Competition Policy and Innovation

We briefly review the rationale behind technological alliances and provide a snapshot of their role in global competition, especially insofar as it is based around intellectual capital. They nicely illustrate the increased importance of horizontal agreements and thus establish the relevance of the topic. We move on to discuss the organisation of industries in a dynamic context and draw out consequences for competition policy. We conclude with an outlook on the underlying tensions between technology alliances, competition policy, and industrial policy.competition policy; innovation; alliances; industrial policy

Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly

In the economics literature, various views on the likely (efficiency) effects of information exchange, communication between firms and market transparency present themselves. Often these views on information flows are highly conflicting. On the one hand, it is argued that increased information dissemination improves firm planning to the benefit of society (including customers) and/or allows potential customers to make the right decisions given their preferences. On the other hand, the literature also suggests that increased information dissemination can have significant coordinating or collusive potential to the benefit of firms but at the expense of society at large (mainly, potential customers). In this chapter, we try to make sense of these views, with the aim of presenting some simple lessons for antitrust practice. In addition, the chapter presents some cases, from both sides of the Atlantic, where informational issues have played a significant role.

Exclusive Safeguards and Technology Transfer: Subcontracting Agreements in Eastern Europe's Car Component Industry.

We study the rationale for the use of exclusivity to protect transfer of technology in subcontracting agreements. The legal possibility arises through the EU Notice on Subcontracting. Empirically, the link between exclusive agreements and technology transfer among firms in the automotive supply industry in EU candidate countries is surprisingly weak, although with exclusive-supply or exclusive-buying clauses in subcontracting agreements upstream transfer of technology is more likely. Exclusive agreements are often reciprocal, and are typically passed on. Downstream firms are more likely to face and use vertical restraints. Technology trickles upstream: Multinational final assemblers transfer more technology than lower-tier suppliers.vertical restraints: technology transfer; automotive supply networks; competition policy

Competition Compliance: Limits to Competition Policy Harmonisation in EU Enlargement

The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the candidates. Finally, we examine a large database of inter-firm agreements in Eastern Europe's car industry and use insights from case studies of subcontracting to highlight instances of non-conformity between (1) East European competition law and practice and (2) EU rules and East European competition law enforcement. The conclusion recommends how to improve competition policy practice, and thus compliance, post-enlargement.antitrust law; EU enlargement; empirical studies

Market Transparency and Competition Policy.

We survey some of the literature on the effects of improved market transparency on competition in oligopoly. Generally, improved transparency from the perspective of firms makes detection of deviations from tacitly collusive agreements easier, thus facilitating oligopolistic coordination. On the other hand, improved transparency from the perspective of consumers, particularly in terms of easier comparability of goods characteristics, has ambiguous effects: More elastic demands make deviations from collusive prices more profitable to firms in the short run, but they also make future retaliation by rivals more severe. Which of these forces will dominate in a dynamic oligopoly competition is shown to depend on the markets-specifics. In light of the theoretical results, we discuss the likely effects on inter-firm competition of information exchange and online trading institutions as well as the American and European competition policy attitude towards market transparency.market transparency; repeated oligopoly; secret price-cutting; customer switching

Aktive forbrugere og økonomisk performance

Forbrugerrådet og Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen har bedt CEBR om at udarbejde studie af den eksisterende1 litteratur om sammenhængen mellem forbruger- og konkurrencepolitik og produktivitet, vækst og velfærd. Målet har været at lave en empirisk og policy-orienteret oversigt, der har leverandørskift og gennemsigtighed som de overordnede indgangsvinkler, selvom også de traditionelle typer forbrugerbeskyttelse (fx fortrydelsesret og klagesystem) som påvirker forbrugerens adfærd i købsøjeblikket behandles. Litteraturgennemgangen kortlægger de kanaler, hvormed forbrugerne påvirker økonomiens performance; identificerer de mest oplagte virkemidler for konkurrence- og forbrugerpolitik; og giver eksempler på forbrugernes rolle i forhold til økonomisk performance. Aktive og kompetente forbrugere er en forudsætning for at få konkurrencen på et marked til at fungere, så varerne bliver billigere og/eller bedre. Hvis forbrugerne ikke reagerer på pris eller kvalitet, er der ikke megen grund til, at leverandørerne skal lægge sig i selen for at levere varer med et rimeligt forhold mellem kvalitet og pris