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
**REINSTATING CLASS:
A STRUCTURAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY
OF HONG KONG SOCIETY**

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
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Acknowledgements

This paper is one of our articles discussing and presenting the findings from our 1989 survey study 'A Benchmark Study of Social Mobility in Hong Kong'. As the reader will notice, it contains fairly extended discussions on several areas which, in our view, are particularly pertinent to one's understanding of the Hong Kong social structure and its development. Our study aims to bring together, on the one hand, the relevance and rigour of mainstream sociology (in particular, stratification and mobility studies), and, on the other, the unique context and concerns of Hong Kong society. As ours is, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical study --- proffering schema and structure, numbers and narratives --- of its kind in Hong Kong, we hope we are not totally unjustified in presenting our analyses in a series of 'working papers'; we feel that findings thus disclosed will better generate responses, and hopefully, work towards a reorientation of Hong Kong studies in general.

Our attempt to lay a benchmark, and to fill some of the more gaping holes in the terrain of Hong Kong studies, would not have got off the ground, were it not for generous support from the Strategic Research Grant (University of Hong Kong), the Centre of Hong Kong Studies (The Chinese University of Hong Kong), and 'Education Eye'. We would like to thank Mr. Robert Chung and Ms. Linda Cho of the Social Sciences Research Centre (University of Hong Kong) for their administrative assistance; Mr. Chung was also part of the research team. In particular, we are grateful to Prof. Siu-lun Wong, then director of the SSRC, for his unstinting support all these years. In the processes of data editing and processing, Ms. S.M. Hsu has been most helpful and her assistance is gratefully acknowledged. Dr. Gordon Marshall (Nuffield College, Oxford) clarified in a most valuable session for us many questions of the British and American mobility studies, and made available to us the look-up tables for coding

occupational information to the Goldthorpe class schema. To him we are most indebted.

In writing and revising this paper, we have benefited from many people's comments and advice. Mr. John Goldthorpe (Nuffield College, Oxford) suggested ways of improving our analyses, while also introducing us to new techniques, which we intend to incorporate in our subsequent monograph. His influence on our thinking is, we believe, obvious to the reader, and we guess we could never acknowledge enough our debt to him and his works. Dr. Gordon Marshall took an active interest in our work, but some of his comments arrived too late to be incorporated into the paper. Mr. Tak-wing Chan and Dr. Chun-hung Ng wrote us pages of comments, filled with insights and alternatives, exhortations and encouragement, providing, in our view, the best a true intellectual community could offer. To them we are most grateful. We, however, fear that we have, in this final product, still fallen short of their high expectations from us. Dr. Benjamin Leung suggested ways to make the paper less daunting to the non-technically-inclined readers. Finally, one of us has had the opportunity of attending the courses given by Prof. Aage Sorensen and Prof. Tony Tam at Harvard, and some of their ideas no doubt have found their way into the paper. In particular, by bringing his methodological (in the broadest and best sense of the term) mind to our work, Tony Tam has helped us to see the substantive issues in a new light; he has, above all, enabled us to see both the limits and the promise of 'reinstating' class.

REINSTATING CLASS: A STRUCTURAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF HONG KONG SOCIETY

'The study of social stratification and social mobility is probably the area of sociology that has been most affected by methodological and theoretical changes and developments in the period since the mid-1950s.'

(Aage B. Sorensen)

Introduction

In this paper, we attempt to put up a new agenda for the study of Hong Kong society. That we feel such an agenda is justified is due not so much to our feeling that the studies have reached an impasse, as to the growing recognition that a structural - in our case, class and the related question of social mobility - understanding of the society is an indispensable basis for discussion on political stability, middle class formation, and, indeed, on the social dynamics of post-war Hong Kong. However, it is not just programmatic that we are dealing with here; we will also present and thematize the findings from our social mobility research, in relation to a few sociological areas. In the following, we would first survey the context and concerns of social stratification and mobility studies in general, and, with that as our background, argue the case for a need to reinstate class and mobility into our study of Hong Kong society. Next, in Part Two, we discuss our findings under the following topics: (a) the class schema and the general profile; (b) openness and equality of opportunity (the patterns and rates of the mobility regime in Hong Kong); (c) class structure and class formation; and (d) class, education, and meritocracy. In proffering our findings, we hope to open up new areas of inquiries, and henceforth, to redress the generally culturalistic and undifferentiated approach to the study of Hong Kong society. And as we argue our way, we would tackle issues like: how open the society is, how equally the opportunities are distributed, how important one's educational resources and one's parental

background for social advancement are, how, and in what sense, the Hong Kong middle class has come into being, and so on. In other words, we would try to grapple with some of the conventional intuitions about Hong Kong, as dream and reality, and find a conceptual and theoretical language for identifying and analyzing these intuitions. We would hold that an indispensable part of this task is to examine the breaks and barriers, the inequalities and iniquities, of the class structure.

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Part One: The point of social class and social mobility, and why Hong Kong missed the point

While we have little doubt as to the truth contained in the above quotation from Sorensen, we feel it would be useful to understand why this is so. We feel it is necessary to point out, and we intend to substantiate our views in the following, that part of the reason lies in the fact that the study of social stratification and social mobility, perhaps more so than other areas of focus in sociological research, is undergirded and influenced by divergent socio-political interests and values. There is, in other words, a much more engaging interplay between these interests, on the one hand, and the choice and emphasis of problems, or the methods thought appropriate for their studies, on the other. Often, we find in the best works of this field a conscious fusion of interests and inquiry, with the underlying socio-political interests informing and inspiring the neutral and scientific efforts. The result is that these studies have an acute bearing on the larger problems of the society, and on one's responses to them. This remains so, regardless of whatever ideological stances we may attribute to the works under question.

In the British tradition, the pioneering study of social mobility, under the direction of David Glass (1954), originally conceived of its specific purpose as a study of the formation and structure of the 'middle classes'. Realizing, however, that such a study necessarily entails, or indeed presupposes, a general investigation of social status and social mobility in the society (*ibid*:5), Glass turned the attention to the implications of social mobility for the society as a whole, and to the more specific problem of the effect of the expansion of educational opportunities on the relationship between successive generations. For him, social mobility bears significantly on social efficiency: a fluid social structure will mean that there is 'more likelihood that positions requiring high ability will in fact be held by individuals who possess high ability', with the further advantage that the society as a whole will become more adaptive to changes. It also bears on social harmony, for from the viewpoint of the individual, social mobility

'should ensure that there are fewer square pegs in round holes'; not only will people be motivated to develop their full potential, there will also be less thwarted aspirations and frustrated goals, contributing therefore to greater social harmony.

But the effect of social mobility is not an unmixed blessing. The phenomenon and experience of *declassé*, of 'status inconsistency', of the 'anxiety neurosis' found in middle class parents' aspirations for their children, and lastly, of general dislocations and discontinuities in normative and relational matters wrought by mobility experience are the negative but integral part of the result of social mobility. Alongside these adverse effects is the more specific question of social engineering and monitoring: given the broadcloth of the mixed effects of social mobility, what could one do to redress the unjust, to uncover and correct the imperfections of the system? It is here that the more Fabian strain of this classic work on social stratification and social mobility enters. For Glass and his associates were interested in bringing out the limits of educational expansion and increased equality for educational opportunity (as initiated by the Education Act 1944), as well as the unintended and negative consequences of having an educational system emphasizing streams and 'measured intelligence'. In the tradition of 'political arithmetic' (Heath 1984), formal and quantitative studies are undertaken to inform, and if need be, criticize, public policies. In this respect, disinterested academic concerns and Fabian socio-political interests are fused.

Arguing from another tradition, Lipset and Bendix see their study 'Social Mobility in Industrial Society' (1959) as concerned with the empirical and comparative documentation of the mobility patterns of industrial societies. Their thesis, to put it summarily, is that the rate of social mobility in the industrial societies is broadly similar, notwithstanding differences in political institutions and historical legacies, and that industrial societies tend to attain a relatively high mobility rate once they reach a certain level of economic-industrial expansion (ibid:13). This is the, as it were, academic concern. Coexisting with this, however, is the attempt to tease out the

implications of social mobility for power and social stability, especially in modernizing societies. The search for common (or convergent) institutional patterns in industrial, modernizing societies, and the corollary interest in the institutional strengths and weaknesses of these societies in the face of the heightened scale of impingement of the broader strata on the centre and state, so evident in the 'modernization' theoretical approach, lies implicit here in this work (see Goldthorpe 1972, 1985 for critical discussion of this tradition). For Lipset and Bendix, the relation between mobility and social stability is two-folded. On the one hand, mobility in the sense of redistribution of rewards (or the Weberian 'spoils of status', Lipset and Bendix, 1959:4) and unbound opportunities may or may not lead to greater stability, just as 'stable poverty' could either be the spring of rebellion or the soil of moderation and conservatism. As Tawney, in an earlier context and from a different intellectual tradition, remarked: the problem of modern society is one of proportion, and not absolute amounts (Tawney 1920). Social fluidity or perhaps just the myth of opportunity may in fact generate more frustration and resentment. On the other hand, Lipset and Bendix also saw clearly that mobility poses a dilemma to the ruling class of every society. As the ruling class could not control the natural distribution of talent and abilities, those possessing high abilities among the lower strata and who are, as it were, thrown up by them as potential leaders will sooner or later become a challenge to the ruling class. The dilemma for the latter is: 'how many qualified newcomers will, or rather can, be accepted without undermining its legitimate prestige?' This issue of elite recruitment is more than a technical one of size and composition. Rather, it bears on the question of stability of political regimes, and it also suggests a Weberian concern with power relations and legitimacy.

And in regard to the broader strata in the society, the stability issue is equally pertinent. In the modern industrial society, the population participates in politics, and being part of a broader political community, where there is increasing group mobility, improved living standard, and more importantly, the ability to organize along

functional lines and impinging on the state (see Bendix 1966 for a broad historical analysis), the broad strata's satisfaction, or frustration, with mobility opportunities, will surely have a direct impact on political stability. Here one finds a similar fusion of purely academic concerns (the similarities and differences of the social dynamics in industrial societies) and a set of underlying socio-political interests (the threat of 'lower class leadership' to the ruling class, the search for a formula for a viable and tenacious social order in the face of escalating demands for opportunities and equality).

