Science in Social Practice

This paper represents the text for the Annual Phi Beta Kappa address given at the University of Kansas on Friday evening, March 3, 1911, under the announced title of "Science in Social Practice.

Beyond words: Aesthetic knowledge and knowing in design

Aesthetic knowledge comes from practitioners understanding the look, feel, smell, taste and sound of things. It is vital to work in many organizational contexts. In this paper, we explore aesthetic knowledge and knowing in organizations through detailed observation of design work in the architectural practice Edward Cullinan Architects. Through our research, we explore aesthetic knowledge in the context of architectural work, we unpack what it is, how it is generated, and how it is applied in design projects, shared between practitioners and developed at the level of the organization. Our analysis suggests that aesthetic knowledge plays an important part in organizational practice, not only as the symbolic context for work, but as an integral part of the work that people do. It suggests that aesthetic reflexivity, which involves an opening up and questioning of what is known, is experienced as part of practice as well as a `time out' from practice

Products as Affective Modifiers of Identities

© The Author(s) 2015. Are salesclerks seen as better, more powerful, or more active when they drive Mustangs? What about entrepreneurs? What about driving a mid-sized car? Intuitively, we have ideas about these, but much of the research on the affective nature of products is on purchasing, desires, and self-fulfillment. Drawing on symbolic interactionism, we argue that people's association with products has some basis in the impression management of their identity. For this to occur, there must be some cultural consensus about the way that products modify identities. Drawing on affect control theory's (ACT) methodology and equations, we measure the goodness, powerfulness, and activeness of several products, identities, and the associated product-modified identities to explore how products function as affective modifiers of identities. We find consistent effects across several types of technology products, whereby products pull the modified identity in the direction of the products' affective qualities. Support is established for the ACT equations that predict how traits modify identities as also having utility for predicting how products modify identities. This suggests that the opening questions can be answered empirically by measuring cultural-specific sentiments of the identity and the product and by developing equations to predict the identity modification process

Il naturalismo culturale di Dewey

The essay focuses on John Dewey’s pragmatic naturalism in order to show that the relatively recent naturalizing trend in philosophy should be considered a historically and culturally situated restriction of other forms of naturalism. Dewey’s cultural naturalism is based on a strong continuity between nature and culture, assuming that human intelligent behaviour arises from already existing organic and environmental resources in an entirely contingent manner. This kind of naturalism does not involve physical reductionism: more complex interactions between organisms and their environment, such as human mental behaviour, are seen as innovative, in the sense that they produce forms of organization that, on the one hand, are not reducible to the simple association of pre-existing elements. On the other hand, innovative modes of interaction between human organisms and their naturally social environment have consequence on the natural world: they produce changes within it. The second part of the text presents Dewey’s non-substantive conception of the mind, which has its roots in the non-reversible consequences of the advent of highly communicative and linguistic interactions in the human world as well as in the possibility for human organism to reconsider analytically or reflectively their primarily holistic, qualitatively felt experiences.The essay focuses on John Dewey’s pragmatic naturalism in order to show that the relatively recent naturalizing trend in philosophy should be considered a historically and culturally situated restriction of other forms of naturalism. Dewey’s cultural naturalism is based on a strong continuity between nature and culture, assuming that human intelligent behaviour arises from already existing organic and environmental resources in an entirely contingent manner. This kind of naturalism does not involve physical reductionism: more complex interactions between organisms and their environment, such as human mental behaviour, are seen as innovative, in the sense that they produce forms of organization that, on the one hand, are not reducible to the simple association of pre-existing elements. On the other hand, innovative modes of interaction between human organisms and their naturally social environment have consequence on the natural world: they produce changes within it. The second part of the text presents Dewey’s non-substantive conception of the mind, which has its roots in the non-reversible consequences of the advent of highly communicative and linguistic interactions in the human world as well as in the possibility for human organism to reconsider analytically or reflectively their primarily holistic, qualitatively felt experiences