73 research outputs found
Generic Modal Cut Elimination Applied to Conditional Logics
We develop a general criterion for cut elimination in sequent calculi for
propositional modal logics, which rests on absorption of cut, contraction,
weakening and inversion by the purely modal part of the rule system. Our
criterion applies also to a wide variety of logics outside the realm of normal
modal logic. We give extensive example instantiations of our framework to
various conditional logics. For these, we obtain fully internalised calculi
which are substantially simpler than those known in the literature, along with
leaner proofs of cut elimination and complexity. In one case, conditional logic
with modus ponens and conditional excluded middle, cut elimination and
complexity were explicitly stated as open in the literature
Substitution in a sense
The Reference Principle (RP) states that co-referring expressions are everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. On first glance, (RP) looks like a truism, but a truism with some bite: (RP) transforms difficult philosophical questions about co-reference into easy grammatical questions about substitutability. This has led a number of philosophers to think that we can use (RP) to make short work of certain longstanding metaphysical debates. For example, it has been suggested that all we need to do to show that the predicate ‘( ) is a horse’ does not refer to a property is point out that ‘( ) is a horse’ and ‘the property of being a horse’ are not everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. However, when we understand ‘substitution’ in the simplest and most straightforward way, (RP) is no truism; in fact, natural languages are full of counterexamples to the principle. In this paper, I introduce a new notion of substitution, and then develop and argue for a version of (RP) that is immune to these counterexamples. Along the way I touch on the following topics: the relation between argument forms and their natural language instances; the reification of sense; the difference between terms and predicates; and the relation between reference and disquotation. I end by arguing that my new version of (RP) cannot be used to settle metaphysical debates quite as easily as some philosophers would like
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