One could further argue that these socio-political interests, which, in our view, underlie and fruitfully spawn sociological studies of class and social mobility, could claim a longer and more classical genealogy. One could trace the lineage, in so far as the issue of elite recruitment addressed by Lipset and Bendix bears on class leadership or the potential for class formation among the lower strata, to Marx, with the caveat that the ideological commitments, if one cares to adduce, are drastically divergent here. Conversely, the concern with the imperfections of the system, with the unforeseen and unintended barriers, apparently just or unequivocally unjust, to individual advancement and social improvement, so evident in Glass's position, could claim Mill as its ancestor and its philosophical spokesman. What is striking, and what perhaps makes the study of class and social mobility so uniquely important in sociological endeavours, is that these divergent socio-political interests and the traditions they presuppose are intimately tied, and indeed, constitute the guiding force, to the thinking and practice of social stratification research. To the extent that the study of class and social mobility straddles both individual efforts (how does one benefit from education, as compared with the advantages one derived from his family background) and structural constraints (is the society open and just enough for one's efforts to pay off), both social positions (how likely is it for the lower classes to form into collectivities if their talented members are 'coopted' into the upper classes; how does social fluidity 'forebode' for the formation of a collective identity) and social groupings (how far does the society allow for free

movements of individuals within the social hierarchy), both reformist and radical persuasions, then it is fair to say that this subject matter does occupy the centre stage of sociology. Further, this will go some way to explaining why its study has been most affected by theoretical and methodological changes, as the quotation of Sorensen suggested. It is so, because socio-political interests are so much an inseparable part of the studies, and divergences and development of these interests undoubtedly play a part in instilling shifts and changes in the theory and methodology of social stratification studies.¹

In a related vein, Goldthorpe (1984) has more recently addressed these issues by distinguishing two traditions in social mobility research. The first one is concerned with the liberal's question: whether capitalism would be able to provide the conditions under which the ideal of true equality of opportunity for all might be realized; whether in fact the inequality of conditions, the social hierarchy, could be somewhat justified by equality of opportunity, and, further, is there congruence between the individual's efforts and his rewards, often measured in terms of his position in the social hierarchy. In short, is there open and fair competition among individuals, and does this competition contribute to the general welfare of all? These are perennial taxing questions for the liberal mind. Studies spurred on by these questions (or to go back to our argument, interests) focus on the hierarchical context of the society, and on the individual's movements (mobility), together with all the attendant opportunities and obstacles, within it.

The second tradition, on the other hand, arises from the Marxist discourse: how far are social classes identifiable as social collectivities in consequence of the continuity with which individuals and families retain the same class position over time? The concern is with social positions, and the structure of such positions, with a view to ascertaining the possibility of socio-economic and demographic collectivities coalescing into socio-cultural and political entities or actors. This tradition (the 'class formation' tradition, as Goldthorpe

coined it), characteristic of the Marxist approach, pitches the level of study at the collectivity, and the issues that have perplexed its practitioners surround the essential question of translating a structural category into action (Lockwood 1981), or simply, class and politics (Hindess 1987). The debates between neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians in contemporary sociology could to a large extent be characterized as polemics on these questions within the class formation tradition.² Goldthorpe's aim is to revive this tradition in the study of class and social mobility without being embroiled in these polemics. For him, what is essential, both theoretically and logistically, is to address the conditions for class formation first. The demographic, normative and relational characteristics of the classes must be uncovered, and the stability of these features over time must be rigorously tackled by mobility analyses (is it 'fixity' or 'flux'? is there a class 'core', as distinct from the changing and interchanging parts?) before the question of class as socio-cultural and political entity could be fruitfully raised.

The distinction of the two traditions raised by Goldthorpe is, we believe, important, and his aim to bring back mobility studies into the discussion of class admirable. We might further add two points. First, in addition to this primary interest in the implications of social mobility for class formation and class action, there is also the secondary interest in Goldthorpe, viz. the openness of the British society. To this extent, he shares the socio-political interests of the Fabian (e.g. Glass) or what he called the 'ethical socialist'. (1980, ch.1) Secondly, in his more recent works (the CASMIN project), Goldthorpe and his associates have taken up where Lipset and Bendix have left: comparative social mobility of industrial societies. (Goldthorpe 1984, 1985; Erikson *et.al.*, 1983) By imposing sophisticated structural models on mobility data, they argued that the most striking feature of social mobility in industrial nations is their similar relative mobility rates. Further, in examining the relationship between, on the one hand, mobility, and, on the other, levels of economic development and types of political systems, Goldthorpe and his associates are actually engaged in the 'modernization' discourse,

somewhat akin to the comparative concerns of Lipset and Bendix, and proffering a considered and critical response to it.

So far our discussion has tried to tackle the variety of socio-political interests underlying social mobility studies, and the two traditions sustained by these studies. The following schematic representation (Figure 1) may help to bring out the possible combinations of purpose and paradigm:

Figure 1: Analytical Traditions and Socio-political Interests in Social Mobility Studies

Analytical tradition	Underlying socio-political interests		
	Fabian	Marxist	Modernization
Individual (social hierarchy)	Glass (1954)	Jencks (1972) ³	Lipset & Bendix (1959) Sewell & Hauser (1975) Blau & Duncan(1967)
Structure (class structure)	Goldthorpe (1980)	Wright; Goldthorpe	Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) (CASMIN)

A few caveats are immediately in order here. The difference between the social hierarchy and the class formation tradition, real and useful though it is, must in the last analysis be seen as one of approach and emphasis, rather than one of principle. As noted before, Glass's study was originally conceived for a study of the

formation and structure of the middle classes. Also, Lipset and Bendix regard the consequences of social mobility for the individual as preeminent in their study, and the effects felt at the level of values, commitments and attitudes will not fail to bear on the propensity and potential of group/collectivity formation. Similarly, the political arithmetic studies of researchers like Halsey or Heath have thrown much light on larger issues of class and the reproduction of class. Secondly, those more sympathetic with a Fabian, or social engineering, cause will also tend to emphasize more on the individual level, and the freedom - and the consequent bearing on justice - the individual is able to move within the social hierarchy. The Marxist stance, on the other hand, is more likely to lean to a structural, positional (as distinct from individual) approach. Nevertheless, there is no denying that the schema is arbitrary, that there is no cut-and-dry way to pigeon-hole (even if it is felt justified to do so) studies and scholars. Goldthorpe's position, in our view, while largely falling within the class formation tradition, has an undeniably important bearing on whatever socio-political persuasion one chooses to address the subject matter of social mobility.

When we bring the above discussion closer home, we find that, in the East Asian context, steps have already been taken to address the problem of social class and social mobility. The impulse, we argue, comes from two sources. First, faced with the rapid economic growth and social development in the newly industrialized countries (NICs), the usually Western-trained sociologists are stimulated to put the theories and methodologies developed from their subject to use, and, to test. This is, to use Goldthorpe's term, doing 'endogenous sociology', where ideas and techniques (and there is certainly no lack of these in the post-war development of sociology, and particularly, in the area of social stratification, in the Western world) are taken from the discipline and applied in one's own society. Inquiries ranging from 'origins and destinations', and its corollary thesis of meritocracy (Chiew 1977; Quah, *et. al.*, 1991; Sheu 1989a; Chan and Chan 1989), to 'occupational prestige' (Lin 1988; Cai & Zhu 1989; Tsang 1990) and social imageries of the working class; from 'status attainment' (Sheu

1989a; Yang 1992; Cai 1988; Tsang 1990) to changes in occupational structure and internal labour markets (Chou 1989; Hsiao 1989; Sheu 1989b; Koo 1990), have been undertaken, and the basis for comparative mobility studies is now eagerly sought after. It is particularly noteworthy that Japan, though not a NIC, has been incorporated into Goldthorpe and his associates' comparative project (Ishida *et.al.*, 1987; Ishida 1989). In this wide array of studies, the common theme is perhaps the degree of dynamism and flexibility of the social structure, with the understanding that social mobility reflects that degree, that it synthesizes a complex of changes that occur through time in the social system and in individuals as both a product and determinant of development (cf. Pastore 1982). The phenomenon of East Asian development forces one to focus on the social structure as a factor, as well as a result, of growth and prosperity, and the consequences and constraints on the individual. And social mobility is a product of a combination of individual resources and structural restrictions (Sorensen 1975).

The second source for the growing interest in class and social mobility lies in the more specific, and more recent, preoccupation with the structural position and political role of the middle class in the NICs. Despite their divergent socio-political systems and their trajectories of the political regime, in recent years, there emerged in these societies a thinly disguised quest for the true identity and role of the middle class in development, politics, and culture (see Hsiao 1989, 1992; Cheung *et.al.*, 1988). In a sense, this is doing 'exogenous sociology', for here, the sociologist takes note of the changes and direction of the larger society, and is making his response to them. (The socio-political interests underlying social stratification studies again rear their heads.) If 'endogenous sociology' in the East Asian context is enriching the 'social hierarchy'/individual' tradition mentioned earlier, then 'exogenous sociology', with its more or less exclusive concern with the middle class, is the progeny of the 'class formation/structure' tradition (Wong 1992).

Bringing the matter to Hong Kong reveals a most peculiar situation, which is not without its singular interest. First, vaunted as the last bastion of *laissez faire* economy and endowed with a utilitarian, expedient, and no-nonsense type of governance ('anachronistic? undemocratic? yes, but it works'), there seems no better example and environment for the self-made man. Yet, there has not been any sociological study of the Hong Kong Horatio Alger heroes. Openness and fluidity are taken for granted, and the overall prosperity and stability (achieved within nary little more than a generation) turns one's attention to the successful (more as a general agreement than as substantiated claims), and not to those left-behinders, those suffering from the vicissitudes of fortunes.

Second, the refugee nature of Hong Kong society could have (for again, there is a paucity of data and arguments here) meant that we are dealing with a situation where the majority competed on a more or less equal footing, and that, as a result, it was open recruitment from below in a context where social capillarity is given preeminent, almost sacrosanct, value and emphasis. This perhaps made possible a close approximation to the Smilesian society of unbound opportunities, where little constrains, and where what matters is self-efforts and determination, with secular success, whether shorn of moral overtones or not, being an obvious and generally subscribed goal.

But did the refugees really compete on a more or less equal footing? And did their offspring? Is the Hong Kong case a fulfillment of the liberal's vision, where equality of opportunities to a large measure justifies inequality of conditions? How were, and to what extent, wealth and advantages transmitted? How much openness was there, and what were the barriers? Was social stability a consequence of social mobility, itself a concomitant of economic growth and differentiation? And if one turns to the classical questions of political leadership and political change, has social levelling-up absorbed the best minds of the lower classes, thus rendering it more difficult for these classes to organize and to struggle for better life? In the

following sections, we attempt to answer some of these questions. It should, however, be clear that we are only taking the first, preliminary, step towards broaching class and social mobility with a full awareness of the variety of socio-political interests underlying such pursuits and of the possible traditions from which our techniques and theories are derived. Before proceeding to our efforts, it might be worthwhile to understand why there has been such a dearth of response to the above questions.⁴

It appears that in regard to two respects, Western or mainstream sociology has, as it were, passed us by. First, the contemporary debates between Marxists and Weberians, and their ramifications in studies of class, mobility, labour market, etc., have not made an imprint on the local problematic. Second, attempts made in recent years to understand East Asian 'exceptionalism' by comparing its social structures and processes with the advanced industrial world, viz. by marrying 'exogenous' and 'endogenous' sociology, have not fallen on fertile soil in Hong Kong. On the whole, we feel there is an inadequate self-awareness, or to use Gouldner's term, 'reflexiveness', on the part of the local sociological studies, with regard to their forefather-tradition, be it the political arithmetic one or the radical alternative. What, however, particularly worries us is that just as a lack of adequate research does not prevent policies from being passed, so a dearth of research on inequality and class does not prevent scholars from harping on the identity and political mission of 'new middle class' in Hong Kong.⁵ Without a clear and systematic picture of the social structure, we submit, political analysis looks like demagogue tracts, and sociological arguments little more than *exposé* (see detailed discussion in Wong and Lui 1992).

