The Impact of the New York State Retail Milk Price Regulation on Farm-to-Retail Price Transmission and Supermarket Pricing Strategies in Metropolitan Fluid Milk Markets

The New York State Milk Price Gouging Law establishes that the retail prices of fluid milk products are not to exceed 200% of the prices that NYS milk processors pay for Class I milk. The enforcement of this law significantly affected the nature of the Class I fluid milk price transmission process and the milk pricing strategies of supermarkets in the five largest cities in New York State: New York City, Albany, Syracuse, Buffalo and Rochester. During the pre-law period, supermarkets used a retail price-stabilization strategy, as evidenced by asymmetric Class I fluid milk price transmission. In contrast, supermarkets use a retail profit stabilization strategy during the law period. This variation of retail milk price control actually creates an institutional environment that facilitates cooperative conduct of supermarkets, acting in an oligopolistic market environment, which caused greater instability in retail milk prices. Differences in the competitive environments of each city impact the effects of the statewide law.dairy, milk, price regulation, price transmission, asymmetric price response, food retailing, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Demand and Price Analysis, Industrial Organization, Marketing, Q11, Q13, Q18,

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF FREER TRADE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN DAIRY SECTORS: A SPATIAL ANALYSIS

International Relations/Trade,

An Application of Experimental Economics to Agricultural Policies: the Case of U.S. Dairy Deregulation on Farm-Level Markets

R.B. 97-11Current dairy regulations in the U.S. are the result of over 80 years of regulatory activities. Through the 1920s and 1930s the U.S. government passed various acts designed to increase the share of market surplus captured by sellers, which at the time was judged insufficient. Lately, budget constraints and commitments to freer trade agreement have let the government and some dairy sector leaders contemplate different levels of dairy deregulation. The elimination of the Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs), a cornerstone of U.S. dairy regulation, has emerged as a possibility. The thought of eliminating the FMMOs was particularly disturbing to milk producers because of uncertainty regarding what might happen to the farm price, the volume of raw milk supplied, market stability and price efficiency, and to the distribution of market surplus between dairy farmers and dairy processing plants. These particular questions have not been extensively studied before due to data availability problems. Data from the era prior to the establishment of FMMOs would be difficult to obtain, and probably not meaningful because FMMOs have been around since the late-1930s. Experimental economics is used to simulate U.S. dairy market conditions and the effect of the elimination of FMMOs. The experimental task is a simple 2 X 2 matrix laboratory game. The treatments are oligopsony and regulation. Perishability is represented by an advance production decision with no carry-over and is kept constant across the experiments. Experimental sessions comprised 12 periods and a practice period. Sellers made production decisions and received a pool price, while buyers made a price (bid) and quantity decision. The allocation of units produced is made by the monitor on a highest bid basis. The game is computer assisted. Experimental results indicate that, in the absence of regulation, buyers are successful in reducing market price below the perfectly competitive price and in capturing a larger share of market surplus than a competitive solution predicts. Regulation reduced the market power of buyers and the price fluctuation of raw milk, in an oligopsonistic market, and had no significant impact on the overall price efficiency of the market

Tariff-Rate Quotas : Difficult to model or plain simple?

The difficulty of reliably and accurately incorporating tariffrate quotas (TRQs) into trade models has received a lot of attention in recent years. As a result of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, TRQs replaced an assortment of tariff and nontariff instruments in an effort to standardise trade barriers, and facilitate their future liberalisation. Understanding the nuances of TRQs is now particularly crucial for New Zealand because of the preferential access arrangements that New Zealand has for a number of products in highly protected markets such as the European Union, Japan, and the United States. It has been argued that TRQs are complex instruments and are difficult to model because for any trade flow between two countries, one of three regimes may be applicable : 1. The import quota may not be binding and the within-quota tariff applies; 2. The quota may be binding, the within-quota tariff applies, and a quota rent is created; or 3. Trade occurs over and above the quota, in which case an over-quota tariff applies (although, even in this regime, someone is still able to collect the quota rent on within-quota trade). But even this characterisation, which many claim is too complex to model, is a major simplification of reality. Bilateral preferences are ubiquitous, and such preferences are usually included in the determination of multilateral market access quotas. It is usual, therefore, that the TRQ instrument has several tiers to the quota schedule, plus a number of within and over-quota tariff rates applicable on either a bilateral or a multilateral basis. Further trade liberalisation creates something of a dilemma for New Zealand. Any decrease in over-quota tariffs and/or increase in quota levels potentially reduces the value of quota rents, many of which accrue to New Zealand due to the bilateral preferences. It is important, therefore, that New Zealand trade negotiators understand how much additional trade is required to offset the loss of New Zealands quota rents. Modelling trade in the presence of TRQs is the only way to ascertain this knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to show that complex TRQs can be modelled very easily and precisely. The only catch is that the model must be formulated as a complementarity problem rather than the more conventional linear or nonlinear optimisation problem. The concept will be demonstrated using a simple 3-region, single commodity spatial price equilibrium model of trade.Tariff-rate quota, trade modelling, mathematical programming, complementarity

A reversible water-based electrostatic adhesive

\ua9 2023 The Authors. Angewandte Chemie International Edition published by Wiley-VCH GmbH. Commercial adhesives typically fall into two categories: structural or pressure sensitive. Structural glues rely on covalent bonds formed during curing and provide high tensile strength whilst pressure-sensitive adhesives use physical bonding to provide weaker adhesion, but with considerable convenience for the user. Here, a new class of adhesive is presented that is also reversible, with a bond strength intermediate between those of pressure-sensitive and structural adhesives. Complementary water-based formulations incorporating oppositely charged polyelectrolytes form electrostatic bonds that may be reversed through immersion in a low or high pH aqueous environment. This electrostatic adhesive has the advantageous property that it exhibits good adhesion to low-energy surfaces such as polypropylene. Furthermore, it is produced by the emulsion copolymerization of commodity materials, styrene and butyl acrylate, which makes it inexpensive and opens the possibility of industrial production. Bio-based materials have been also integrated into the formulations to further increase sustainability. Moreover, unlike other water-based glues, adhesion does not significantly degrade in humid environments. Because such electrostatic adhesives do not require mechanical detachment, they are appropriate for the large-scale recycling of, e.g., bottle labels or food packaging. The adhesive is also suitable for dismantling components in areas as varied as automotive parts and electronics

Analyzing the Impacts of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement on European-North American Dairy Trade Using a Joint-Input, Multi-Product Approach

Mathematical programming models, as typically formulated for international trade applications, may contain certain implied restrictions limiting price responsiveness, intermediate product flows, and arbitrage possibilities. These restrictions are especially important in the case of dairy, and may lead to results which are technically infeasible, or if feasible, not consistent with market equilibrating behavior. The difficulties encountered when modeling dairy trade are described, and an alternative formulation of a spatial model is presented. This formulation allows joint-inputs, multi-products, intermediate markets, and pure transshipment and product substitution forms of arbitrage

Regional Impact of Change in Dairy Trade Policies on the Northeast U.S. and Central Canada Dairy Sectors

Quebec, Ontario and the Northeast U.S. are expected to be important players in Canada-U.S. dairy trade. This study explores two dairy trade scenarios between Quebec, Ontario and the Northeast U.S. In simulation I, the U.S. is allowed to unilaterally export yogurt and frozen desserts to Canada, and simulation II reflects a total free trade environment. In both trade simulations, the Canadian farm milk value decreases significantly

1976 Base Data for the Dairy Market Policy Simulator

A.E. Res. 80-2