The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law

According to the doctrine of State sovereignty each State has the right to exercise its jurisdiction over crimes committed in its territory-known as the territoriality principle. Even if the crimes committed are of a type that affects the international community as a whole, States are often hesitant to have their own nationals tried by an international judicial organ. History demonstrates that States rarely waived this right, which is inherent to their sovereignties, and did not rely exclusively on international justice. Rather they always preferred to exercise their jurisdiction exclusively, and only occasionally, when coerced by special circumstances, have they accepted international intervention. In order to create an international criminal court to punish grave crimes of an international character, this historical obstacle had to be overcome. The compromise reached is the principle of complementarity. This principle requires the existence of both national and international criminal justice functioning in a subsidiary manner for the repression of crimes of international law. When the former fails to do so, the latter intervenes and ensures that perpetrators do not go unpunished

The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law

According to the doctrine of State sovereignty each State has the right to exercise its jurisdiction over crimes committed in its territory-known as the territoriality principle. Even if the crimes committed are of a type that affects the international community as a whole, States are often hesitant to have their own nationals tried by an international judicial organ. History demonstrates that States rarely waived this right, which is inherent to their sovereignties, and did not rely exclusively on international justice. Rather they always preferred to exercise their jurisdiction exclusively, and only occasionally, when coerced by special circumstances, have they accepted international intervention. In order to create an international criminal court to punish grave crimes of an international character, this historical obstacle had to be overcome. The compromise reached is the principle of complementarity. This principle requires the existence of both national and international criminal justice functioning in a subsidiary manner for the repression of crimes of international law. When the former fails to do so, the latter intervenes and ensures that perpetrators do not go unpunished

The ECHR and States of Emergency: Article 15 - A Domestic Power of Derogation from Human Rights Obligations

This study is divided into two sections. The first section is further divided into two subsections. The first subsection examines the problems in defining emergencies; in the second subsection, we will examine the preconditions required for a valid derogation. The second section determines the Strasbourg machinery for the protection of human rights. This section is also divided into four subsections. Each subsection examines separate case laws from the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, a conclusion will be deduced in the light of the former reviews

The International Criminal Court and complementarity: five years on

Introduces papers given at a September 2006 symposium in Vienna concerning the International Criminal Court's approach to the principles of gravity and complementarity. Highlights the importance of the court's practices for the future development of international criminal law

Revisión de la jurisdicción ad hoc de la Corte Penal Internacional

Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which allows a state that is not a party to the Statute to 'accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court' by way of a declaration lodged with the registrar, is one of the Statute's most inconspicuous provisions. It has attracted only brief notice either in the general literature on the jurisdiction of the ICC' or in the particular context of the debate over U.S. objections to the Court's third-party jurisdiction.2 Few writers have looked closely at the provision's construction and procedural regime, and the first declaration made by a state under this provision-by the Ivory Coast in February 2005-has gone almost unnoticed in international theory and practice.3 Within abroader context, legal scholars have expressed doubts about the effectiveness ofthe Court's jurisdiction under Article 12 of the Statute ('Preconditions to the Exercise ofJurisdiction'). Critics of the jurisdictional regime agreed upon in Rome voiced the concern that the Court would be largely unable to deal with some of the most egregious crimes committed in conflict zones-owing to a presumed reluctance of territorial states either to become partiesto the Statute or to trigger the Court's jurisdiction. It was feared, in particular, that the Statute 'gives undue shelter to the very civil war conflicts that were the moral impetus for the negotiation of a Rome Treaty'; not only would a 'genocidaire leader' refuse to 'agree to ad hocjurisdiction for crimes committed against his own people,' but there would 'not be consent from the state where the offence occurred, or the state of nationality of the offender.'4 These fears have not been borne out by experience. The ICC Statute has received a growing number of ratifications from conflict or postconflict societies over the last few years.5 The Court's firsthree situations (Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic, in that order) were submitted to it by self-referral under Articles 13(a) and 14.6 Moreover, the first declaration under Article 12(3) was lodged by a state that is not party to the Statute but suffers from civil strife and internal conflict