What, then, explains this gaping hole in our sociological terrain?⁶ In the mid-60s, Jarvie and Agassi (1969), musing over the general lack of sociological studies of the colony, concluded that it was due to, first, the Western (especially American sinologists and anthropologists) perception of Hong Kong as a 'colonial fossil', that one is better off studying Chinese society in Taiwan; and, second, the

lack of research personnel and support. But surely, we have come a long way since then. If Hong Kong is still a 'colonial fossil', it is one which has, paradoxically, 'come of age', and is indeed a very interesting fossil. And there is now certainly no lack of competent and committed researchers, whether local or not. The answer, or better, partial answer, we believe, lies in the general discursive structure of the majority of our sociological studies. We shall try to address this issue along two aspects: the point of departure of these studies, and the conception of the Hong Kong social structure implicit in them.

The starting point for most Hong Kong studies is this apparent paradox: why is it that, unlike other modernizing societies, Hong Kong could achieve both prosperity *and* stability? Why is it that she is spared of the civil unrest and social instability which are afflicted on other developing societies in their trajectories of economic growth and political modernization? We have come to believe that Lau's framework of 'minimally-integrated socio-political entity' has provided an elegant and impressive solution to that paradox. At the risk of glossing him, we think his answer (see particularly, Lau 1982, 1983, 1988) is this: in terms of institutional resources and behaviour, and of ethical orientations, the Chinese society in Hong Kong largely looks after itself; it is a society relying on centripetal, and thus inward-turning and self-reliant, family efforts for social advancement, and the ethos reflected and buttressed these efforts.

On the other hand, the government (the polity), either by omission or commission, by the art of governance or by sheer administrative short-sightedness, has kept itself largely out of the business of 'society', just as the latter sees this as the best way to do their business of making good and becoming successful. Doing what they think as the best or the expedient, harmony of interests is achieved, and the greatest welfare is created.⁷ Although Lau did not put it in so many words, it seems as if the 'invisible hand' has donned another glory. This framework has become, we think, the cornerstone of the discursive structure of many sociological studies. Theses such as

'utilitarian familism', 'social accommodation of politics', 'egoistical individualism', or 'administrative absorption of politics' have either substantiated the self-helping nature of the Chinese society, or refined the relation between 'society' and 'polity'. The edifice of 'minimally integrated socio-political framework' is left unaffected. Indeed, we would venture to say that it becomes even more solidified (though, in our view, not necessarily more valuable or justified) as subsequent studies address to the various areas of inquiries entailed by the general framework. The studies of community service delivery (Lau, Kuan and Ho, 1986), of bureaucratic and community leadership (Lau and Kuan, 1986), and ethos' are attempts to examine the society-polity relationship in specific institutional and 'ideological' contexts. It is in this sense that we feel justified to say that there is a predominant discursive structure in Hong Kong studies.⁸

From the vantage point of this paradigmatic structure, Chinese society is conceptualized as consisting of a myriad of families or family-centred resource networks, each keeping very much to itself, and with all competing openly in the 'game' of social advancement. In the absence of horizontal integration among these familial groups, potential leaders would find the task of forging links and building organization a daunting one (Lau and Ho 1982; Wong and Lui 1992; Wong 1992). We hold that this conception of the social structure is inadequate and also misleading. For one, it is divested of any interest in the differentials of life-chance resources among the familial groups; if 'utilitarian familism' or some variant of it is fundamentally concerned about collective 'bootstrap-pulling', involving resources and opportunities (and the implications for politicization of needs and demands), then, obviously, differentials in these respects ought to be of paramount importance. Furthermore, who are the people using these resource networks? How are the networks used? With the basic constraining and conditioning factors on social relationships untackled, what we are left with is what we in another context called an 'underdeveloped' conception of social structure (Wong & Lui 1992). Secondly, given the fact that the general intellectual

orientation is not really enamoured of structural basis such as class, it is just a small step to using instrumental and privatized social ethos evinced from attitudinal findings to hammer home the point that: 'social classes as structural forces in shaping interpersonal relationships and political actions are relatively insignificant in Hong Kong' (Lau & Kuan 1988:66). What is, as it were, deflected from one's discursive framework is further ruled out of court by the finding that there is a 'feeble sense of class division and class conflict'. Subjective irrelevance is conflated with objective insignificance. However, it is useful to remind ourselves that:

The absence of explicit class 'discourses' does not betoken the absence of class realities and their effects in shaping the life-conditions and consciousness of the people who come within their 'field of force'. If these class situations and oppositions have not been directly mirrored in the political domain, it can hardly be concluded that people have no class interests or even that they have chosen not to express these interests politically. (Wood 1986:97)

By prematurely excluding the question of class from the agenda of studies⁹, studies have tended to rely on normative and cultural explanations. (In regard to the discourse on politics and political stability, we have characterized the change as 'from one brand of politics to one brand of political culture'.) The net result is something not much different from that characterized and criticized by Blackburn with reference to the 'affluent worker' studies in Britain. It is worth quoting him at length:

(closely related to the concerns of individual action and choice) is an emphasis on values. There is a corresponding lack of attention to the contexts of action, including the constraints, process of structural reproduction, and the cognition of individuals. Social stability, therefore, has (had) to be explained in terms of 'acceptance' based on some sort

of free or manipulated value consensus. (quoted in Newby 1982)

What with such a theoretical disposition, it is then natural that the related question of social mobility has hardly been approached; more often, the existence and indeed the value of social mobility have simply been taken for granted by the layman and the sociologist alike. What is then singularly interesting, perhaps ironic, is that the meaning of social mobility - the extent of movement in social position within some hierarchical structure by individuals of diverse social origins - is actually underlying some of the most important sociological theses. Could not one say, for instance, that 'utilitarian familism' (as an ethos and as an organizational and interactional structure) is indeed some mobility strategy? Are not attempts to recount the reasons of Hong Kong's success assuming this unspoken question, that the opportunities available have made possible upward mobility for many, and that this in turn makes for a stabilizing mechanism for the society? Or, to take another example, in examining the small factory owners and their entrepreneurial drives, their flexibility, and so on, aren't we also pointing to the emergent problem of mobility and flux/fluidity in at least occupational, if not in class, terms? That this question - social mobility as the unrecognized lynch-pin of these studies - remains unarticulated, and unaddressed in structural terms, goes some way, we believe, to reflect the generally non-structural approach of most Hong Kong studies, and to justify the need for reinstating the issue of class and social mobility.

Our approach and our study will be detailed in the following sections. It is our hope that our findings, and the significance that the reader may find in them, will do a better job - than what has been said so far - of demonstrating the need and the value of reinstating class. And it is our goal that our study may mark the beginning of a new discursive framework, from whence studies will display a greater reflexiveness, a concerted attempt to 'do endogenous sociology', and,

lastly, a readiness to confront the question of analytical traditions and their underlying socio-political interests.¹⁰

Part Two: A benchmark study of social mobility in Hong Kong

We have mentioned above that the two traditions of 'social hierarchy', and 'class formation' discussed by Goldthorpe should ultimately be seen as a difference in approach and emphasis, rather than one of principle. This is more so, we believe, in regard to the study of this subject in Hong Kong society. We can ill afford to side with one tradition, while there is a glaring gap in our understanding of the degree of openness in our society, of the barriers and breaks in our social structure, and the implications of these for the individual and for group/collectivity formation. In our benchmark study of social mobility in Hong Kong, we aimed to tackle the issues germane to both the 'individual' and the 'structure' tradition. If the following reads like a hodgepodge of findings, and worse, findings in search of a theme, it is to some extent inevitable; and although readers may see that the findings do not coherently tell a Hong Kong story, they are none the less pertinent to important themes in the literature of social stratification. Our long-term aim is to provide a structural and developmental understanding of Hong Kong society (thence our 'programmatics'), and the findings, together with the theories and techniques, presented here could at best amount to some rough sketch. Given our more limited purpose here, we do not attempt to fill in the necessary background - documents, figures or polemics - for all the issues we address; indeed, we do not find it at all possible or feasible to do so within the confines of this paper. What we intend to do - and we hope the following will bear us out - is to bring 'proportion and relation' to the long-due need of reinstating studies of inequalities and opportunities back into the fold of Hong Kong studies.

The Class Schema and General Profile

Our target population is consisted of male household heads¹¹ aged 20 to 64 in January 1989; our sampling frame Hong Kong-wide households randomly chosen from district- and block-stratified sample blocks provided by the Census and Statistics Department.¹² We successfully interviewed 1000 household heads during the three-and-a-half months of the fieldwork. The age parameter of 20-64 is chosen so as to capture both those young school-leavers, at the beginning of their worklife, and those near the end of the worklife, or who have retired but still having fresh memory of their last occupation. We paid particular emphasis to occupational details and worklife history, for such information will, according to our theoretical position, provide us with a solid basis for determining class position, and coming up with a class structure of the society. Over 50% of our respondents are in the prime of their working life (30-45), while 17% are near the end of the (formal) working life (55-64). Those who have less than, say, 10 years of active working life (aged 20-25) constitute about 5% of our sample. Nearly 80% have held more than one job (in a different organization) since their first entry into the labour market, thus enabling us to study their worklife history as representing 'intra-generational mobility'. An overwhelming majority of our respondents is married (83%). The proportion of those born in Hong Kong amounts to 45%; so does those born elsewhere; of the latter, not surprisingly, most of them are from the Quangdong province. The 'normalcy' of the population is just barely attested. For those not born in Hong Kong, very few are recent immigrants. Only 4% of this group have been in Hong Kong for less than 5 years (it rises to 14% if less than 10 years; still a relatively small number). Nearly 80% have lived in Hong Kong for 10 to 40 years. The 'stable' character of our sample population is evident, and is further compounded by their common place of origin. When asked about whether they plan ('dasuan') to emigrate, one-quarter replied yes. The 1997 issue certainly accounts for part of this; but all the same, the 'fluidity' of the population is something not alien to the society and its history.

Our younger respondents are on the whole better educated than the old, and, as compared with the older counterpart, they are less likely to have their schooling interrupted. Yet, two facts are noteworthy. First, nearly every one in three of the younger group (25-34) *did* have their schooling interrupted, due to various reasons; secondly, again comparing the young and the older groups, the younger people do not necessarily have better educated fathers, perhaps pointing to the 'first-generation' educational characteristic of the locally born people. As compared with the 1986 by-census survey, our respondents are slightly better educated, although there are fewer upper secondary students and matriculants in our sample. Our sample is definitely doing better in money terms (both personal and household income). And we have less people in self-contained private housing block, more in the public housing sector, and in the home-ownership blocks; 90% of our respondents and their families occupy whole flat, while there are very few 'tenement hall' type of housing (cf. Maunder 1969; Commerce and Industry Department 1964; Ho 1991, for discussion of the housing problem at different points of Hong Kong history). A comparison with the 1986 By-census data with regard to a few selective profile indicators is in the following tables (see Tables 1-3).

