Not Here? Housing Market Policy and the Risk of a Housing Bust

Can a US-style housing bust happen in Canada? Recent swings in Canadian house prices have raised concerns about the possibility. To evaluate the likelihood of a US style housing market crash in Canada, this paper examines what caused the US housing boom and bust from 2000 to 2009. A decline in underwriting standards played an essential role in the US housing market boom and dramatic bust. While monetary policy was very similar in both countries from 2000 to 2008, housing markets (especially the subprime component) were structured and regulated differently in each. Canadian housing policies, which avoided the sharp decline in underwriting standards seen in the US, worked well in reducing the possibility of a housing bust in Canada during 2008-2009, and continue to mitigate the risk of a massive wave of defaults in the future.Financial Services, housing bust, real estate, Canadian housing policies, US-style housing bust

Why didn’t Canada’s housing market go bust?

Housing markets in the United States and Canada are similar in many respects, but each has fared quite differently since the onset of the financial crisis. A comparison of the two markets suggests that relaxed lending standards likely played a critical role in the U.S. housing bust.Mortgage loans ; Housing - Canada

The Welfare Effects of Restrictions on U.S. Trade

macroeconomics, U.S. trade

Land Titles, Credit Markets and Wealth Distributions

Does the existence of formal title to land and real estate matter for the distribution of wealth? This paper reviews the empirical literature on the economic impact of land and real estate administration systems across countries. This paper argues that a functioning credit market for secured credit is necessary to realize the full benefits of legal title to private real estate. This paper also reviews quantitative economic theory on wealth distribution to assess the likely impact of different land registration systems on wealth inequality. The implication of current theory is that poor land administration systems may sometimes lead to lower levels of wealth inequality than better land registration systems.land titles, credit markets, wealth distribution

What Banks Do and Markets Don't: Cross-subsidization

We show that interbank markets are a poor substitute for ``broad'' banks that operate across regions or sectors. In the presence of regional or sectoral asset and liquidity shocks, interbank markets can distribute liquidity efficiently, but fail to respond efficiently to asset shocks. Broad banks can condition on the joint distribution of both shocks and, hence, achieve an efficient internal allocation of capital. This allocation involves the cross-subsidization of loans across regions or sectors. Compared to regional banks that are linked through well-functioning interbank markets, broad banks lead to higher levels of aggregate investment, higher output, and less fluctuations within regions. However, broad banks generate endogenously aggregate uncertainty.Banking Restrictions, Interbank Markets, Universal Banking, Endogenous Uncertainty

Limited enforcement and efficient interbank arrangements

Banks have historically provided mutual insurance against asset risk, where the insurance arrangement itself was characterized by limited enforcement. This paper shows that a non-trivial interaction between asset and liquidity risk plays a crucial role in shaping optimal banking arrangements in the presence of limited enforcement. We find that liquidity shocks are essential for the provision of insurance against asset shocks, as they mitigate interbank enforcement problems. These enforcement problems generate endogenous aggregate uncertainty as investment allocations depend upon the joint distribution of shocks. Paradoxically, a negative correlation between liquidity and asset shocks ameliorates enforcement limitations and facilitates interbank cooperation.Risk ; Liquidity (Economics)

The vortex tube

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston UniversityTheories of the operation of the vortex tube have been offered by men of many vocations. Some have even tried to justify their theories by mathematical analysis. However, in the writer's estimation, none of these theories had been proven conclusively. In the the allotted to a master's thesis, it is not possible to prove or disapprove the theories of operation. It is possible to add to the information that is known about the tube. It will also be necessary to compile, read, and digest all the information that is available. None ot the references contained a complete digest of all the material previously written; thus, a portion of the problem is to gather as such information on the vortex tube as practicable

Consumer bankruptcy: a fresh start

American consumer bankruptcy provides for a Fresh Start through the discharge of a household’s debt. Until recently, many European countries specified a No Fresh Start policy of life-long liability for debt. The trade-off between these two policies is that while Fresh Start provides insurance across states, it drives up interest rates and thereby makes life-cycle smoothing more difficult. This paper quantitatively compares these bankruptcy rules using a life-cycle model with incomplete markets calibrated to the U.S. and Germany. A key innovation is that households face idiosyncratic uncertainty about their net asset holdings (expense shocks) and labor income. We find that expense uncertainty plays a key role in evaluating consumer bankruptcy laws.

Accounting for the Rise in Consumer Bankruptcies

Personal bankruptcies in the United States have increased dramatically, rising from 1.4 per thousand working age population in 1970 to 8.5 in 2002. We use a heterogeneous agent life-cycle model with competitive financial intermediaries who can observe households' earnings, age and current asset holdings to evaluate several commonly offered explanations. We find that increased uncertainty (income shocks, expense uncertainty) cannot quantitatively account for the rise in bankruptcies. Instead, the rise in filings appears to mainly reflect changes in the credit market environment. We find that credit market innovations which cause a decrease in the transactions cost of lending and a decline in the cost of bankruptcy can largely accounting for the rise in consumer bankruptcy. We also argue that the abolition of usury laws and other legal changes are unimportant.

Accounting for the Rise in Consumer Bankruptcies

Personal bankruptcies in the United States have increased dramatically, rising from 1.4 per thousand working age population in 1970 to 8.5 in 2002. We use a heterogeneous agent life-cycle model with competitive financial intermediaries who can observe households’ earnings, age and current asset holdings to evaluate several commonly offered explanations. We find that increased uncertainty (income shocks, expense uncertainty) cannot quantitatively account for the rise in bankruptcies. Instead, stories related to a change in the credit market environment are more plausible. In particular, we find that a combination of a decrease in the transactions cost of lending and a decline in the cost of bankruptcy does a good job in accounting for the rise in consumer bankruptcy. We also argue that the abolition of usury laws and other legal changes are unimportant.Consumer Bankruptcy, Uncertainty, Credit Markets, Stigma