Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy: determinants and outcomes. An empirical study into the risks and payoffs of communicating corporate strategy.

Business leaders increasingly face pressure from stakeholders to be transparent. There appears however little consensus on the risks and payoffs of disclosing vital information such as corporate strategy. To fill this gap, this study analyzes firm-specific determinants and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Stakeholder theory and agency theory help to understand whether companies serve their interest to engage with stakeholders and overcome information asymmetries. I connect these theories and propose a comprehensive approach to measure voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Hypotheses from the theoretical framework are empirically tested through panel regression of data on identified determinants and outcomes and of disclosed strategy through annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports, corporate websites and corporate press releases by the 70 largest publicly listed companies in the Netherlands from 2003 through 2008. I found that industry, profitability, dual-listing status, national ranking status and listing age have significant effects on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effects are found for size, leverage and ownership concentration. On outcomes, I found that liquidity of stock and corporate reputation are significantly influenced by voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effect is found for volatility of stock. My contributions to theory, methodology and empirics offers a stepping-stone for further research into understanding how companies can use transparency to manage stakeholder relations

Can Managers Appraise Performance Too Often?

This paper discusses the relationship between the frequency of performance appraisal and escalation of commitment to a losing course of action. It is commonly thought that the more often employees are appraised, the more effective they become. Contrary to this view, we discuss conditions that cause employees, particularly project managers responsible for capital budgeting decisions, to stick with decisions that have been shown to result in negative consequences for the company. We report the results of a set of work place simulations where the frequency of performance appraisal affected the length of commitment to losing courses of action as well as the managers perceptions about their personal benefits resulting from those decisions. The results suggest that frequent performance appraisals during the course of long-term projects may divert managers from the profit maximization goal sought by the owners of the firm

On the Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Smoothing and the Value-Relevance of Earnings: The Case of Switzerland

This paper examines whether voluntary disclosure by Swiss firms constrains the use of discretionary accruals to smooth earnings, and explores the effect of voluntary disclosure on the value relevance of earnings. We focus on Swiss firms because Switzerland's financial reporting system provides managers with extensive discretion in corporate disclosure, and there are important variations in the level of information provided in their annual reports. We consider that managers can choose two different ways to voluntarily convey information, either through the quality and quantity of annual report disclosure or, through compliance with International Accounting Standards (IAS)/International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Relying on a simultaneous equations approach, our results suggest that Swiss firms use discretionary accruals to smooth earnings. However, this relation is reduced for firms that voluntarily disclose more information in their annual report or comply with IAS/IFRS or US GAAP. Moreover, we show that discretionary accruals of high disclosers or of firms voluntarily complying with IAS/IFRS or US GAAP receive a lower valuation weight.

Corporate Compliance with Non-Mandatory Statements of Best Practice: The Case of the ASB Statement on Interim Reports

This paper contributes to our understanding of compliance with non-mandatory statements of best practice. Specifically, we examine the efficacy of agency-related mechanisms on the degree of disclosure compliance with the ASB Statement on interim reports. Using data drawn from a sample of 259 UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, we show that although overall disclosure compliance is high (74.5% of the items of information being disclosed), companies do not fully comply with the ASB Statement on interim reports. We employ an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model to establish whether selected company-specific and corporate governance characteristics (proxying for agency-related mechanisms) are related to the degree of disclosure compliance. Our results indicate that multiple listing, company size, interim dividend and new share issuance are positively associated with the degree of compliance. We also find that the degree of disclosure compliance is positively associated with auditor involvement, audit committee independence and audit committee financial expertise. These results have important implications for policy because they suggest that whilst agency-related mechanisms may motivate compliance with best practice non-mandatory statements, full compliance may be unattainable without regulations.