Table 1: General Profile -- Educational Attainment

Level of educational attainment	Our Study (1989)	By-Census (1986)
No schooling/kindergarten	6	14
Primary	31	29
Lower secondary	23	18
Upper secondary	21	25
Matriculation/Technical/ Commercial diploma/certificate	9	7
Tertiary (non-degree)	4	3
Tertiary (degree)	6	4

Table 2: General Profile -- Monthly Household Income

Monthly household income (HK\$)	Our Study (1989)	By-Census (1986)
Under 2000	0	10
2000-4999	12	49*
5000-9999	44	23**
10000-14999	22	10
15000-24999	14	4***
25000 & above	8	5****

* The census category is 2000-5999

** The census category is 6000-9999

*** The census category is 15000-19999

**** The census category is 20000 and above

Table 3: General Profile -- Type of Living Quarters

Type of quarters	Our Study (1989)	By-Census (1986)
Housing Authority/ Housing Society Public Housing	46	41
Housing Authority Temporary Housing	3	2
Self-contained private housing	35	39
Non-self-contained private Home-ownership blocks	5	0*
	7	4
Roof-top housing	1	1
Others	2	13

*0.1%

Our theoretical framework is derived from the Goldthorpe class schema. To put it briefly, we hold that the following are true and important for our perspective:

- (a) an individual's occupation is a congealed outcome of his efforts to compete in a primarily market-mediated context, and is of foremost importance in affecting, and reflecting, his life-chance and life-chance-related matters¹³;
- (b) in approaching the nature of occupation, the broad components of market situation and work situation (cf. Lockwood 1958:13-16 for original formulations) combined to form an indicator robust enough to be of relevance to variant conditions of external competitiveness and of internal advantages such as training and promotion prospects.¹⁴ The ultimate aim is to incorporate both employment conditions and the relations at the production/work unit into our occupation *qua* class measure. The differentiation in work situation also confronts the factor of 'management - supervision - sheer employee' directly, and is, in our view, both technically more viable and theoretically less problematic than what the neo-Marxist researcher is wont of doing¹⁵;
- (c) the class positions that resulted are not necessarily hierarchical; there is also no presupposition of conflict or domination. Rather, the belief is simply that classes conceived this way capture an important slice of reality, that of resources and prerogatives derived through the incumbency of occupational positions in a basically competitive-market context. Interests could be attributed to classes, and action forged with them; but first and foremost, classes are only the material on which interest and action could be built. Classes, in our view, are made to delineate broad inequalities in the society with a view to seeing the

matter not so much as inequalities as such ('who owns what') but as 'proportion and relation', power and prestige, generated by the occupational distribution of the society. To us, classes are not social relationships of exploitation, existing independently, or prior to, of individuals.¹⁶ Nor are they simply nominal concepts, such as white-collar and blue-collar workers. They are concepts about the social structure and the social process. But before they could be used to, so to say, bear on the latter, and further, made to 'act' (as if transforming from Durkheim's mechanical solidarity, where, to change the metaphor again, one potato adds to another without creating anything new, to organic solidarity, where we are talking of a qualitatively distinct social order), we must first understand their chance of becoming viable demographic and then socio-political entities. This is why the analysis of inflows and outflows, relative mobility propensities and the socio-demographic profile over time of the different classes is so crucial to us. For without this analysis (which is primarily couched in terms of the individual, and not the position), we just cannot ascertain the likelihood, or the direction, of classes becoming socio-political and cultural entities.¹⁷

Given the above considerations, we have tried, in our research, to probe for detailed occupational information, in many cases going beyond the request for an occupational title. Such information is essential for grafting our occupations onto the OPCS classification lists (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys 1980) on which Goldthorpe constructed his class schema.¹⁸ Detailed information is also gathered on the respondent's employment status and managerial/supervisory duties. With the occupational information, we then coded our respondents' occupations first into the OPCS scheme (consisting of 547 occupations)¹⁹, and then, by the use of a convenient look-up table, generously provided to us by Marshall and his research team, we arrived at the class position by matching the

OPCS code with the corresponding employment status of the respondent. (For a sample of the look-up table, see Figure 2.)

Figure 2: Sample of the Lookup Table for Coding Goldthorpe's Class Schema

Occupational title no.	OPCS occupational code	Code of Employment Status						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
156	059.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
157	060.1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
158	060.2	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
159	060.3	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
160	060.4	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
161	060.5	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
162	060.6	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
163	061.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
164	061.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
165	061.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
166	062.1	1	5	6	-	-	-	8
167	062.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
168	062.3	1	5	6	-	-	-	8
169	063.1	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
170	063.2	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
171	063.3	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
172	063.4	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
173	064.0	1	5	6	2	2	-	9
174	065.1	-	-	6	-	-	-	10
175	065.2	-	-	6	-	-	-	10
176	066.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
177	066.2	-	-	-	-	-	8	10
178	067.1	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
179	067.2	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
180	067.3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
181	067.4	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
182	067.5	-	-	-	-	-	8	-

Our class schema is eleven-folded, though in our analysis, we would collapse it into a seven-folded class scheme, and occasionally, into a three-folded one, and occasionally a dichotomous one between the non-manual and the manual classes. The Hong Kong class structure, based on the 7-folded scheme, is as follows (Table 4):

Table 4: The Hong Kong Class Structure

7-folded Class	Brief Description	N	%	3-folded Class
I	Upper Service Class: Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials, managers in large establishments, larger proprietors	81	8.6	} Service
II	Lower Service Class: lower-grade professionals, administrators, higher-grade technicians, managers in small business and industrial establishments, supervisors of non-manual employees	107	11.3	
III	Routine non-manual employees in commerce and administration, personal service workers and shop sales personnel	90	9.6	} Intermediate
IV	Petty Bourgeoisie: small proprietors, artisans, contractors, with or without employees	132	14.0	
V	Lower-grade technicians, supervisors of manual workers	150	15.9	
VI	Skilled manual workers	149	15.8	} Working
VII	Semi-skilled and unskilled workers, agricultural workers	234	24.8	

A few additional remarks are in order here. Our class structure is about objective matters; we hold that what people do in their work, and whether they are self-employed or not, are important markers, and dividers, of status and resources. Unlike occupational status, our occupation-class positions are not synthetic, and subjective, measures of status; they have nothing to do with the way people weigh different positive and negative elements in their mind and come up with a synthetic view. Whether our class map is truer or better than others rests with our ability to obtain comprehensive and undistorted occupational information, and it is something that can be adjudged empirically. Secondly, although we have said earlier that according to our theoretical framework, classes derived this way are not necessarily hierarchical in nature, we nonetheless feel that some sense of hierarchy or at least inequality must be entailed or involved in interpreting our class structure. If there are vast class differences with regard to educational attainment, or housing type, then certainly one is justified, without recouring to the problem of prestige and class, in saying that there are differences in desirability of positions, in superior and inferior positions. At the very least, the two ends of the class structure could be perceived in this broadly hierarchical fashion. Finally, as in most stratification studies, we have not been able to include the very rich and the most powerful into our scheme. This is perhaps a limitation of the survey study, and perhaps also a limitation of our theoretical framework. In any case, the notion of 'service class', which we took from Goldthorpe (and he from Renner), bespeaks an European stratification tradition where professors and doctors (the old professional) were given more deference and significance than say the capitalist. This however will lead us to the cultural aspect of stratification, which obviously we cannot begin to tackle here. We just raise this point as a reminder of our particular theoretical orientation, and as a signpost for future discussion.²⁰

It might be useful if we sketch a few areas where class differences are significant. First, it is interesting to note that more than 80% of our service classes (class I and II) respondents were already in Hong

Kong with their families when they were only 14 years old. In comparison, only 50%, and sometimes less, of the working classes (class VI-VII), were so. This difference, other than suggesting perhaps a 'late-starter' character for our working class families (with the corollary that the 'upper classes' had a longer and more favourable formative period), should really draw our attention to the larger issue of the relatively distinct nature and composition of the successive waves of immigration into Hong Kong, and the ways families of different class backgrounds made their way in the new environment. In a later section, where we examine mass mobility trends by age cohorts, we would return to these themes (although we would be the first to caution against making over-generalized linkages, given the general lack of data).

We mentioned earlier that interruption of schooling among the younger people is still noteworthy, despite the fact that they are better educated than the more elderly. Among the younger age group (25-34), nearly one in three has had his primary education interrupted once due to various reasons. This implies that even by the early 70s, education was still not, so to say, plain sailing for a sizable number of young people. And what is further noteworthy is that there is little class difference on this point: class I and II respondents fared just as badly (with 23%) as the petty bourgeoisie (class IV: 23%) and the working classes (class VI & VII: 20%). It, however, is a different story, when we come to the eventual outcome. With regard to educational attainment, class differences are evident and unmistakable: 80% of class I respondents attained upper secondary and above qualifications, with half of them acquiring tertiary education (both degree and non-degree, but excluding commercial/technical education). The working classes fared much worse: only 18% of them (class VI & VII) have achieved secondary and above qualifications; indeed, upper secondary education is virtually their ceiling, the farthest they could go. The petty bourgeoisie (class IV) are doing not much better than the manual working classes: only 20% of them acquired upper secondary and matriculation standard.

The issue of the educational credentials of the petty bourgeoisie deserves more detailed exploration. For instance, one could find that, in terms of level of educational attainment, educational track, and type of education, the petty bourgeoisie's experience is very similar to that of the working classes. Thus, one could find that 66% - as compared with 77% of class VI, and 68% of class VII - of the petty bourgeoisie attained an education only up to the lower secondary level. In terms of educational track, the data show that up to lower secondary level, the 'spread' of the petty bourgeoisie resembles closely those of classes VI and VII. Lastly, the majority of them also received Chinese language-type education, again, very much similar to the working class counterpart (especially during the secondary-school period).

Class differences are also quite marked in the area of type of housing and housing tenure. More than 60% of the service classes are living in self-contained private housing; in contrast, 57% of the working classes, and similarly for the routine non-manual class (class III), are found in the Housing Authority/Housing Society public housing blocks. Compared to the working classes, more of the petty bourgeoisie (47%) were accommodated in self-contained private housing. As for tenure, again, 65% of the service classes owned their accommodation, while for the working classes, the majority (ranging from 67% for the unskilled workers to 76% for the skilled workers) rented their premises. Again, the routine non-manual class is in a similar housing predicament as their manual counterpart. And, for the petty bourgeoisie, more of them (55%) owned than rented (45%) their living quarters.

Turning to income, 90% of the highest income group (monthly income of \$20,000 and above derived from main occupation) are from the service classes. While over 95% of the service class respondents earned more than \$6,000 a month, three-quarters of the unskilled workers (class VII) earned between \$1,500 and 6,000. The situation of the routine non-manual workers and the petty bourgeoisie

provides some interesting contrasts. Whereas 90% of the former earned between \$3,000 and 10,000 a month, the income distribution of the latter has a wider and more even spread: 38% earned between \$3,000 and 6,000; 39% between 6,000 and 10,000, 17% between 10,000 and 20,000, and 4% more than 20,000. Thus whereas in terms of educational attainment, type of education and, to a certain degree, housing conditions, the petty bourgeoisie shared some similarities with the working classes, in terms of material well-being, it is closer to the service classes, and is in many respects better-off than the routine non-manual class. Thus, with regard to monthly household income, the petty bourgeoisie is more comfortable than the working class and the routine non-manual class, with nearly half of the households earning between \$10,000 and 25,000, and 17% of it topping the \$25,000 and above range.

