Large-scale wind power in European electricity markets: Time for revisiting support schemes and market designs?

This paper questions whether current renewable support schemes and electricity market designs are well-suited to host a significant amount of wind energy. Our analysis aims at finding the right equilibrium between market signals received by wind generators and their intrinsic risks. More market signals are needed to give the right incentives for reducing wind integration costs but should not undermine the effectiveness of support schemes. Although several alternatives combining support schemes and market signals could improve the current situation in terms of market signals and risks, feed-in premium support scheme seems actually to be the more balanced option. Furthermore, an adequate sharing of wind generation technical responsibility between the system operator and wind power producers can help to control wind integration costs even in the absence of accurate market signals.Electricity Market Design Renewable Support Schemes Wind Power

An Institutional Frame to Compare Alternative Market Designs in EU Electricity Balancing

The so-called “electricity wholesale market” is, in fact, a sequence of several markets. The chain is closed with a provision for “balancing,” in which energy from all wholesale markets is balanced under the authority of the Transmission Grid Manager (TSO in Europe, ISO in the United States). In selecting the market design, engineers in the European Union have traditionally preferred the technical role of balancing mechanisms as “security mechanisms.” They favour using penalties to restrict the use of balancing energy by market actors. While our paper in no way disputes the importance of grid security, nor the competency of engineers to elaborate the technical rules, we wish to attract attention to the real economic consequences of alternative balancing designs. We propose a numerical simulation in the framework of a two-stage equilibrium model. This simulation allows us to compare the economic properties of designs currently existing within the European Union and to measure their fallout. It reveals that balancing designs, which are typically presented as simple variants on technical security, are in actuality alternative institutional frameworks having at least four potential economic consequences: a distortion of the forward price; an asymmetric shift in the participants’ profits; an increase in the System Operator’s revenues; and inefficiencies.Electricity Forward Market, Balancing Mechanism, Risk Aversion, Penalty, Institutional Frame, Market Design.

Generation adequacy and transmission interconnection in regional electricity markets

International audienceThe power system capacity adequacy has public good features that cannot be entirely solved by electricity markets. Regulatory intervention is then necessary and established methods have been used to assess adequacy and help regulators to fix this market failure. In regional electricity markets, transmission interconnections play an important role in contributing to adequacy. However, the adequacy problem and related policy are typically considered at a national level. This paper presents a simple model to study how the interconnection capacity interacts with generation adequacy. First results indicate that increasing interconnection capacity between systems improves adequacy up to a certain level; further increases do not procure additional adequacy improvements. Furthermore, besides adequacy improvement, increasing transmission capacity under asymmetric adequacy criteria or national system characteristics could create several concerns about externalities. These results imply that regional coordination of national adequacy policies is essential to internalise adequacy of cross-border effects. © 2009

Optimal wind power deployment in Europe-A portfolio approach

International audienceGeographic diversification of wind farms can smooth out the fluctuations in wind power generation and reduce the associated system balancing and reliability costs. The paper uses historical wind production data from five European countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and Spain) and applies the Mean-Variance Portfolio theory to identify cross-country portfolios that minimise the total variance of wind production for a given level of production. Theoretical unconstrained portfolios show that countries (Spain and Denmark) with the best wind resource or whose size contributes to smoothing out the country output variability dominate optimal portfolios. The methodology is then elaborated to derive optimal constrained portfolios taking into account national wind resource potential and transmission constraints and compare them with the projected portfolios for 2020. Such constraints limit the theoretical potential efficiency gains from geographical diversification, but there is still considerable room to improve performance from actual or projected portfolios. These results highlight the need for more cross-border interconnection capacity, for greater coordination of European renewable support policies, and for renewable support mechanisms and electricity market designs providing locational incentives. Under these conditions, a mechanism for renewables credits trading could help aligning wind power portfolios with the theoretically efficient geographic dispersion. © 2009 Elsevier Ltd