Exploring Web-Based University Policy Statements on Plagiarism by Research-Intensive Higher Education Institutions

Plagiarism may distress universities in the US, but there is little agreement as to exactly what constitutes plagiarism. While there is ample research on plagiarism, there is scant literature on the content of university policies regarding it. Using a systematic sample, we qualitatively analyzed 20 Carnegie-classified universities that are “Very High in Research.” This included 15 public state universities and five high-profile private universities. We uncovered highly varied and even contradictory policies at these institutions. Notable policy variations existed for verbatim plagiarism, intentional plagiarism and unauthorized student collaboration at the studied institutions. We conclude by advising that the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the American Association of Colleges and Universities (AACU) and others confer and come to accord on the disposition of these issues

State owned enterprises as bribe payers: the role of institutional environment

Our paper draws attention to a neglected channel of corruption—the bribe payments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is an important phenomenon as bribe payments by SOEs fruitlessly waste national resources, compromising public welfare and national prosperity. Using a large dataset of 30,249 firms from 50 countries, we show that, in general, SOEs are less likely to pay bribes for achieving organizational objectives owing to their political connectivity. However, in deteriorated institutional environments, SOEs may be subjected to potential managerial rent-seeking behaviors, which disproportionately increase SOE bribe propensity relative to privately owned enterprises. Specifically, our findings highlight the importance of fostering democracy and rule of law, reducing prevalence of corruption and shortening power distance in reducing the incidence of SOE bribery

Firms’ crimes and land use in Italy. An exploratory data analysis

The aim of this analysis is a preliminary understanding of the firms’ illegal land-use dynamics. The paper empirically substantiates whether the firm’s illegal behavior and a set of macro and micro factors can lead to different degree of illegal land use expressed in term of m2. Through a unique data collection drawn from 342 judgments of the Italian court of cassation over the last six years a robust regression with M-estimation was carried out. Findings are interpreted with the idea that any illegal firms’ choice is oriented by a cost/benefit analysis both in case of legal firms and mafia-type organization. Thus the cost of detections as well as the benefits tied to the illegal business are emphasized. Finally, this is a preliminary analysis that has been conducted thanks to the members’ contribution of the Observatory of the territorial development (University of Salerno)