How to Defeat W\"{u}thrich’s Abysmal Embarrassment Argument against Space-Time Structuralism

In his 2009 PSA Recent Ph.D. Award winning contribution to the bi-annual PSA Conference at Pittsburgh in 2008, C. Wu ̈thrich mounted an argument against struc- turalism about space-time in the context of the General Theory of Relativity (GTR), to the effect that structuralists cannot discern space-time points. An “abysmal embarrass- ment” for the structuralist, Wu ̈thrich judged. Wu ̈thrich’s characterisation of space-time structuralism is however incorrect. We demonstrate how, on the basis of a correct char- acterisation of space-time structuralism, it is possible to discern space-time points in the GTR-structures under consideration. Thus Wu ̈thrich’s argument crumbles

The Insidiously Enchanted Forest

Essay Review of B.C. van Fraassen's *Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective* (2008

The Influence of Quantum Physics on Philosophy

We ponder the question whether quantum physics has had any influence on philosophy, and if not, whether it ought to have had any. Answers to these questions are provided, and they turn out to depend on which branch of the tree of philosophy we swing, sweep and sway, and even which twig of the branch we touch when we swing, sweep, sway

How to Defeat W\"{u}thrich’s Abysmal Embarrassment Argument against Space-Time Structuralism

In his 2009 PSA Recent Ph.D. Award winning contribution to the bi-annual PSA Conference at Pittsburgh in 2008, C. Wu ̈thrich mounted an argument against struc- turalism about space-time in the context of the General Theory of Relativity (GTR), to the effect that structuralists cannot discern space-time points. An “abysmal embarrass- ment” for the structuralist, Wu ̈thrich judged. Wu ̈thrich’s characterisation of space-time structuralism is however incorrect. We demonstrate how, on the basis of a correct char- acterisation of space-time structuralism, it is possible to discern space-time points in the GTR-structures under consideration. Thus Wu ̈thrich’s argument crumbles

The Insidiously Enchanted Forest

Essay Review of B.C. van Fraassen's *Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective* (2008

Withering away, weakly

One of the reasons provided for the shift away from an ontology for physical reality of material objects & properties towards one of physical structures & relations (Ontological Structural Realism: OntSR) is that the quantum-mechanical description of composite physical systems of similar elementary particles entails they are indiscernible. As material objects, they 'whither away', and when they wither away, structures emerge in their stead. We inquire into the question whether recent results establishing the weak discernibility of elementary particles pose a threat for this quantum-mechanical reason for OntSR, because precisely their newly discovered discernibility prevents them from 'whithering away'. We argue there is a straightforward manner to consider the recent results as a reason in favour of OntSR rather than against it

The Case against Factorism

We discuss the case against Factorism, which is the standard assumption in quantum mechanics that the labels of the ⊗-factor Hilbert-spaces in direct-product Hilbert-spaces of composite physical systems of similar particles refer to particles, either directly or descriptively. We distinguish different versions of Factorism and argue for their truth or falsehood. In particular, by introducing the concepts of snapshot Hilbert-space and Schrödinger- movie, we demonstrate that there are Hilbert-spaces and ⊗-factorisations where the labels do refer, even descriptively, to similar particles, which renders them probabilistically absolutely discernibl

Six Measurement Problems of Quantum Mechanics

The notorious ‘measurement problem’ has been roving around quantum mechanics for nearly a century since its inception, and has given rise to a variety of ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics, which are meant to evade it. We argue that no less than six problems need to be distinguished, and that several of them classify as different types of problems. One of them is what traditionally is called ‘the measurement problem’. Another of them has nothing to do with measurements but is a profound metaphysical problem. We also analyse critically T. Maudlin’s (1995) well-known statement of ‘three measurements problems’, and the clash of the views of H. Brown (1986) and H. Stein (1997) on one of the six meansurement problems. Finally, we summarise a solution to one measurement problem which has been largely ignored but tatictly if not explicitly acknowledged

Six Measurement Problems of Quantum Mechanics

The notorious ‘measurement problem’ has been roving around quantum mechanics for nearly a century since its inception, and has given rise to a variety of ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics, which are meant to evade it. We argue that no less than six problems need to be distinguished, and that several of them classify as different types of problems. One of them is what traditionally is called ‘the measurement problem’. Another of them has nothing to do with measurements but is a profound metaphysical problem. We also analyse critically T. Maudlin’s (1995) well-known statement of ‘three measurements problems’, and the clash of the views of H. Brown (1986) and H. Stein (1997) on one of the six meansurement problems. Finally, we summarise a solution to one measurement problem which has been largely ignored but tatictly if not explicitly acknowledged