Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView

Integrating evidence, politics and society: a methodology for the science–policy interface

There is currently intense debate over expertise, evidence and ‘post-truth’ politics, and how this is influencing policy formulation and implementation. In this article, we put forward a methodology for evidence-based policy making intended as a way of helping navigate this web of complexity. Starting from the premise of why it is so crucial that policies to meet major global challenges use scientific evidence, we discuss the socio-political difficulties and complexities that hinder this process. We discuss the necessity of embracing a broader view of what constitutes evidence—science and the evaluation of scientific evidence cannot be divorced from the political, cultural and social debate that inevitably and justifiably surrounds these major issues. As a pre-requisite for effective policy making, we propose a methodology that fully integrates scientific investigation with political debate and social discourse. We describe a rigorous process of mapping, analysis, visualisation and sharing of evidence, constructed from integrating science and social science data. This would then be followed by transparent evidence evaluation, combining independent assessment to test the validity and completeness of the evidence with deliberation to discover how the evidence is perceived, misunderstood or ignored. We outline the opportunities and the problems derived from the use of digital communications, including social media, in this methodology, and emphasise the power of creative and innovative evidence visualisation and sharing in shaping policy

Statistical mechanics of voting

Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as `chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system from the agents' preferences and a voting rule. The dynamics form a one dimensional statistical mechanics model; this suggests the use of the topological entropy to quantify the complexity of the system. We formulate natural political/social questions about the expected complexity of a voting rule and degree of cohesion/diversity among agents in terms of random matrix models---ensembles of statistical mechanics models---and compute quantitative answers in some representative cases.Comment: 9 pages, plain TeX, 2 PostScript figures included with epsf.tex (ignore the under/overfull \vbox error messages

The Complexity of Computing Minimal Unidirectional Covering Sets

Given a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives, a common thread in the social sciences is to identify subsets of alternatives that satisfy certain notions of stability. Examples can be found in areas as diverse as voting theory, game theory, and argumentation theory. Brandt and Fischer [BF08] proved that it is NP-hard to decide whether an alternative is contained in some inclusion-minimal upward or downward covering set. For both problems, we raise this lower bound to the Theta_{2}^{p} level of the polynomial hierarchy and provide a Sigma_{2}^{p} upper bound. Relatedly, we show that a variety of other natural problems regarding minimal or minimum-size covering sets are hard or complete for either of NP, coNP, and Theta_{2}^{p}. An important consequence of our results is that neither minimal upward nor minimal downward covering sets (even when guaranteed to exist) can be computed in polynomial time unless P=NP. This sharply contrasts with Brandt and Fischer's result that minimal bidirectional covering sets (i.e., sets that are both minimal upward and minimal downward covering sets) are polynomial-time computable.Comment: 27 pages, 7 figure

An "exception culturelle"? French Sensationist political economy and the shaping of public economics

International audienceThis paper examines some ideas developed in the field of public economics by French Sensationist political economists, from Turgot and Condorcet to the young Jean-Baptiste Say. An ideal-typical account of their position is based on the fact that issues raised by public expenditure and revenue are not dealt with independently. Instead, a strong link between the two sides of the budget is emphasised, an approach arising out of political considerations concerning human rights and equity. Following on from this they develop a theory of public expenditure based on public goods -- national and local -- and externalities, and a theory of taxation culminating in a justification of progressive taxation. The central section of the paper forms a kind of pivotal point in the analysis, showing how the above political and ethical requirements of the theory lead to the first estimation of the optimal amount of public expenditure and revenue -- involving an equilibrium at the margin