Policy and Practice Brief: Funding of Assistive Technology to Make Work a Reality

This brief provides a definition of assistive technology and a discussion of funding sources for assistive technology including: public schools; state vocational rehabilitation agencies; Medicaid; Medicare; and, SSA’s Plan for Achieving Self Support. Eligibility is reviewed for each along with other protections and rights

Review of “Jurisdictional” Issues Under the Bumpers Amendment

The proposed Bumpers Amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act would encourage courts to be less deferential than they have previously been toward federal agencies\u27 views on issues of law. With regard to jurisdictional questions, the amendment would go further: it would invite courts not only to assert their independence, but also to disfavor agencies\u27 positions. Professor Levin regards this special rule of construction for jurisdictional questions as an attempt to achieve deregulation through judicial review. He criticizes this strategy as poorly conceived and calls attention to several weaknesses in the draftsmanship of the jurisdiction provision

Policy and Practice Brief: The Transition from School to Work; The Special Education and State Vocational Rehabilitation Systems’ Obligations to Prepare Students with Disabilities for the World of Work

This brief provides an overview of the transition requirements outlined in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Reviewed are concepts of free appropriate public education, least restrictive environment; individual education programs; and, due process. The brief provides an illustrated case study along with a discussion of how special education and vocational rehabilitation intersect

Policy and Practice Brief: Funding of Assistive Technology to Make Work a Reality, Part II; Using the Americans with Disabilities Act to Fund AT

This article is a continuation of “Funding Assistive Technology to Make Work a Reality” (Policy and Practice Brief #3). This brief reviews the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) with a particular emphasis on how the ADA can be used to ensure that a person with a disability has access to needed assistive technology to do their job, or to ensure the individual has access to the job site

Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory

Potential bidders respond to a seller's choice of auction mechanism for a common-value or affiliated-values asset by endogenous decisions whether to incur a participation cost (and observe a private signal), or forego competing. Privately informed participants decide whether to incur a bid-preparation cost and pay an entry fee, or cease competing. Auction rules and information flows are quite general; participation decisions may be simultaneous or sequential. The resulting revenue identity for any auction mechanism implies that optimal auctions are allocatively efficient; a nontrivial reserve price is revenue-inferior for any common-value auction. Optimal auctions are otherwise contentless: any auction that sells without reserve becomes optimal by adjusting any one of the continuous, spanning parameters, e.g., the entry fee. Seller.s surplus-extracting tools are now substitutes, not complements. Many econometric studies of auction markets are seen to be flawed in their identification of the number of bidders.Optimal Auctions, Endegenous Bidder Participation, Affiliated-Values, Common-Value Auctions, Surplus-Extracting Devices

Endogenous Competition Alters the Structure of Optimal Auctions

Potential bidders respond to a sellerfs choice of auction mechanism for a common-value or affiliated-values asset by endogenous decisions whether to incur an information-acquisition cost (and observe a private estimate), or forgo competing. Privately informed participants decide whether to incur a bid-preparation cost and pay an entry fee, or cease competing. Auction rules and information flows are quite general; participation decisions may be simultaneous or sequential. The resulting revenue identity for any auction mechanism implies that optimal auctions are allocatively efficient; a nontrivial reserve price is revenue-inferior. Optimal auctions are otherwise contentless: any auction that sells without reserve becomes optimal by adjusting any one of the continuous, spanning parameters, e.g., the entry fee. Sellerfs surplus-extracting tools are now substitutes, not complements. Many econometric studies of auction markets are seen to be flawed in their identification of the number of bidders.