Fading Opportunities

There is a missing piece in the puzzle of social development in post-1997 Hong Kong: regional and national integration. For a long time it was envisaged that while Hong Kong would remain relatively secluded from the mainland, it could seize the opportunities, evidenced in the massive relocation of manufacturing plants to the Pearl River Delta since the mid-1980s, presented by China’s economic reform. However, before long, with the deepening of China’s market reform and its emergence as a new economic power, Hong Kong was caught unprepared for its integration into the motherland. Growing tensions between mainlanders and Hong Kong people have already received considerable media attention. But what has somehow escaped people’s attention is that the expected opening of new opportunities for Hong Kong people on the mainland has not fully materialised. In this paper, we shall look at Hong Kong’s current status in realising the expected opportunities to be created in the process of China’s economic development and Hong Kong’s further integration into the process of national development. Drawing upon official statistics on Hong Kong residents working in mainland China, it is suggested that, instead of seeing more Hong Kong residents finding the mainland to be a newly developed environment for career development, the trend has reversed

Fading Opportunities

There is a missing piece in the puzzle of social development in post-1997 Hong Kong: regional and national integration. For a long time it was envisaged that while Hong Kong would remain relatively secluded from the mainland, it could seize the opportunities, evidenced in the massive relocation of manufacturing plants to the Pearl River Delta since the mid-1980s, presented by China’s economic reform. However, before long, with the deepening of China’s market reform and its emergence as a new economic power, Hong Kong was caught unprepared for its integration into the motherland. Growing tensions between mainlanders and Hong Kong people have already received considerable media attention. But what has somehow escaped people’s attention is that the expected opening of new opportunities for Hong Kong people on the mainland has not fully materialised. In this paper, we shall look at Hong Kong’s current status in realising the expected opportunities to be created in the process of China’s economic development and Hong Kong’s further integration into the process of national development. Drawing upon official statistics on Hong Kong residents working in mainland China, it is suggested that, instead of seeing more Hong Kong residents finding the mainland to be a newly developed environment for career development, the trend has reversed

Editorial

In the years leading to the handover on 1 July 1997, there were both pessimists and optimists among the observers of the process of decolonisation and the establishment of the so-called “One Country, Two systems” arrangement in Hong Kong. For the pessimists, their main concerns were two. First, the socialist system in China could hardly accommodate a free market, capitalist Hong Kong; conflict was inevitable. Second, the encounter between an authoritarian China and a highly liberalised Hong Kong would also be a source of conflict and contention; personal freedom in Hong Kong would quickly be contained. For the optimists, with China eager to carry out market reform and Hong Kong being well placed to facilitate its economic reform and modernisation, capitalism would continue to prosper in the former British colony. The return of Hong Kong to China would therefore be no more than business as usual. Changes, if any, would be minimal. Both the pessimists and the optimists failed to anticipate the kind of problems encountered by Hong Kong since 1997.

Editorial

In the years leading to the handover on 1 July 1997, there were both pessimists and optimists among the observers of the process of decolonisation and the establishment of the so-called “One Country, Two systems” arrangement in Hong Kong. For the pessimists, their main concerns were two. First, the socialist system in China could hardly accommodate a free market, capitalist Hong Kong; conflict was inevitable. Second, the encounter between an authoritarian China and a highly liberalised Hong Kong would also be a source of conflict and contention; personal freedom in Hong Kong would quickly be contained. For the optimists, with China eager to carry out market reform and Hong Kong being well placed to facilitate its economic reform and modernisation, capitalism would continue to prosper in the former British colony. The return of Hong Kong to China would therefore be no more than business as usual. Changes, if any, would be minimal. Both the pessimists and the optimists failed to anticipate the kind of problems encountered by Hong Kong since 1997.

