Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Negotiations

Theorists in all three major branches of deliberative theory have traditionally excluded from the concept of deliberation simple convergence to an outcome as well as any form of negotiation. In a major reformulation of the deliberative ideal, this paper argues that not only convergence but also incompletely theorized agreements, integrative negotiations, and fully cooperative distributive negotiations are valid forms of democratic deliberation. The analysis takes the absence of coercive power as the central feature of the “regulative ideal” of deliberation (a regulative ideal being a standard, admittedly impossible to achieve fully, toward which to strive). In their ideal forms, these four methods of achieving agreement do not involve coercive power. In the ideal, therefore, they are fully deliberative forms of negotiation. Democracies also need non-deliberative forms of negotiation and decision, which should be judged on other criteria, including the degree to which the parties involve exercise equal power

`Representing and Being Represented in Turn’ - A Symposium on Hélène Landemore’s "Open Democracy"

Hélene Landemore’s Open Democracy challenges today’s democracies to meet their legitimacy deficits by opening up a wide array of participatory opportunities, from enhanced forms of direct democracy, to internet crowdsourcing, to representation through random selection to a citizens’ assembly: “representing and being represented in turn” (p. xvii).  Her aim: to replace citizen consent with citizen power.  The critics advance both praise and misgivings.  Joshua Cohen asks if Landemore's innovations are best understood as supplements or alternatives to the current system. Daniele Cammack argues for the significance of open mass meetings as well as smaller representative bodies. Peter Stone considers citizens’ assemblies inadequate for popular sovereignty.  Christopher Achen warns of problems in accurate representation, through both self-selection into the lottery and domination in the discussion. Ethan Lieb argues that particular innovations are useful only in some contexts, and that in each citizens should learn their appropriate role responsibilities. Landemore responds by agreeing, clarifying and rebutting

The Politics of Environmental Dispute Resolution

Also PCMA Working Paper #17.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/51148/1/380.pd

Beyond Environmental Regulatory Fragmentation: Signs of Integration in the Case of the Great Lakes Basin

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/72007/1/j.1468-0491.1995.tb00197.x.pd

The problem of constitutional legitimation: what the debate on electoral quotas tells us about the legitimacy of decision-making rules in constitutional choice

Proponents of electoral quotas have a ‘dependent interpretation’ of democracy, i.e. they have formed an opinion on which decision-making rules are fair on the basis of their prior approval of the outcomes these rules are likely to generate. The article argues that this position causes an irresolvable problem for constitutional processes that seek to legitimately enact institutional change. While constitutional revision governed by formal equality allows the introduction of electoral quotas, this avenue is normatively untenable for proponents of affirmative action if they are consistent with their claim that formal equality reproduces biases and power asymmetries at all levels of decision-making. Their critique raises a fundamental challenge to the constitutional revision rule itself as equally unfair. Without consensus on the decision-making process by which new post-constitutional rules can be legitimately enacted, procedural fairness becomes an issue impossible to resolve at the stage of constitutional choice. This problem of legitimation affects all instances of constitutional choice in which there are opposing views not only about the desired outcome of the process but also about the decision-making rules that govern constitutional choice