Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games

This paper considers an economy with a single private and a single public good, where the preferences of the agents are common knowledge but initial endowments of the population are unknown. The public good is produced by the initial endowments of the agents. We ask what happens if a 'Lindahl government' (endowment pretension mechanism) is instituted, which directly asks the agents to reveal their initial endowments. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the allocations which would be obtained by this method at undominated Cournot (Nash) equilibria, and we determine when these allocations coincide with the allocations at a voluntary contributions equilibrium.Boğaziçi ÜniversitesiA preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Seminar in Economic Design, April, 1994, Boğaziçi University, and at the 17th Bosphorus Workshop on Economic Design, August 1994. We benefited from useful comments of Ahmet Alkan, Semih Koray and Muhamet Yıldız. We would also like to thank two anonymous referees whose comments helped to improve the paper. Remzi Sanver also thanks the Boğaziçi University Foundation (BUVAK) which supported his research

Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes

Let A be a set of alternatives whose power set is A. Elements of A are interpreted as non-resolute outcomes. We consider the aggregation of preference profiles over A into a (social) preference over A. In case we allow individuals to have any complete and transitive preference over A, Arrow's impossibility theorem naturally applies. However, the Arrovian impossibility prevails, even when the set of admissible preferences over A is severely restricted. In fact, we identify a mild "regularity" condition which ensures the dictatoriality of a domain. Regularity is compatible with almost all standard extension axioms of the literature. Thus, we interpret our results as the strong prevalence of Arrow's impossibility theorem in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes. © 2007 Springer-Verlag

Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity [2-s2.0-85028263989]

We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules. Although the literature has established their logical independence, we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would suggest. Our analysis is made both under variable and fixed-size electorates. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.We acknowledge financial support from the ANR-14-CE24-0007-01 CoCoRICo-CoDec and from LAMSADE (Pôle 1). We also thank the associate editor and the referees for insightful comments that upgraded the quality of this work and the audiences at the Paris School of Economics and at the 13th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Lund, where this paper was presented for their suggestions

Consensus in preference-approvals: A weighted distance approach

Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK-CEN);Ghent University10th International Fuzzy Logic and Intelligent Technologies inNuclear Science Conference, FLINS 2012 -- 26 August 2012 through 29 August 2012 -- Istanbul -- 102034Measuring consensus level for a set of preferences requires a proper distance defined on the considered domain. We focus on preference-approvals which are extensions of ordinal preferences by the approval information. For any given set of alternatives, a preference-approval is defined by a weak ordering of the alternative set, subsets of approved and disapproved alternatives and a consistency condition. We propose a method of using weighted distances for ordering and approval components. A consensus measure based on this distance is provided which is sensitive to the position of the disagreements on ordering and approval

The Manipulability of Matching Rules via Segmentation

Matching, Endowments, Segmentation, C78,

Strategy-Proof Location Functions on Finite Graphs

Dedication This paper is dedicated to our friend and colleague Boris Mirkin on the occasion of his 70th birthday. A location function on a finite graph takes a set of most preferred locations (vertices of the graph) for a set of users, and returns a set of locations satisfying conditions meant to please the entire user set as much as possible. A strategyproof location function is one for which it never benefits a user to report a suboptimal preferred location. We introduce four versions of strategy-proof and prove some preliminary results focusing on two well-known location functions, the median and the center.

Choosers as extension axioms

Preferences over sets, Non-resolute outcomes,