In terms of the ability of the different classes to accumulate wealth, given the obvious difficulty of tapping such information (and also given the fact that we did not include real estates investment as an option), only 27% of our respondents admitted that they have one or more investments (be it shares, foreign currency..). None the less, our finding reveals that more than 50% of the service classes, in comparison with only 17% of the class VII, had such investments. The class differences in monthly income from main occupation, household income, and investments, are all statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).

Concerning wives and their economic status, we find that relatively more 'upper' (in the following, whenever this term is used, we refer to the service classes) classes respondents' wives have full-time work (54% as compared with 37% of the unskilled working class). But if the job is part-time in nature, one sees a reverse of the picture: more working class wives are engaged in part-time jobs. Only 5% of the wives are engaged in outwork, most of whom are found in the working class families.

Lastly, we must note that there is little difference between the upper and the lower classes in regard to family (or better, household) type. In interpreting the findings, we, however, must bear the following caveats in mind. The meaning of the relation between class and family composition, is somewhat tricky. We are not here attributing a substantive relation between the two variables, for, firstly, class position in our case is only that of the respondent, the male household head; secondly, our survey unit is that of the household; thirdly, there are cases where the respondent is simply the principal earner of the household, and as such, is not the focus or 'cause' of the family structure. In other words, the full structure and complexity of the family/household under question could be due to the, so to say, undertaking of the father or mother still living with the respondent. Further, in our survey, we have about 150 unmarried household heads; one may very well doubt the centrality of their class position to the structure or composition of the household. In any case, the finding is as follows (see Table 5):

Table 5: Social Class and Household Composition

	Service Class	Routine Non-manual	Petty Bourgeoisie	Working Class
Unextended nuclear*	62%	53%	64%	64%
Vertically extended**	2%	0	0	4%

* This includes the following: R(espondent)+Sp(ouse)/R+Sp+S(on)/R+Sp+S+D(aughter)/R+Sp+S+D. Although we have followed the census terminology and definitions, we have excluded the 'single parent with one or more children' cases.

** Inclusive: R+Sp+R's parents+S+D. There are only 36 cases in our sample.

The predominance of the nuclear type is not affected by class differences. The 1986 By-census also shows that 59.2% of the domestic households are of the 'one unextended nuclear family' type (but note the slight difference from our definition). But for our purpose here, and given the proviso mentioned above, it is obvious that the relation between class and family structure must await a future analysis, and perhaps a different approach from one taken here, which takes into account and elucidates the relation between class and fertility, resources and relationships, and generally the effect of class on the family life-cycle.

As a preliminary analysis of the relation between class and fertility, we have the following results (see Table 6):

Table 6: Social Class and Fertility

Class		Average Number of Children ever Born
I	Upper Service Class	2.1
II	Lower Service Class	2.0
III	Routine non-manual	2.2
IV	Small proprietors	2.7
V	Technicians/supervisors	2.8
VI	Skilled manual worker	2.4
VII	Semi- and unskilled worker	2.8

Note: The chi-square result is not statistically significant.

Although our study is a benchmark inquiry into class, inequalities and social mobility, it might also be worthwhile to explore other easily available data sets, and see if they are amenable to some reconstructed secondary analysis, with the view to providing some tentative reference or preliminary comparison. With this purpose in mind, we have recoded the activity status (full-time, economically active population) and occupation of the male household heads (aged 19 to 64) of a 1% random sample of the 1986 By-census, and come up with a roughly comparable class scheme.²¹ A comparison of this class structure with ours, in relation to educational attainment is presented in table 7:

Table 7: Social Class and Educational Attainment (in %)

Class*	Level of Educational Attainment**							
	K'g	U.P.	L.S.	U.S.	Matri	Tech	N.D.	Degree
I (I)	1 (0)	5 (3)	9 (10)	24 (23)	4 (7)	0 (7)	19 (10)	38 (40)
II (II)	4 (0)	31 (5)	19 (9)	25 (27)	4 (10)	1 (8)	7 (14)	9 (27)
III (III)	2 (2)**	22 (12)	18 (15)	42 (40)	9 (19)	0 (3)	4 (5)	4 (5)
IV (III)**	11	43	26	14	3	0	1	2
V (IV)	12 (8)	60 (39)	16 (27)	12 (16)	0 (3)	0 (1)	0 (2)	0 (4)
VI (V,VI,VII)	8 (9)	44 (39)	27 (27)	16 (17)	2 (2)	0 (4)	3 (2)	1 (0)

* Roman letters and percentages within parentheses refer to classes and percentages in our own class study. The classes constructed from the census data are as follows:
 I (Upper service class); II (Lower service class); III (routine non-manual, excluding service workers); IV (service workers); V (petty bourgeoisie); VI (manual workers, including supervisory workers and lower-grade technicians)*

- **
- K'g = Kindergarten & lower primary
 - U.P. = Upper primary
 - L.S. = Lower secondary
 - U.S. = Upper secondary
 - Matri = Matriculation
 - Tech = Technical & vocational
 - N.D. = Non-degree tertiary
 - Degree = University degree

- ***
- As delineated earlier, our Class III includes both routine non-manual workers and service workers.

What we have discussed so far reveals that there are some important areas where class differences are real and substantial. In terms of length of stay in Hong Kong, spouses' participation in the labour market, educational attainment level, income, investment and housing, the differences are noteworthy. But in a way, this is hardly novel. One could argue that the similarities between classes with respect to fertility, family composition or educational experience in the formative years are equally noteworthy and in need of explanation, for which, alas, there is a general lack of studies.²² The differences point, perhaps unsurprisingly, to differences in resources and general well-being, but there is, as yet in our discussion, no substantial evidence on the differences in relationships, opportunities and orientations, i.e. on those elements that make for or inhibit cohesiveness, or conduce to a sense of we-ness. A class analysis must go beyond general disparities in material or cultural resources, for in a way, the latter are simply additional indicators of the class positions. What we need to investigate further is the potential of these classes becoming significant forces in the society, and the basis and likelihood of their being organized into collective, interest-group, action.

To us, such an analysis involves a three-pronged exercise. First, we need to have some idea as to the openness of the Hong Kong society.

Do classes compete on the same footing? Is there equality of opportunity in Hong Kong?²³ Our findings on these questions can go some way to providing the link between opportunities, openness and class formation. Second, we need to examine the internal differentiation of each class; this will include a detailed look of its socio-demographic structure, and more importantly, its fluidity or fixity in terms of intergenerational and intragenerational mobility. The latter point involves an assumption (which we would hold and regard as reasonable) to the effect that fixity of class positions, whether within an intergenerational or intragenerational time frame, will conduce to cohesion, to the continuity of class-specific orientations and dispositions; and vice versa for fluidity. We would address questions like: how rigid is the class structure? how 'permeable' are the upper classes? what are the major breaks and barriers in the class structure? Thirdly, we need to examine the relative advantages attendant on different class positions in terms of their differential ability to transmit advantages over time, or their ability to capitalize on certain assets they happen to possess, or translate one kind of advantage to another in some cumulative fashion. These are the classic 'origins and destinations' questions, and are particularly pertinent, as we have argued in Part 1, to a tradition of social stratification studies which focuses on the individual and the social hierarchy, rather than on structure and class formation. But as we try to argue, the analyses will also have important implications for the issue of structure and class formation. We will now proceed to the findings on these three areas.

Openness and Equality of Opportunity: Absolute and Relative Mobility Rates

Our intergenerational mobility matrix is in the following table (Table 8):

Table 8: Intergenerational Mobility Matrix

Father's Class*	Son's (Respondent) Class in 1989							Total Fathers(%)
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
I	12	6	3	4	6	2	6	39
(%)	(30.8)	(15.4)	(7.7)	(10.3)	(15.4)	(5.1)	(15.4)	(5.2)
II	7	13	4	5	9	4	3	45
(%)	(15.6)	(28.9)	(8.9)	(11.1)	(20.0)	(8.9)	(6.7)	(6.0)
III	8	15	15	8	10	9	7	72
(%)	(11.1)	(16.7)	(20.9)	(11.1)	(13.9)	(12.5)	(9.7)	(9.6)
IV	28	27	21	43	37	35	60	251
(%)	(11.2)	(10.8)	(8.4)	(17.1)	(14.7)	(14.0)	(24.0)	(33.4)
V	8	11	7	7	12	16	6	67
(%)	(12)	(16.4)	(10.4)	(10.4)	(18)	(23.9)	(9.0)	(8.9)
VI	6	7	12	9	11	20	25	90
(%)	(6.7)	(7.8)	(13.3)	(10.0)	(12.2)	(22.2)	(27.8)	(12.0)
VII	7	15	13	22	38	32	61	188
(%)	(3.7)	(8.0)	(7.0)	(11.7)	(20.2)	(17.0)	(32.4)	(25.0)
Total Sons	76	94	75	98	123	118	168	752
(%)	(10.1)	(12.5)	(10.0)	(13)	(16.4)	(15.7)	(22.3)	(100.0)

- * This refers to the occupation that the father held when the respondent (son) was 14 years old. This is the common practice of determining the father's class in mobility studies. One may wonder if doing it the other way round, i.e. asking the father for the son's occupation, will make a difference. The general verdict is 'no'. See Broom *et. al.* (1978) for a methodological discussion of this problem.

