T-Wise Balanced Designs from Binary Hamming Codes

Abstract. I

INTEGRATED DYNAMIC PRICING FOR SEASONAL PRODUCTS WITH PRICE AND TIME DEPENDENT DEMAND

In this paper, an inventory model for deteriorating items with ramp-type time and price dependent consumption rate over a finite planning horizon is considered. In contrast to the traditional deterministic inventory model with static price over the entire planning horizon or fixed number of price changes over the finite time horizon, an alternative model is derived in which prices and the number of price change are to be decision variables. We show that the total profit function is concave. With the concavity, a solution procedure is presented to determine optimal prices, optimal number of pricing cycles and optimal lot size and optimal profit. We illustrate the model with numerical examples. Sensitivity analysis of the model is also carried out.Inventory, deterioration, pricing, time and price dependent ramp-type demand

Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-pricesensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models

Supply chain coordination under stock- and price-dependent selling rates under declining market

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models