Can a US-style housing bust happen in Canada? Recent swings in Canadian house prices have raised concerns about the possibility. To evaluate the likelihood of a US style housing market crash in Canada, this paper examines what caused the US housing boom and bust from 2000 to 2009. A decline in underwriting standards played an essential role in the US housing market boom and dramatic bust. While monetary policy was very similar in both countries from 2000 to 2008, housing markets (especially the subprime component) were structured and regulated differently in each. Canadian housing policies, which avoided the sharp decline in underwriting standards seen in the US, worked well in reducing the possibility of a housing bust in Canada during 2008-2009, and continue to mitigate the risk of a massive wave of defaults in the future.Financial Services, housing bust, real estate, Canadian housing policies, US-style housing bust

Jim MacGee

English

Research Papers in Economics

e-brief
F FI IN NA AN NC CI IA AL L   S SE ER RV VI IC CE ES S
Not Here? Housing Market Policy and the Risk of a Housing Bust 
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Jim MacGee
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August 31, 2010
 Can a US-style housing bust happen in Canada? Recent swings in Canadian house
prices have raised concerns about the possibility. To evaluate the likelihood of a US-
style housing market crash in Canada, the author examines what caused the US
housing boom and bust from 2000 to 2009. 
 A  decline in underwriting standards played an essential role in the US housing
market boom and dramatic bust. While monetary policy was very similar in both
countries from 2000 to 2008, housing markets (especially the subprime component)
were structured and regulated differently in each. 
 Canadian housing policies, which avoided the sharp decline in underwriting standards
seen in the US, worked well in reducing the possibility of a housing bust in Canada during
2008-2009, and continue to mitigate the risk of a massive wave of defaults in the future.  
The author would like to thank Finn Poschmann and Philippe Bergevin for helpful comments, as well as Ben Dachis,  David Laidler,
Thor Koeppl, Angelo Melino, Angela Redish, Nick Rowe and anonymous reviewers at the Bank of Canada and the CMHC.
1 See, for example, Wolf and Kwan 2008. 
2 Both series are based on repeat sales, making these series a closer approximation to a “constant-quality” price index of nominal
home prices than average house price sales.
Recent swings in Canadian house prices have raised concerns that a US-style housing bust looms on the
horizon.
1 A comparison of housing market policies in Canada versus the US, however, suggests that there is little
likelihood of a US-style surge in foreclosures or a collapse of house prices in Canada. 
Many of the concerns about the Canadian housing market are motivated by recent US experiences. Over the
years 2000 to 2006, US prices appreciated nearly twice as much as Canadian houses (Figure 1 plots the United
States’ S&P Case-Shiller 20 city composite index and the Canadian Teranet-National Bank 6 city composite
index).
2 This rapid appreciation has been followed by an equally rapid decline, as US house prices declined by
over 30 percent between 2006 and 2009, before staging a modest recovery late in 2009, only to fall into the
doldrums again this year. 
The decline in Canadian house prices lagged the US, and was more muted, as house prices continued to
appreciate until late 2008, before declining by roughly 9 percent between August 2008 and April 2009. This
decline was followed by a rapid bounce back, with house prices returning to their pre-recession high by the
end of 2009. After another price surge in the spring of this year, buyers and sellers remain on tenterhooks
about the future path of prices.
To evaluate the likelihood of a US-style housing market crash in Canada, one first needs to understand what
caused the US housing boom and bust. As argued elsewhere (MacGee 2009), the Canada-US comparisonsuggests that a decline in underwriting standards played an essential role in the US housing market boom and dramatic
bust. While monetary policy was very similar in both countries from 2000 to 2008, housing markets (especially the
subprime component) were structured and regulated somewhat differently in each. Unlike in the US, the Canadian
subprime market never expanded significantly into newer products, such as interest-only or negative-amortization
mortgages, whose popularity grew rapidly in the US from 2003 to 2006.
3 Moreover, while subprime lending increased
rapidly in both countries over 2000 to 2006, the Canadian subprime market remains much smaller than that in the 
US, as subprime lenders accounted for roughly 5 percent of mortgage originations in 2006 – compared to 22 percent 
in the US (Mortgage Architects 2007). 
Mortgage delinquencies support the key role of underwriting standards in what transpired. While mortgage
delinquencies began to climb before the recession in the US, they only began to rise in Canada after the economic
slowdown began. Moreover, the decline in Canadian house prices between August 2008 and April 2009 did not result in
a large increase in mortgage delinquencies.
Government housing market policies likely played an important role in the evolution of differential underwriting
standards. Governments in both countries provide guarantees to lenders against the risk of mortgage defaults for a
significant share of mortgage lending. Government insurance of default risk creates what economists term “moral hazard,”
since the insurance reduces the cost to lenders of making high-risk loans. This means that an essential part of government
mortgage insurance programs is minimum underwriting standards, which reduce the incentive for banks to lower
underwriting standards to generate loan volume. If these standards are too “loose,” then lenders have an incentive to