The gross or total mobility (with the class scheme collapsed into three categories of 'service', 'intermediate' and 'working') comes to 55.2%; in less technical parlance, such mobility refers to the total rate of movements of respondents away, or different, from the occupational status of their fathers. Out of this total mobility, 12.6% is structural (or 'net') mobility (caused by the changes in the distributions of the marginals; this refers to the intuitive understanding of the intergenerational changes in the occupation structure), and 42.6% circulation (or 'exchange') mobility, viz. the rate of those who belong to different classes from those of their fathers, after the 'structural' mobility effect is deducted. The gross mobility rate is at any rate higher than those reported in Lipset and Bendix's study of industrial societies (1959). The upward mobility for a trichotomous class structure is 31.5%, and downward mobility 23.8, very much similar to that of the (allegedly closed) British society in the 1972 Oxford Mobility Study. (The rates are higher with the 7-folded categories: 42.4% for upward mobility, and 34% for downward mobility.) Another way of gauging the openness of Hong Kong society is to look at the pure mobility rate. The purpose is to see how far each class's mobility rate approximates the perfect mobility situation, viz. where the position of the son (respondent) is independent of that of the father. Here we have calculated both the Yasuda (1964) and the Boudon (1973) mobility index for each class and for the society as a whole:

Table 9: Yasuda and Boudon Indices

Class	Yasuda index*	Boudon index**
I (Upper S.C.)	0.77	0.69
II (Lower S.C.)	0.81	0.71
III (Routine non-manual)	0.88	0.79
IV (Petty Bourgeoisie)	0.84	0.56
V (Supervisors)	0.98	0.82
VI (Skilled manual)	0.92	0.78
VII (Unskilled manual)	0.85	0.64
Society as a whole	0.87	0.70

* The Yasuda index (y coefficient) is derived from

$$y_i = \frac{\min(n_{i.}, n_{.i}) - f_{ij}}{\min(n_{i.}, n_{.i}) - (n_{i.}, n_{.i})/n}$$

for the i th category

The greater the index approaches 1, the greater the pure mobility. The idea is to compare the observed pure mobility (the nominator in the equation) with the amount of pure mobility under the assumption of 'perfect mobility', viz. where there is no correlation between father's and son's position. (See Tominago & Naoi 1978)

** The Boudon index' (b_i coefficient) is derived from

$$b = \frac{\min(n_{i.}, n_{.i}) - f_{ij}}{\min(n_{i.}, n_{.i})}$$

The difference from the Yasuda index lies in the denominator. There is no comparison with the amount of pure mobility obtained under 'perfect mobility'; Boudon proposed this index because there is a defect in Yasuda's index. In the latter case, f_{ij} can be much smaller than $(n_{i.}, n_{.i})/n$, the number of cases obtained under 'perfect mobility', thus rendering y_i greater than 1. In this sense, Boudon's index is more descriptive in nature, while Yasuda's is more normative (by regarding the

state of 'perfect mobility' as yardstick). (See Boudon 1973; Pastore 1982)

We can see from these Yasuda figures that all except perhaps class I and II (both service classes) approximate closely the state of 'perfect mobility'. But if we consider the Boudon index as a more accurate measure (see notes to the table), then it is clear that the upper service class, the petty bourgeoisie and the unskilled manual class have a lower mobility rate than the other classes. The case of the petty bourgeoisie is somewhat peculiar, to which problem we would return later. (But a cursory look at our mobility matrix table will already show that while there are 251 petty bourgeoisie fathers, there are only 98 sons occupying the same class position.) On the whole, we may judge from the data that there is much mobility within the society, and in a very loose sense, one may say that our society has a high degree of openness. However, one must add that, when compared to other societies, either in terms of the gross rate, or the indices, ours is not particularly striking or unique. Similarly high rates are found in Tokyo, Chicago, Taiwan, Scandinavia (Tominago & Naoi 1978; Rogoff 1957; Sheu 1989), societies differing from one another historically, economically and politically. ²⁴

Clearly, then, our measures are not quite up to the task of ascertaining openness and opportunities. A whole array of other questions must be raised: how does the expansion of non-manual, professional/managerial occupations ('room at the top') affect mobility (by providing more opportunities, and thus accounting to some degree the openness)? How do various class backgrounds differ in their ability to take advantage of these opportunities? More specifically, and to anticipate a later argument, in what ways were the sons of petty bourgeois class background 'forced' out of this class, given the fact that a sizable number of their fathers were small proprietors (small shop-owners, or self-employed artisans with or without employees) when they were in Mainland China? (It should be noted that although self-employed farmer fathers are included in class IV, they do not constitute a majority of this class; and those

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employee farmer fathers are coded to class VII. It is true that given its migrant status, its short history as an industrial society, and given the rapidity of changes, some of the social mobility of Hong Kong could be characterized as mobility from one world to another. But to attribute its experience as one of the mobility of the peasant migrant is to miss the point.) Or, if the pure mobility index (Yasuda or Boudon) for the service classes (particularly the upper division) suggests a lower mobility rate than the other classes, does it imply a greater degree of inheritance (or class perpetuation), and if so, to what extent? To answer these questions, we must further look at other measures. The following table (Table 10) shows the change of the Hong Kong social structure as a function of the changes in the distribution (in percentages) of Father's and Son's classes:

Table 10: Distribution of Father's and Son's Classes (%)

Class	Father	Son
I (Upper S.C.)	5.2	10.1
II (Lower S.C.)	6.0	12.5
III (Routine non-manual)	9.6	10.0
IV (Petty Bourgeoisie)	33.4	13.0
V (Supervisors)	8.9	16.4
VI (Skilled manual)	12.0	15.7
VII (Unskilled manual)	25.0	22.3

The index of dissimilarity (Rogoff 1953; Pastore 1982), viz. the number of sons who have to shift occupations or class positions if their distribution is to be the same as the fathers', is 23%. To the extent that the distribution of the fathers and of the sons can be taken as some approximate indicator of the occupational structure of the society in the respective time period²⁵, we can see there was a great expansion of higher professional, managerial and administrative posts, i.e. class I occupations. (The fact of which could be generally - for here a different and less theoretical indicator is

involved here - borne out by surveying the census surveys.) The increased 'room at the top' (twice as many sons as fathers in class I and II occupations) is evident; this structural change probably accounted for much of the upward mobility we observed earlier. We can also note that there is a slight decrease in class VII occupations, again a phenomenon common to other industrial societies. The petty bourgeoisie represented a more striking case of decrease: there were nearly thrice as many fathers as sons in these occupations. If we look at the gross mobility rates (Table 11), and the 'forced mobility rates' for each individual class, we could have a better idea of the effect of the structural changes of Hong Kong society on the 'mobility propensities' of each class.

Table 11: Gross Mobility Rates

Class	Inflow	Outflow
I (Upper S.C.)	0.84	0.69
II (Lower S.C.)	0.86	0.71
III (Routine non-manual)	0.80	0.79
IV (Petty Bourgeoisie)	0.56	0.83
V (Supervisors)	0.90	0.82
VI (Skilled manual)	0.84	0.78
VII (Unskilled manual)	0.64	0.68

We could note that for the upper service class (class I), and, to a less extent, lower service class, there is, relatively speaking, high inflow rate and low outflow rate, suggesting that it is an expanding category, with a relatively high degree of self-recruitment.²⁶ The fact that more newcomers could join this class, while the degree of succession or inheritance is still relatively strong, can only be explained by the increased 'room at the top'. And in the Hong Kong context, one must bear in mind the relatively short period in which this expansion has taken place. For the unskilled manual class (VII), we find both low inflow and outflow rates, pointing to its contracting

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nature or tendency, and to the significant degree of inheritance. The intermediate classes all evinced great flux or mobility, both in terms of inflow or outflow rates, and we would argue later that much of the total mobility rate we found earlier must be accounted by the great flux in the intermediate regions of the class structure. There are areas or pockets of greater rigidity in the polar regions. The very low inflow rate for the petty bourgeoisie is partly explained, we believe, by the drastically reduced number of petty bourgeoisie occupations among the sons; the sons of petty bourgeois fathers were simply forced out of such background. The following table (Table 12) on 'forced mobility rates' further illustrates this:

Table 12: Forced Mobility Rate

Class	Forced mobility rate*
I (Upper S.C.)	-0.49
II (Lower S.C.)	-0.52
III (Routine non-manual)	-0.04
IV (Petty Bourgeoisie)	0.61
V (Supervisors)	-0.46
VI (Skilled manual)	-0.24
VII (Unskilled manual)	0.11

* By 'forced mobility rate', we refer to structurally induced mobility caused by change in the vectors of the two marginal distributions. (See Tominago & Naoi, 215 for mathematical notation.) A plus sign means forced outflow, and negative sign forced inflow.

From this table, we can see that only two classes have experienced 'forced outflow': the petty bourgeoisie and the unskilled manual workers, with the former attaining a striking degree, and the latter only weakly so.

So far we have been concerned only with the absolute mobility rates, whether pertaining to the society as a whole, or to the individual classes. These mobility rates have managed, we think, to throw light on the general structural changes of Hong Kong society, as well as pointing to the differential mobility propensities of the individual classes. There has been a remarkable increase of opportunities, if the expansion of the 'room at the top' is anything to go by. And the society is, based on the absolute mobility rates (which basically measures the degree of flux or fluidity extracted from the mobility table), open and mobile; although we would hasten to add that a cursory comparison with other societies with a less vaunted economic ideology or a less fabled ethos of Chinese entrepreneurship shows that Hong Kong is not particularly successful or remarkable in this regard. These findings, we hope, have laid the basis for a comparison with other East Asian or Western societies, and will thus contribute to the debate about whether the mobility rates and patterns of industrial societies constitute some core and common features and tendencies, or whether they just represent some 'trendless fluctuations'.

We do not intend to pursue this subject here, although a study has been made of our data in this direction.²⁷ What we want to look at concerns two questions: First, the class differentials with regard to mobility chance; in other words, given the available opportunities, do people of different class backgrounds have an equal chance of making advantage of them, and in the process, improve their life stations? This is the question of equality of opportunity in a basically open society.²⁸ For this, we have to examine the relative mobility rates. The second question is one of class formation: given the intergenerational changes, how likely is it for some core socio-demographic continuity to develop within a class, and thence form the basis of a cohesive, collective and eventually self-conscious entity? In the following, we would first answer the question of class differentials in mobility chance, and, in the next section, we approach the more intricate problem of class formation.

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Before proceeding to the relative chance of mobility, there are a few more aspects of the mobility regime worth investigating. We have prepared the outflow and inflow tables (see Table 13), using the three-folded class categories.

Table 13: Outflow and Inflow Statistics (in %)

Outflow					Inflow				
Son's class*					Son's class*				
I	II	III	Total		I	II	III		
I	45.2	37.0	17.8	100.0	I	22.4	10.5	5.2	
II	24.8	41.1	34.1	100.0	II	57.0	54.1	46.5	
III	12.6	37.8	49.6	100.0	III	20.6	35.4	48.3	
					Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	

* See the Hong Kong Class Structure (p.30) above for composition of the 3-folded class scheme.

From the outflow table, we see that nearly half of those with service class background (class I & II; collapsed here as I in the 3-folded schema) remained in the same class position; similarly half of those with working class (class VI & VII, collapsed into III in the 3-folded schema) fathers followed in their fathers' footsteps. The degree of succession (or self-recruitment in regard to the outflows from the origin classes) is quite significant. But (to quote Heath 1980), self-recruitment does not mean closure. If one turns to the inflow table, one sees that more than half of the service classes membership is filled by the intermediate classes; and 47% of the working classes also came from the intermediate classes. If we refer back to the 7-folded class structure, and look at the inflows, we can find that for

the upper service class, more than one-third of it was filled by people with petty bourgeois class background, and another 28% came from the three blue-collar classes. It means in effect that about 60% of class I are upwardly mobile newcomers, with no hitherto non-manual background or experience.²⁹ The answer again is due to the expansion of the 'room at the top'. But more importantly, it reflects the heterogeneity of the service classes. While one may think that, in contrast, the unskilled working class (class VII) will be much more homogeneous in its composition, resulting in some 'captive' toiling class, with fixed 'station and duties', the situation is actually more fluid. More than one-third of its membership came from people with petty bourgeois class background. But, as we shall try to amplify later on, there is an increasing tendency for the working classes to become more self-recruiting and stable. As for the inflow into petty bourgeoisie (class IV), nearly 40% was from the three blue-collar classes.

