Estimating Ratios of Normalizing Constants Using Linked Importance Sampling

Ratios of normalizing constants for two distributions are needed in both Bayesian statistics, where they are used to compare models, and in statistical physics, where they correspond to differences in free energy. Two approaches have long been used to estimate ratios of normalizing constants. The `simple importance sampling' (SIS) or `free energy perturbation' method uses a sample drawn from just one of the two distributions. The `bridge sampling' or `acceptance ratio' estimate can be viewed as the ratio of two SIS estimates involving a bridge distribution. For both methods, difficult problems must be handled by introducing a sequence of intermediate distributions linking the two distributions of interest, with the final ratio of normalizing constants being estimated by the product of estimates of ratios for adjacent distributions in this sequence. Recently, work by Jarzynski, and independently by Neal, has shown how one can view such a product of estimates, each based on simple importance sampling using a single point, as an SIS estimate on an extended state space. This `Annealed Importance Sampling' (AIS) method produces an exactly unbiased estimate for the ratio of normalizing constants even when the Markov transitions used do not reach equilibrium. In this paper, I show how a corresponding `Linked Importance Sampling' (LIS) method can be constructed in which the estimates for individual ratios are similar to bridge sampling estimates. I show empirically that for some problems, LIS estimates are much more accurate than AIS estimates found using the same computation time, although for other problems the two methods have similar performance. Linked sampling methods similar to LIS are useful for other purposes as well

Puzzles of Anthropic Reasoning Resolved Using Full Non-indexical Conditioning

I consider the puzzles arising from four interrelated problems involving `anthropic' reasoning, and in particular the `Self-Sampling Assumption' (SSA) - that one should reason as if one were randomly chosen from the set of all observers in a suitable reference class. The problem of Freak Observers might appear to force acceptance of SSA if any empirical evidence is to be credited. The Sleeping Beauty problem arguably shows that one should also accept the `Self-Indication Assumption' (SIA) - that one should take one's own existence as evidence that the number of observers is more likely to be large than small. But this assumption produces apparently absurd results in the Presumptuous Philosopher problem. Without SIA, however, a definitive refutation of the counterintuitive Doomsday Argument seems difficult. I show that these problems are satisfyingly resolved by applying the principle that one should always condition on all evidence - not just on the fact that you are an intelligent observer, or that you are human, but on the fact that you are a human with a specific set of memories. This `Full Non-indexical Conditioning' (FNC) approach usually produces the same results as assuming both SSA and SIA, with a sufficiently broad reference class, while avoiding their ad hoc aspects. I argue that the results of FNC are correct using the device of hypothetical ``companion'' observers, whose existence clarifies what principles of reasoning are valid. I conclude by discussing how one can use FNC to infer how densely we should expect intelligent species to occur, and by examining recent anthropic arguments in inflationary and string theory cosmology