38 research outputs found
Commentary: The Alleged Coupling-Constitution Fallacy and the Mature Sciences
A commentary on: The Alleged Coupling-Constitution Fallacy and the Mature Sciences
by Ross, D., and Ladyman, J. (2010). The Extended Mind, ed R. Menary (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 155â166
Thinking through the implications of neural reuse for the additive factors method
One method for uncovering the subprocesses of mental processes is the âAdditive Factors Methodâ (AFM). The AFM uses reaction time data from factorial experiments to infer the presence of separate processing stages. This paper investigates the conceptual status of the AFM. It argues that one of the AFMâs underlying assumptions is problematic in light of recent developments in cognitive neuroscience. Discussion begins by laying out the basic logic of the AFM, followed by an analysis of the challenge presented by neural reuse. Following this, implications are analysed and avenues of response considered
The Narrow Conception of Computational Psychology
One particularly successful approach to modeling within cognitive science is computational psychology. Computational psychology explores psychological processes by building and testing computational models with human data. In this paper, it is argued that a specific approach to understanding computation, what is called the ânarrow conceptionâ, has problematically limited the kinds of models, theories, and explanations that are offered within computational psychology. After raising two problems for the narrow conception, an alternative, âwide approachâ to computational psychology is proposed
Resolving Two Tensions in 4E Cognition Using Wide Computationalism
Recently, some authors have begun to raise questions about the potential unity of 4E (enactive, embedded, embodied, extended) cognition as a distinct research programme within cognitive science. Two tensions, in particular, have been raised:(i) that the body-centric claims embodied cognition militate against the distributed tendencies of extended cognition and (ii) that the body/environment distinction emphasized by enactivism stands in tension with the world-spanning claims of extended cognition. The goal of this paper is to resolve tensions (i) and (ii). The proposal is that a form of âwide computationalismâcan be used to reconcile the two tensions and, in so doing, articulate a common theoretical core for 4E cognition
Leveling the Field: Talking Levels in Cognitive Science
Talk of levels is everywhere in cognitive science. Whether it is in terms of adjudicating longstanding debates or motivating foundational concepts, one cannot go far without hearing about the need to talk at different âlevelsâ. Yet in spite of its widespread application and use, the concept of levels has received little sustained attention within cognitive science. This paper provides an analysis of the various ways the notion of levels has been deployed within cognitive science. The paper begins by introducing and motivating discussion via four representative accounts of levels. It then turns to outlining and relating the four accounts using two dimensions of comparison. The result is the creation of a conceptual framework that maps the logical space of levels talk, which offers an important step toward making sense of levels talk within cognitive science
Music and Cognitive Extension
Extended cognition holds that cognitive processes sometimes leak into the world (Dawson, 2013). A recent trend among proponents of extended cognition has been to put pressure on phenomena thought to be safe havens for internalists (Sneddon, 2011; Wilson, 2010; Wilson & Lenart, 2014). This paper attempts to continue this trend. It is argued that because music perception is as part of a locationally wide computational system, it is an extended process. In articulating the view, the work of J.J Gibson (1966, 1986) and Robert Wilson (1994b, 1995, 2004) is drawn on. The view is defended from objections and its implications outlined. The paper concludes with a comparison to Kruegerâs (2014) view of the âmusically extended emotional mindâ.
The Sound of Music: Externalist Style
Philosophical exploration of individualism and externalism in the cognitive sciences most recently has been focused on general evaluations of these two views (Adams & Aizawa 2008, Rupert 2008, Wilson 2004, Clark 2008). Here we return to broaden an earlier phase of the debate between individualists and externalists about cognition, one that considered in detail particular theories, such as those in developmental psychology (Patterson 1991) and the computational theory of vision (Burge 1986, Segal 1989). Music cognition is an area in the cognitive sciences that has received little attention from philosophers, though it has relatively recently been thrown into the externalist spotlight (Cochrane 2008, Kruger 2014, Kersten forthcoming). Given that individualism can be thought of as a kind of paradigm for research on cognition, we provide a brief overview of the field of music cognition and individualistic tendencies within the field (sections 2 and 3) before turning to consider externalist alternatives to individualistic paradigms (section 4-5) and then arguing for a qualified form of externalism about music cognition (section 6)
Wide computation: a mechanistic account
This Ph.D. thesis explores a novel way of thinking about computation in cognitive science. It argues for what I call âthe mechanistic account of wide computationalismâ, or simply wide mechanistic computation. The key claim is that some cognitive and perceptual abilities are produced by or are the result of computational mechanisms that are, in part, located outside the individual; that computational systems, the ones that form the proper units of analysis in cognitive science, are particular types of functional mechanisms that, on occasion, spread out across brain, body, and world. Wide mechanistic computation is the result of bringing together two distinct strands of thinking about computation: (i) âwideâ views, which hold that computational systems can, on occasion, include parts of the surrounding environment; and (ii) âmechanisticâ views, which hold that computational explanation is a species of mechanistic explanation, and that computational mechanisms are a special type of functional mechanism. I argue that wide mechanistic computation draws support from several sources. First, I examine research on animal and human psychology and show that several organismsâ behaviours are properly treated as being the output of wide computational mechanisms. Second, I defend the view from several philosophical charges, including worries about its explanatory parsimony and empirical testability. Finally, I argue for the viewâs theoretical credentials by showing that it can help resolve specific problems that have recently troubled 4E cognition. The result is an argument for not only the coherence but also empirical plausibility of wide mechanistic computation. On route to its main objective, the thesis also accomplishes a number of related tasks, including: (i) providing a framework for organising and conceptualising different views of computation, (ii) securing the conceptual foundations of mechanistic computation by addressing an outstanding challenge called the âabstraction problemâ, (iii) sounding a cautionary note about recent predictive processing accounts of extended cognition and (iv) arguing against a particular conception of levels often used within cognitive science, what is labelled the âhierarchical correspondence view of levelsâ.