What we have here is then a situation where self-made 'new men' shared a similar life-chance situation with those 'born to succeed', those who made from rags to riches coexisting with those from riches to riches, or those from riches to rags with those from rags to rags. Although we do not want to overstate the case, we need to see if such heterogeneity is reflected in socio-political attitudes, and whether the mobility experience (upward or downward) will make a difference to these attitudes and the possibility of a socio-political identity. We shall return to these issues in a later section. Now, let us look at the relative mobility chance of the different classes.

One way to measure the relative mobility chance of different classes is to compare their chance of attaining a certain class position to what would have happened if there was 'perfect mobility'. (This is similar to the Yasuda index, although here we are more concerned about the relative rate.) Table 14 on Indices of Association serves to bring out some features³⁰ :

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Table 14: Indices of Association

Father's class	Indices of Association Son's class		
	I	II	III
I	2	0.9	0.5
II	1.1	1	0.9
III	0.6	1	1.3

We can see that twice as many class I (the service classes) respondents are intergenerationally stable as would be expected if fathers' and sons' class positions were unrelated. To a less extent, we find also a noteworthy degree of intergenerational stability among the class III respondents. There is little downward mobility, with 'perfect mobility' as the yardstick, of class I background people to class III positions. Similarly, it seems it is relatively difficult for class III background people to climb up to class I positions. No doubt, these are general sketches, but they represent problems or issues central to the question of the rigidity or permeability of the class structure, and all the attendant barriers and breaks. Our answer to these issues will in turn have important bearings on the question of class formation: it would be reasonable to assume that continuous streams of upwardly mobile newcomers will, by creating sheer heterogeneity, hamper the formation of a cohesive, self-conscious class identity. These general ideas prompted us to undertake more sophisticated statistical analyses of mobility tables, to which we would return later.

The following tables (Tables 15-18) on disparity ratios and odds ratios (in regard to both the 3-folded and 7-folded class schema) further compare the class differentials in mobility chance:

Table 15: Disparity Ratios (3-folded Class Schema)

Father's class	Son's class Relative chances of being found in		
	I	II	III
I	3.6	1.0	0.4
II	2.0	1.1	0.7
III	set at 1	set at 1	set at 1

Table 16: Disparity Ratios (7-folded Class Schema)

Father's class	Son's class Relative chances of being found in						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
I	8.3	1.9	1.1	.88	.76	.30	.48
II	4.2	3.6	1.3	.95	.99	.52	.21
III	3.0	2.1	3.0	.95	.69	.74	.30
IV	3.0	1.4	1.2	1.5	.73	.82	.74
V	3.2	2.1	1.5	.89	.89	1.4	.28
VI	1.8	1.0	1.9	.85	.60	1.3	.86
VII set at	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

Table 17: Odds Ratios (3-folded Class Schema)

Pairs of origin classes 'in competition'	Pairs of destination classes competed for		
	I/II	II/III	I/III
I vs.II	2.0	1.8	3.5
II vs.III	1.8	1.6	2.9
I vs. III	3.7	2.8	10.2

Table 18: Selected Odds Ratios (7-folded Class Schema)

Pairs of origin classes	Pairs of destination classes competed for									
	I/III	I/IV	I/V	I/VII	III/IV	III/V	III/VII	IV/V	IV/VII	V/VII
I vs.III	7.5									
I vs.IV		4.6								
I vs.V			3.0							
I vs.VII				17.5						
III vs.IV					3.8					
III vs.V						2.6				
III vs. VII				10.0			10.0			
IV vs. V							2.0			
IV vs. VII								2.0		
V vs. VII				11.7						3.2

The table on disparity ratios for the 3-folded classification (Table 15) shows that men from class I origins have 3.6 times as much chance

as men from class III origins of being found in class I positions. With the 7-folded schema, the advantage of class I (upper service class) is even more obvious and marked: its chances of remaining in the same class position is more than eight times that of the unskilled workers (class VII) (Table 16). The chances for the lower service class (class II) are half of it, and those for the intermediate classes (class III to V) of the routine non-manual, the personal service workers, petty bourgeoisie and the supervisors and technicians are comparable, about three times that of the unskilled workers.

The odds ratios tables are even more useful in ascertaining the relative mobility chances of the different classes. These tables show the odds of one class as compared with another in arriving at one destination class rather than another. From the 3-folded classification schema, we find that class I (the service classes) background men have an advantage of 10.2 times over class III (semi- and unskilled workers) background competitors in arriving at class I rather than class III destination (Table 17). Such advantage, though to a less extent, is evident in other pairs of destinations. And turning to the selected odds ratios in the 7-folded scheme, one could see that professionals and top managers (class I) have a large and largely uncontested competitive edge over the clerical and personal workers, just as the latter group outcompetes the unskilled manual workers (class VII), whether it is a matter of remaining in the same class position or one of attaining a higher one (Table 18). It is also noteworthy that the supervisors and technicians (class V) have a substantial competitive advantage over the unskilled workers.³¹ Generally, the ways such advantage work through cannot be decided now, for it is ultimately a matter of individual achievement and not one of structural positions.³² Nonetheless, the class differentials in relative mobility chances should warn us against any generalized notion of equality of opportunity. In a later section on the relation between education and class, we will address this issue again, in which the extent and pattern of inequality of opportunity in Hong Kong will be discussed.*

Class Structure and Class Formation

In this section, we would examine two major issues. First, we attempt to understand some of the socio-demographic implications of mobility for class formation. Apart from juxtaposing the 'new men' and the 'old guards', thus creating greater heterogeneity, does upward mobility entail normative and relational discontinuities? Were the upwardly mobile 'uprooted', detached from their accustomed relationships and networks? And what about the downwardly mobile? How widespread is the phenomenon of *declassé*? Was there *ressentiment*? Although we could not possibly attend to all these questions, our findings will have some bearing on the potential of class formation. The second major issue we address concerns the rigidity of the class structure. We aim to delineate the areas where the greatest class barriers lie; again, we want to draw out the implications for the formation and identity of classes.

We stated earlier that about 60% of the service classes are upwardly mobile 'newcomers'. What does this say of the heterogeneity of these classes? Our data show that there are some important areas of objective difference between the 'newcomers' and the, as it were, 'born to succeed'. The following discussions, based on an analysis of the three-folded class schema, serve to bring out these differences. (For convenience's sake, we would contrast the inter-generationally stable service class (I-I) and working class (III-III), and those moving down from service class background to working class (I-III), and those moving up from working class background to service class position (III-I)).³³

It is interesting to note that the general socio-demographic background and experience of the intergenerationally stable and the upwardly mobile are very different. For one, while half of those, as it were, 'born to succeed' (I-I), had their birth place in Hong Kong, 80% of the 'self-made' men (III-I) were born elsewhere, mostly in Quangdong. The same pattern extends to the locale of their first job: more of the (III-I) group had built up their career in Hong Kong. The

educational background of the fathers of those upwardly mobile is quite different from those service class members experiencing no change in their position. While 57% of the latter group's fathers had upper secondary and above education, only 3% of those of the upwardly mobile had attained that qualification. Similarly, those 'born to succeed' are educationally more better-off than the newcomers: whereas only 43% of the latter finished matriculation and above education, 61% of those with a service class background, and thence perhaps a stronger tradition of 'cultural capital', had that educational attainment. For the (I-I) group, the employment status of their fathers was more varied, with about one-fifth of them being employers. In contrast, the fathers of the upwardly mobile group (III-I) were all employees, suggesting perhaps that their sons represent some 'self-made' generation. Perhaps the significance of these differences could be further highlighted by two facts. First, for the (I-I) group, more than 25% of them held managerial positions, whereas for the (III-I) group, none of them had a managerial employment status. Secondly, 63% of the (I-I) group had first jobs that put them into class I position; in contrast, the same could be said for only 28% of the (III-I) group. Indeed among the latter the group, more than 40% of its members started off in class III (semi- and unskilled manual) occupations; in contrast, it is only 11% for the I-I group.

Such differences point to the fact that within the service class, there are important elements of heterogeneity, based on original class background, worklife characteristics and general socio-demographic characteristics.³⁴ But it would be unjustified to exaggerate this point. For it is possible that the common *destination* class position will play an even more significant role in shaping the newcomers and the old guards alike, and that their present class location will make for a common socio-political orientation, and thus overweighing the differences and incompatibilities generated by different origins and mobility experience. In a way, this is exactly what we find.

Cross-tabulating the same three-folded class mobility trajectory scheme with a few socio-political attitudes, we find that with regard to three main areas, both the intergenerationally stable service class and the upwardly mobile service class shared common orientations. These three areas are work, politics and 'social justice'. (Again for simplicity's sake, for each area, we just select one item in our questionnaire to illustrate the point.) First, as Table 19 shows, the majority of both groups regard their work as having meanings other than that of simply making a living: 58% and 57% respectively. Then, in comparison with other mobility-trajectory groups, more respondents in both groups did not feel politically powerless.³⁵ Further, both of them disagreed that they were ignorant of political issues: 74% and 57% respectively. When asked more specifically about their views about the relative importance of stability and governmental reforms ('Do you agree with the view that as long as there is social stability, it does not matter how the government is constituted?'), the majority of both groups disagreed with the statement (see Table 20). Lastly, both groups shared a generally 'conservative' attitude towards social justice and exploitation: the majority of them disagreed that the relation between employer and employee is bound to be exploitative in nature, and that the labouring classes always get far less than what they give out (Table 21).

Table 19: Views on Meaning of Work by Mobility Experience* (in %)

Mobility experience**		Just means	More meaning
I	to I (intergenerationally stable)	42	58
III	to I (upward mobility)	43	57
I	to III (downward mobility)	93	7
III	to III (intergenerationally stable)	93	7

*Q. 'Is your present job just a means for earning a living, or does it mean much more to you than that?'

** Using the three-folded scheme, 'I to I' means the respondent is inter-generationally stable, with both he and his father occupying class I position. 'III to I' thus means an experience of upward mobility. The same categories apply to the following two tables.

Table 20: Views on Political Matters by Mobility Experience* (in %)

Mobility experience		Strongly Agree/Agree	Neutral	Strongly Disagree/Disagree
I	to I	21	5	74
III	to I	26	17	57
I	to III	33	0	67
III	to III	65	14	21

*Q. 'Tell me whether you agree or not to this view: Politics and government seem to be so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on.'

Table 21: Views on Exploitation by Mobility Experience* (in %)

Mobility experience	Strongly Agree/Agree	Neutral	Strongly Disagree/Disagree
I to I	24	5	71
III to I	17	3	80
I to III	43	14	43
III to III	46	18	36

*Q. 'Some people say that if the boss is to make a profit, he has to exploit his worker. Do you agree?'

