Modality in the nominal domain: Yalnhej DPs in Chuj

How do modal expressions determine which possibilities they invoke? Do they do it the same way across categories? Recent work proposes that modal auxiliaries project the domain of possibilities that they quantify over from an event variable, which can get different values in different syntactic positions (Hacquard 2006, 2009, 2010, see also Kratzer 2013). Based on the behaviour of the Spanish random choice indefinite uno cualquiera, Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2018) conclude that the same strategy is available for modal indefinites. This paper brings evidence from Chuj, an understudied Mayan language, which supports this conclusion further. The paper focuses on yalnhej DPs, a type of quantifier that makes a non-upper bound existential claim and that contributes a modal component with a flavour that depends on syntactic position

Numeral Any: the view from Farsi

This paper documents a dimension of crosslinguistic variation among Universal Free Choice Items. In English, the distribution and interpretation of any DPs containing a numeral ("numeral any") differs from that of any DPs with no numeral (Dayal 2005, 2013; Chierchia 2013). In contrast, the Farsi counterparts of any and numeral any mirror each other. Two competing analyses of the contrast between any and numeral any are assessed against the Farsi data – the Wide Scope Constraint Analysis (Chierchia 2013) and the Viability Constraint Analysis (Dayal 2013). The paper shows that, with minimal extensions, either analysis can capture the behavior of the Farsi counterpart of numeral any with distributive predicates. The situation changes, however, when the minimally modified analyses are assessed with respect to sentences with collective predicates: the extended Wide Scope Constraint Analysis captures the attested interpretation of those sentences, but the extended Viability Constraint Analysis rules them out, undergenerating

Neutralizing Free Choice Items via Maximal Domain Restriction: Farsi -i Indefinites

This paper identifies two types of free choice items (FCIs) in Farsi: yek-i DPs and har -i DPs. Their distribution and interpretation pose a puzzle: yek -i DPs pattern with other existential FCIs, and har -i DPs with other universal FCIs, but both items lose their prototypical FCI behavior when they combine with the accusative marker -ro. The paper shows that the loss of FCI behavior follows from an alternative-based analysis of FCIs (Chierchia 2013) under some assumptions about the semantic effect of -ro. The analysis parallels the explanation for the loss of FCI status of Spanish algunos presented in Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2011 in that it also relies on the derivation of alternatives that are equivalent to the assertion, hence not excludable

Universal force from exhaustification: Farsi hame -i DPs

Polarity items have been analyzed as existential DPs that introduce into the semantic derivation two types of alternatives: domain alternatives (corresponding to possible restrictions of the domain of quantification) and scalar alternatives  (corresponding to stronger quantificational forces.) This approach has led to the development of a typology of polarity items that is based on the types of alternatives that these items introduce (Chierchia 2013). What are the possible dimensions of variation? Bar-Lev & Margulis (2014) argue that the Hebrew determiner kol introduces domain, but not scalar alternatives. This paper shows that a class of Farsi DPs, which we call ‘hame -i DPs’, do too

Are All Concessive Scalar Particles the Same? Probing into Spanish "Siquiera"

Concessive scalar particles (CSPs) (Crnic 2011a,b) (Slovenian magari, Greek esto, and Spanish siquiera, among others) are focus sensitive polarity items that get licensed in a variety of non-veridical contexts, where they trigger a characteristic interpretation: CSPs convey a strengthening effect in downward entailing environments, a "settle for less" interpretation in modal contexts, and a negative bias in questions. This paper explores the characterization of this class of items by probing into Spanish siquiera. The paper reveals differences between siquiera and magari that challenge a straightforward extension to siquiera of the analysis of CSPs presented in Crnic 2011a and Crnic 2011b and shows that the analysis of esto in Giannakidou 2007 does not cover siquiera either – partly for reasons already pointed out for magari by Crnic. The central insights of Crnic's and Giannakidou's work are nevertheless reconciled in an alternative analysis. The picture that emerges is that CSPs might uniformly convey an existential meaning that determines a set of alternatives, but differ with respect to the role that these alternatives play in determining their interpretation and distribution.

'Even' and Biased Questions: The Case of Spanish 'Siquiera'

No abstract

On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual Reasoning

It is widely held that counterfactuals, unlike attitude ascriptions, preserve the referential transparency of their constituents, i.e., that counterfactuals validate the substitution of identicals when their constituents do. The only putative counterexamples in the literature come from counterpossibles, i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. Advocates of counterpossibilism, i.e., the view that counterpossibles are not all vacuous, argue that counterpossibles can generate referential opacity. But in order to explain why most substitution inferences into counterfactuals seem valid, counterpossibilists also often maintain that counterfactuals with possible antecedents are transparency‐preserving. I argue that if counterpossibles can generate opacity, then so can ordinary counterfactuals with possible antecedents. Utilizing an analogy between counterfactuals and attitude ascriptions, I provide a counterpossibilist‐friendly explanation for the apparent validity of substitution inferences into counterfactuals. I conclude by suggesting that the debate over counterpossibles is closely tied to questions concerning the extent to which counterfactuals are more like attitude ascriptions and epistemic operators than previously recognized

Keep 'only' strong

As defined in Horn 1969, only (p) presupposes p. von Fintel & Iatridou (2007) note, however, that only (have to p) may presuppose that p is possible, rather than necessary, and propose revising the analysis of only to weaken its contribution. Building on Ippolito 2007, we show that this revision predicts interpretations which are too weak in data involving plurals and negation. A paradox thus arises: Horn's only is too strong in some cases, but required in others. To resolve the paradox, we maintain Horn's only, but introduce an external source of weakening that is not always available: in von Fintel and Iatridou's modal environment, the argument of only is weakened by a covert operator (AT LEAST, Crnic ̆ 2011; Schwarz 2004) that is blocked in the problematic cases involving plurals and negation.