Éditorial

Dans les années qui ont précédé la rétrocession de Hong Kong à la Chine le 1er juillet 1997, les observateurs du processus de décolonisation du territoire et de l’instauration de la formule « un pays, deux systèmes » étaient partagés en optimistes et pessimistes. Les pessimistes avaient deux inquiétudes principales. Ils pensaient tout d’abord que le système socialiste chinois pourrait difficilement intégrer le capitalisme de marché de Hong Kong et que le conflit était donc inévitable. Ensuite, la rencontre entre un pays autoritaire et une ville très libérale serait également une source de tension et de conflit, qui entrainerait rapidement la limitation des libertés individuelles à Hong Kong. Pour les optimistes, Hong Kong était en revanche bien placé pour faciliter les réformes économiques et la modernisation que la Chine était impatiente de renforcer et poursuivre. En conséquence, le capitalisme allait pour eux continuer à prospérer dans l’ancienne colonie britannique et la rétrocession ne provoquerait que peu de changements. En réalité, ni les pessimistes ni les optimistes n’ont anticipé les nouveaux défis qui se posent à Hong Kong depuis 1997

Reinstating class a structural and developmental study of Hong Kong society

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Effect of angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor and angiotensin receptor blocker initiation on organ support-free days in patients hospitalized with COVID-19

IMPORTANCE Overactivation of the renin-angiotensin system (RAS) may contribute to poor clinical outcomes in patients with COVID-19. Objective To determine whether angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor or angiotensin receptor blocker (ARB) initiation improves outcomes in patients hospitalized for COVID-19. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS In an ongoing, adaptive platform randomized clinical trial, 721 critically ill and 58 non–critically ill hospitalized adults were randomized to receive an RAS inhibitor or control between March 16, 2021, and February 25, 2022, at 69 sites in 7 countries (final follow-up on June 1, 2022). INTERVENTIONS Patients were randomized to receive open-label initiation of an ACE inhibitor (n = 257), ARB (n = 248), ARB in combination with DMX-200 (a chemokine receptor-2 inhibitor; n = 10), or no RAS inhibitor (control; n = 264) for up to 10 days. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome was organ support–free days, a composite of hospital survival and days alive without cardiovascular or respiratory organ support through 21 days. The primary analysis was a bayesian cumulative logistic model. Odds ratios (ORs) greater than 1 represent improved outcomes. RESULTS On February 25, 2022, enrollment was discontinued due to safety concerns. Among 679 critically ill patients with available primary outcome data, the median age was 56 years and 239 participants (35.2%) were women. Median (IQR) organ support–free days among critically ill patients was 10 (–1 to 16) in the ACE inhibitor group (n = 231), 8 (–1 to 17) in the ARB group (n = 217), and 12 (0 to 17) in the control group (n = 231) (median adjusted odds ratios of 0.77 [95% bayesian credible interval, 0.58-1.06] for improvement for ACE inhibitor and 0.76 [95% credible interval, 0.56-1.05] for ARB compared with control). The posterior probabilities that ACE inhibitors and ARBs worsened organ support–free days compared with control were 94.9% and 95.4%, respectively. Hospital survival occurred in 166 of 231 critically ill participants (71.9%) in the ACE inhibitor group, 152 of 217 (70.0%) in the ARB group, and 182 of 231 (78.8%) in the control group (posterior probabilities that ACE inhibitor and ARB worsened hospital survival compared with control were 95.3% and 98.1%, respectively). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE In this trial, among critically ill adults with COVID-19, initiation of an ACE inhibitor or ARB did not improve, and likely worsened, clinical outcomes. TRIAL REGISTRATION ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT0273570

The Sinicisation of the Hong Kong economy or the Hongkongnisation of the Greater Bay Area: are we `barking up the wrong tree??

Asia Pacific Business Review285719-73

Gift to a Former Mentor: Hong Kong's Contribution to the Rise of China and the Consequences of That Rise for the Current Relationship

Hong Kong made a crucial contribution to China's rise, but in the last fifteen years the balance of influence has shifted. Quantitative dominance in foreign investment since reforms began in 1979 was, and apparently still is, a key part of Hong Kong's contribution to China's rise. The qualitative significance of Hong Kong's role in integrating China with the global capitalist economy through providing market knowledge and contacts was even more critical. The central importance of Hong Kong investment in the 1980s was that it provided not what China wanted (higher technology and modernization of state enterprise} but what it needed (a way to take advantage of China's vast stocks of unproductively utilized labour). However, our focus is not on Hong Kong's contribution to China's rise. Instead, we concentrate on the implications of that rise for Hong Kong.Ye