make a large number of risky loans, which in turn sets the stage for high levels of mortgage defaults.
Compared to the US, Canada has maintained tighter conditions on government backstopped insurance against mortgage
default. The Bank Act requires all federally regulated institutions to purchase mortgage insurance on loans with down
payments of less than 20 percent (25 percent before 2007).
4 This mortgage insurance is explicitly backstopped by the
federal government, as the federal government guarantees the insurance provided both by the Canadian Mortgage and
Housing Corporation (CMHC) and its private market competitors.
5 All high loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages  (greater than
80 percent)  insured through this program must satisfy underwriting standards that specify maximum loan-to-value ratios,
maximum amortization periods, and minimum standards for credit worthiness and mortgage documentation. 
During the US housing boom, there was debate over relaxing these underwriting standards so as to allow Canadian
banks to offer products such as interest-only loans and longer amortization periods. However, standards were only
gradually relaxed to allow some forms of interest-only mortgages and longer amortization periods between 2003 and
2006. Subsequently, underwriting standards were tightened in July 2008, and again in April of this year. As a result, the
government-backed insurance program has a small exposure to higher-risk loans. 
In contrast to Canada, prior to 2007, the US government directly guaranteed a small fraction of high LTV loans,
primarily through the Federal Housing Authority (FHA). However, the US government indirectly provided insurance against
default risk to a large fraction of risky high LTV loans through the Federal National Mortgage (Fannie Mae) and the Federal
Home Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), which purchased and guaranteed large groups of mortgages. These
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) were viewed as having an implicit government guarantee to make good on
INDEPENDENT REASONED RELEVANT
| 2 e-brief
3 Interest-only mortgages grew from 2 percent of US mortgage originations in 2004 to 18 percent in 2006, while the market share of
option ARMs (negative-amortization mortgages) rose from 5 to 9 percent of originations (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2010). 
4 Non-federally regulated institutions such as credit unions can also participate in the program, provided they meet the underwriting
standards. Non-bank institutions can provide mortgage products (such as interest-only loans) that are not eligible for government-backed
insurance.
5 The federal government is ultimately responsible for the obligations of the CMHC because of its status as a Crown corporation. The
federal government also explicitly backs private mortgage insurers in the event that they could not meet their obligations to lenders,
subject to a maximum of 90 percent of the original principal amount of a loan. e-brief /3
INDEPENDENT REASONED RELEVANT
mortgage-backed securities they guaranteed or owned. This implicit guarantee became explicit when the US government
placed both institutions into conservatorship in September 2008. Both of these GSEs lowered underwriting standards
before and during the US housing boom, becoming willing to purchase and guarantee mortgage-backed securities based
on interest-only loans and negative amortization loans. One recent estimate is that the large portfolios of Fannie and
Freddie and the FHA helped finance over 50 percent of subprime lending during the US housing boom (Pinto 2009). 
The private-sector suppliers of insurance against mortgage defaults in the US also accommodated lower underwriting
standards. Although mortgage insurance is typically not required on private mortgages in the US, some form of insurance
against default is generally sought by lenders, especially for securitized loans. By providing guarantees against mortgage-
backed securities, private monoline insurers (such as Ambac Assurance and MBIA) effectively provided a significant
amount of  insurance against the risk of mortgage default, especially in the Alt-A loan (i.e., riskier than prime but less risky
than subprime) and non-conforming loan segments. Ultimately, several of these monoline insurers essentially defaulted on
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
US Canada
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Figure 1: House Prices in Canada and the US
Source:  The US series is the Case-Shiller 20 city composite. The Canadian series is the Teranet-National Bank 6 city composite. The value of each 
series is normalized to 100 at January 2000.part of these insurance liabilities.     
These differences in government regulation and provision of mortgage default insurance are important, both in
understanding the US housing market crash and the risks facing the Canadian housing market.
6 During the US housing
boom, both private insurers and government-sponsored enterprises facilitated looser underwriting standards by increasing
their exposure to high-risk mortgage products such as low-documentation, interest-only and adjustable rate mortgages.
This build-up was a key factor in the US housing market crash, since when house price appreciation slowed (and then
reversed) many borrowers found themselves unable to meet their monthly mortgage bills or to rely on higher prices to
refinance. The resulting rapid rise in foreclosures, in turn, seems to have played a role in driving the large decline in US
house prices since 2006.
7
This difference in government policy has helped to discourage the build-up in Canada of a large number of high-risk
mortgage loans. In addition, the US crisis has made it more costly for many non-bank lenders to raise funds. As a result,
