A Logic for Knowledge Flow in Social Networks

In this paper, we develop a formal framework for analysing the flow of information and knowledge through social networks. Specifically, we propose a multi-agent epistemic logic in which we can represent and reason about communicative actions based on social networks and the resulting knowledge and ignorance of agents. We apply this logic to formally analyse the "Revolt or Stay-at-home" problem known from the literature, where social networks play an important role in agents' knowledge acquisition and decision-making. We evaluate our work by proving some mathematical properties of our new logic, including the fact that it generalises the existing Logic of Public Announcement

Conservative Stable Standards of Behavior and φ-Stable Sets

Within Luo’s (2001, J. Math. Econ. 36, 95–109) framework of a general system, I establish an equivalence theorem for the conservative stable standard of behavior (CSSB for short) developed by J. Greenberg (“The Theory of Social Situation: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach,â€\x9D Cambridge University Press, 1990). It is shown that a standard of behavior for a situation is a CSSB if, and only if, its graph is a φ-stable set for the associated general system. Copyright Springer 2006social situations, CSSBs, general systems, φ-stable sets, C70,

Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency

Sequential rationality, Subgame consistency, Stable sets, SSE, C70, C72,