorer pour les études critiques de sécurité
Depuis le xixe siĂšcle la culture populaire joue un rĂŽle important dans la construction de ce que Jutta Weldes a appelĂ© la « sĂ©curitĂ© imaginaire », câest-Ă -dire la façon dont une sociĂ©tĂ© conçoit sa sĂ©curitĂ©, dans le sens le plus large du terme, la dĂ©fense de celle-ci et les menaces dont elle ferait lâobjet. La culture populaire, surtout le cinĂ©ma et les sĂ©ries tĂ©lĂ©visĂ©es, offre un terrain extraordinaire Ă explorer pour les Ă©tudes critiques de la sĂ©curitĂ©, surtout Ă une Ă©poque oĂč la sĂ©curitĂ© est devenue presque une obsession, du moins dans les pays occidentaux. Commençant avec une brĂšve discussion du lien entre culture populaire et sĂ©curitĂ©, lâarticle poursuit en proposant une mĂ©thode qualitative pour analyser la façon dont les divers artefacts de culture populaire contribuent Ă la construction de la sĂ©curitĂ© imaginaire (par exemple, en renforçant les conceptions dominantes des menaces ou des sources dâinsĂ©curitĂ© et dâanxiĂ©tĂ©) ou bien Ă la dĂ©construire (par exemple, en rĂ©vĂ©lant les mĂ©canismes et les processus qui produisent le sentiment dâinsĂ©curitĂ©, et au profit de qui, ou simplement en la ridiculisant). Dans sa derniĂšre partie, lâarticle prĂ©sente deux Ă©tudes de cas, le film dâAlfred Hitchcock FenĂȘtre sur cours et la sĂ©rie tĂ©lĂ©visĂ©e danoise The Killing II, pour illustrer la contribution que la culture populaire peut faire aux Ă©tudes critiques de sĂ©curitĂ©.Since the 19th century, popular culture has played an important role in the construction of what Jutta Weldes has called the âsecurity imaginaryâ, i.e. the way a society conceives its security, in the broad sense of the word, and its defense as well as the threats it believes are aimed at it. Popular culture, especially cinema and television series, offers an extraordinary terrain to be explored by critical security studies, notably in a time when security has become almost an obsession, at least in Western countries. Beginning with a brief discussion of the link between popular culture and security, the article proposes a qualitative method for analyzing the way various popular culture artefacts contribute to the construction of the security imaginary (for example, by reinforcing prevailing conceptions of threats or sources of insecurity and anxiety) or deconstruction of it (for example, by revealing the mechanisms and processes that produce the feeling of insecurity and for whom they benefit, or simply by mocking it). In the last section, the article presents two case studies, Alfred Hitchcockâs Rear Window and the Danish TV series The Killing II, to illustrate the contribution popular culture can make to critical security studies
Les études de sécurité : du constructivisme dominant au constructivisme critique
LâarrivĂ©e du constructivisme vers la fin des annĂ©es 1980 semblait apporter une vĂ©ritable approche de rechange aux thĂ©ories nĂ©orĂ©alistes et nĂ©olibĂ©rales qui dominaient le dĂ©bat en Relations Internationales. Cependant, aprĂšs les premiers Ă©lans dâenthousiasme il fallut se rendre Ă lâĂ©vidence que, malgrĂ© ses promesses, le constructivisme dominant qui Ă©tait en train de sâimposer, surtout en AmĂ©rique du Nord, constituait un courant trĂšs large, qui pouvait sâaccommoder facilement avec les approches positivistes. Dans le domaine des Ă©tudes de sĂ©curitĂ©, ce constructivisme dominant a produit quelques travaux intĂ©ressants, mais qui reflĂštent une prudence profondĂ©ment ancrĂ©e. Il nâest donc pas Ă©tonnant de voir Ă©merger une tendance constructiviste critique, beaucoup plus postposiviste, et qui ne refuse pas le dialogue avec le postmodernisme et la ThĂ©orie Critique. Cette approche ne se confond pas avec les « Ă©tudes critiques de la sĂ©curitĂ© » et se distingue en particulier par ses apprĂ©ciations critiques des travaux de lâĂ©cole de Copenhague.The arrival of constructivism towards the end of the 1980s appeared to herald a truly alternative approach to the neorealist and neoliberal theories which dominated the debate in International Relations. However, after the first surge of enthusiasm, it became clear that, despite its promises, the mainstream constructivism which was beginning to take hold, especially in North America, was a very broad current that could easily fit in with positivist approaches. In the field of security studies, this mainstream constructivism has produced some interesting work, but which reflects a deeply ingrained cautiousness. So there is no surprise to see a critical constructivist trend emerge, which is much more postpositivist, and which does not refuse to dialogue with postmodernism and Critical Theory. This approach is not to be confused with âcritical security studiesâ and is dintinguished in particular by its critical assessment of the work done by the Copenhagen School
Pre-hospital notification is associated with improved stroke thrombolysis timing
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