many of these non-bank lenders have ceased to underwrite subprime loans in Canada. The small number of high-risk loans
underwritten suggests that the modest decline in Canadian house prices predicted for 2011 (TD Economics 2010) is very
unlikely to trigger a US-style surge in foreclosures.
Conclusion
Canadian housing policies, which avoided the sharp decline in underwriting standards seen in the US, worked well in
reducing the possibility of a housing bust in Canada during 2008-2009, and continue to mitigate the risk of a massive wave
of defaults in the future. To the extent that  current policies impose on taxpayers a significant exposure to mortgage
insurance guarantees and, therefore, some of the aggregate risk of a decline in housing prices, it will be in the interest of all
Canadians if policymakers recall the lessons of the 2008-2009 experience should pressures to relax underwriting standards
reoccur in the future.
INDEPENDENT REASONED RELEVANT
| 4 e-brief
6 A frequently cited difference that potentially also lowers the risk of a US-style housing market crash in Canada is the difference in the tax
treatment of mortgage interest (whether mortgage interest is tax deductible). Unlike in Canada, mortgage interest is tax deductible in the
US. A common argument is that by lowering the after-tax cost of mortgage debt, mortgage-interest deductibility leads to higher loan-to-
value ratios in the US since paying down mortgage debt is less attractive. Moreover, mortgage-interest deductibility may make some
mortgage products, such as interest-only mortgages, relatively more attractive. However, there are two reasons to suspect that mortgage-
interest deductibility may not have been a major factor in the US housing boom and bust. First, the different tax treatment of mortgage
interest predates the recent housing boom and bust, and by itself should have a level, not a growth rate effect (i.e., it should have been
capitalized in the level of house prices before the house-price boom). Secondly, the difference in mortgage-interest deductibility only
matters for a subset of borrowers:  mainly low net worth households with sufficiently high income to make itemization worthwhile.
Many (mainly lower and lower middle income) US households find that it is not worth itemizing – in which case they receive the same
tax treatment as Canadian borrowers. Moreover, as Gervais and Pandey (2008) point out, households with sufficiently high net worth in
Canada can effectively replicate the tax effects of mortgage interest deductibility by re-organizing their portfolios, since interest on
investment loans secured by housing equity is tax deductible. 
7 Another common argument is that legal differences make defaulting on mortgage debt more costly in Canada than in the US. Central to
this view is the question of whether lenders have recourse to pursue a borrower who defaults for the difference between the mortgage
balance and the sale price of a foreclosed home (referred to as deficiency judgments). In some US states (notably California and Arizona),
deficiency judgments on principal mortgages are not permitted, while in most Canadian provinces lenders can pursue deficiency
judgments. There is evidence that differences across US states in the availability of deficiency judgments, as well as the cost of foreclosure,
matter for mortgage default decisions, especially for higher income (and net worth) households (Ghent and Kudlyak 2009). However,
many US states (including Florida and Nevada) that permit deficiency judgments also experienced a housing boom and bust, along with
high levels of foreclosure. Overall, the cross-state evidence suggests that while differences in recourse do matter for housing markets, they
may not have played a key role in the US housing bust.This e-brief is a publication of the C.D. Howe Institute.
Jim MacGee is Associate Professor of Economics at The University of Western Ontario.
For more information call 416-865-1904.
This e-brief is available at www.cdhowe.org.
Permission is granted to reprint this text if the content is not altered and proper attribution is provided.
References
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. 2010. Preliminary Staff Report: The Mortgage Crisis.
http://www.fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/2010-0407-Preliminary_Staff_Report_-_Securitization_and_the_Mortgage_Crisis.pdf, 
accessed July 29, 2010.
Gervais, Martin, and Manish Pandey. 2008. “Who Cares about Mortgage Interest Deductibility?” Canadian Public Policy, 34(1): 
1-23, March.
Ghent, Andra, and Marianna Kudlyak. 2009. “Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default: Theory and Evidence from US States.” Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper 09-10.
MacGee, James. 2009. “Why Didn’t Canada’s Housing Market Go Bust?” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Commentary,
September.
Mortgage Architects. 2007. Comparing the Canadian and US subprime and alternative mortgage markets: Why the US subprime fallout is a US-
only phenomenon. http://files.newswire.ca/40/MASubprime.pdf, accessed: June 15, 2009.
Pinto, Edward. 2009. “High LTV, Subprime and Alt-A Originations Over the Period 1992-2007 and Fannie, Freddie, FHA and VA’s Role.”
http://www.aei.org/docLib/Pinto-High-LTV-Subprime-Alt-A.pdf, accessed July 28, 2010.
TD Economics. 2010. “Observation: Canada to Experience a Modest Home Price Correction in 2011.”
http://www.td.com/economics/special/pg0510_home_sales.pdf, accessed July 28, 2010.
Wolf, David D., and Carolyn Kwan. 2008. “The Tipping Point?” Merrill Lynch Canada, Economic Commentary, September.
INDEPENDENT REASONED RELEVANT
e-brief /5

Comparing the Canadian and US subprime and alternative mortgage markets: Why the US subprime fallout is a USonly phenomenon. http://files.newswire.ca/40/MASubprime.pdf, accessed:

Not Here? Housing Market Policy and the Risk of a Housing Bust

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