In all these three areas, the service class, regardless of its class background and mobility trajectory, stands in contrast with the other classes. We may note that these three areas of work, politics and 'social justice' are domains of life where one's occupation, education or general control of resources are directly relevant or 'implicated'. These orientations touch on the more immediate concerns or imageries of one's life-chance position. To that extent, they represent the direct influence of one's present class location (in this case, that of the service class) on the formation of some core elements of the 'middle class' ethos or social imagery.³⁶

But we must put this phenomenon in perspective. Our findings, given the relatively small sample size and other inadequacies (part of which unavoidably arises from a survey research), could not be anything more than some preliminary, bold proposals. (The larger, theoretical, question - the crucial basis for middle class formation (is it politics, organizational-cum-occupational influence, culture or ethos?) - is immanent, and is an issue with too many theoretical and empirical aspects for us to resolve here.) But more importantly, we also feel that the formation of the Hong Kong middle class is still

something very much, so to say, only in the making. The nascent, just emergent, character of such ethos or social imagery becomes more evident when we realize that in regard to many other domains of life or social issues, the service class is at one with the other classes. These issues range from the traditional value placed on the obligation to support one's parents, to the hard-headed view of the inevitability of social conflicts between the haves and the haves-not, from the perception of the best means to improve one's lot (relying on 'self-efforts', rather than organized collectivities) to the recognition of steep inequalities in mobility chances between the upper and the lower classes, and from the uncompromising demand for more social welfare to the ascription of social characteristics to 'people like us'. The following provides a small selection of the questions and the responses (Tables 22-24).

Table 22: Views on Advancement Strategy by Class* (in %)

Class	Collectivistic	Individualistic
I	30	70
II	33	67
III	35	65
IV	31	69
V	35	65
VI	38	62
VII	45	55

- * Q. 'Some people say that the HK workers would be better off if they stick together and work for their common interests. Others say that the average worker would be better off if he makes greater efforts to go ahead on his own. Which view do you agree to?'

Table 23: Views on Class Differences in Career Development by Class* (in %)

Class	Strongly Agree/Agree	Neutral	Strongly Disagree/Disagree
I	36	12	52
II	26	9	65
III	30	5	65
IV	31	6	63
V	28	6	66
VI	26	4	70
VII	26	7	67

*Q 'Would you agree to the view that in HK today, the child of a factory worker has as much the same chance to get ahead as the child of a business executive?'

Table 24: Views on Supporting Family by Class* (in %)

Class	Strongly Agree/Agree	Neutral	Strongly Disagree/Disagree
I	63	6	31
II	66	11	23
III	80	10	10
IV	72	8	20
V	74	6	20
VI	77	9	14
VII	75	8	17

*Q 'Would you agree to the view that it is children's obligation to support their parents?'

All show unequivocally shared socio-political orientations cutting across class lines and mobility experiences. It may sound hedging the argument (and we may disappoint those who have followed through our programmatic and who have expected a resounding hitting-the-headlines empirical discovery), but we think it would be true to say that a distinct and firm basis for the formation of a middle class socio-political and cultural outlook or identity is still barely extant. It is noteworthy that here, mobility experience is an important variable: whereas 62% of the inter-generationally stable (I-I) group identified themselves with the 'middle class', 65% of the upwardly mobile group (III-I) saw themselves as belonging to the 'working class'. There is still a plethora of 'linkages and residues' tying the service class to its less fortunate fellows and to its less successful past.³⁷

Let us now turn to a different issue. We have argued earlier that notwithstanding the increased chance for social mobility made possible by the general expansion of the 'room at the top', there are still significant differentials in the chance for upward mobility among the different classes. This, we believe, is an important, perhaps the fundamental, source for social instability.³⁸ Although a social history of the structure (or networks) and culture of making wealth and attaining status in the Hong Kong Chinese society remains to be written, we think it is fair to characterize it (with no little amount of bold speculation) as an immigrant society, where there is no moral discipline in its division of labour, where it is 'everyman for himself', and where 'catch as catch can' is generally subscribed (tending to 'wage jungles'), the perceived inequalities in opportunities for social advancement are more important than perceived inequalities in conditions in generating discontent and unrest.³⁹ That the lower classes professed quite markedly different orientations in regard to meaning of work, political efficacy and social justice from the service class should sensitize one to the possibility of such dissatisfactions and differentiation as arising from class barriers and the general rigidity of the class structure. In order to understand the breaks and barriers of the Hong Kong class structure, we have examined our

mobility tables more rigorously, by imposing structural models on the matrix.⁴⁰ The following represents some of the results.

In line with common loglinear analyses of mobility tables, we first fitted Goodman's Perfect Mobility model (PM). It is clearly not a good fit, though it is essential as some base line model. Then we fitted the Quasi-Perfect Mobility model (QPM, see design matrix 1: Table 25a). The L-square is 54.2 (df=29, $p < 0.01$, see Table 25e); though still not a good fit, yet it already reduces the L-square from the PM model's 101.2 (df=36, $p < 0.001$) by nearly 47.0, losing only 7 df. Also, as can be seen from the parameter estimates (Table 25f), immobility is *not* insignificant. The greatest area of immobility is in class I and II, followed by those in the routine non-manual (class III), and the unskilled working class. We could note that the index of dissimilarity (Δ), which measures the proportion of cases misclassified, is down to 0.095, meaning that less than 10% of the cases have to be reclassified if the expected and the observed frequencies are to have a close match.

The general pattern of immobility is confirmed by our next two models. With the Quasi-perfect Mobility Corners-model (QPM-Corners I, see design matrix 2, see Table 25b) imposed, L-square is dramatically down to 27.3 (df=21, $p > 0.1$). The assumptions underlying this model are that the short-distance 'excess' mobility among the 'corners' (the top-left and bottom-right clusters; in this case the upper and lower service classes, and the blue collar classes of V, VI and VII) does not amount much to mobility. (Hout 1983:23f) In other words, it is not that different from immobility. Imposing these further constraints ('blocking out' the cells) on the QPM model results in a better fit to the data. However, the index of dissimilarity is not very satisfactory. Another QPM-Corners model is imposed (QPM-Corners II, see design matrix 3, Table 25c), this time grouping the white collar, non-manual, classes together. The L-square is further down to 20.0, losing 4 degrees of freedom ($p > 0.2$), and the index of dissimilarity down to 0.06 (Table 25e). We consider this as a very good fit. With regard to the interaction parameters, it could be

noted (see Table 25h for the Parameters estimates for this model) that the diagonals are broadly similar to those in the QPM model. The greatest immobility areas (intergenerationally stable, fixity, or succession, if you like) remain in class I and II, and again, the lower grade technicians and supervisors (class V) represented the area of great flux.

Table 25(a): Design Matrix 1 (QPM: Quasi-Perfect Mobility)

		Son's class						
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Father's class	I	0*						
	II		0					
	III			0				
	IV				0			
	V					0		
	VI						0	
	VII							0

- * The cells marked '0' constitute frequencies assumed fixed. Thus in this design, the diagonals (intergenerationally stable cells) are assumed fixed (i.e. equal to the observed frequencies), while the off-diagonals are assumed as in flux (perfect mobility), with father's class position as unrelated to son's.

Table 25(b): Design Matrix 2 (QPM-Corners Model I)

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
I	0	0					
II	0	0					
III			0				
IV				0			
V					0	0	0
VI					0	0	0
VII					0	0	0

Table 25(c): Design Matrix 3 (QPM-Corners Model II)

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
I	0	0	0				
II	0	0	0				
III	0	0	0				
IV				0			
V					0	0	0
VI					0	0	0
VII					0	0	0

Table 25(d): Design Matrix 4 (Cross-Boundary Model)

	I	II	III	IV
I	0	0		
II	0	0	0	
III		0	0	
IV				0

Table 25(e): Summary of the Goodness of Fit of the Various Models

Models	L-square	df	p	delta*
Perfect mobility	101.2	36	<0.001	0.135
Quasi-Perfect mobility	54.2	29	<0.01	0.095
QPM-Corners I	27.3	21	>0.1	0.130
QPM-Corners II	20.0	17	>0.2	0.060
Cross-boundary	0.409	1	>0.5	

* Delta: index of dissimilarity

Table 25(f): Parameters estimates (b_{ij}) of QPM model (Hout 1983, 1989)

$$(b_{ij} = \log(f_{ij}/F_{ij}^*))$$

		Son's class						
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Father's class	I	1.40						
	II		1.03					
	III			0.89				
	IV				0.37			
	V					-0.02		
	VI						0.37	
	VII							0.61

Table 25(g): Parameters estimates (bij) of QPM-Corners I

		Son's class						
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Father's class	I	1.46	0.49					
	II	0.75	1.09					
	III			0.78				
	IV				0.19			
	V					0.05	0.55	-0.85
	VI					-0.07	0.75	0.55
	VII					0.66	0.70	0.93

Table 25(h): Parameters estimates (bij) of QPM-Corners II

		Son's class						
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Father's class	I	1.56	0.66	0.09				
	II	0.86	1.28	0.23				
	III	0.52	0.94	1.07				
	IV				0.18			
	V					-0.05	0.46	-0.94
	VI					-0.16	0.65	0.45
	VII					0.56	0.60	0.83

Table 25(i): Parameters estimates (b_{ij}) of Cross-Boundary Model

		Son's class			
		I	II	III	IV
Father's class	I	1.63	0.51		
	II	1.23	1.38	-0.05	
	III		0.09	-0.44	
	IV				0.92

Two other important features should be noted. First, there seems to be some degree of downward mobility among the service classes, with respondents of class I background going down to class II ($b_{ij}=0.66$); but at the same time, there is some good amount of upward mobility of class II sons climbing up to class I ($b_{ij}=0.86$) (Table 25h). Secondly, it is clear that the atypically low density (close to zero) in cell (1,3) suggests that the class I Fathers could to a significant extent 'prevent' their sons from going down to the routine non-manual class (III). It seems they were able to put a block to such downward mobility. At the same time, however, the parameter estimate of cell (3,1) ($b_{ij}=0.52$), suggests that there is a reasonable amount of upward mobility of the sons of routine non-manual fathers to climb up to service class I. In other words, it seems that the broadly white-collar classes tend to recruit mostly within themselves. This is manifested very clearly in the high degree of immobility of class I, as well as in the high upward mobility of class II, and to a lesser extent, class III, background people to move up to class I. Moreover, while there is some downward mobility of class I background people to move down to class II, most of the class I fathers were able to protect their sons from *declassé*, from going

1990) that while long-range mobility from manual class origins to non-manual class positions is rare and difficult, mobility among the white collar classes is relatively easy and frequent. The differentials of mobility chance among the white collar classes are important and interesting.)

What we have been doing so far is conventional mobility tables analysis. The modelling exercise is to try out various hypotheses about the 'deep structure' of the mobility table (in turn throwing light on the macro-patterns of movements within class positions), by trying various ways of predicting the frequency in the cells of the cross-classification data. Different constraints are imposed on the parameters that model the association between father's and son's class. The *raison d'etre* of such statistical modelling can only be a rigorous understanding of the class structure and its dynamics. (See Breiger 1981 for a review of such approaches.) Thus, in our case, it seems that there are real and significant barriers within the class structure. The non-manual and manual break is quite substantial, with the service classes within the non-manual group exhibiting important tendencies to rigidity. How far this rigidity and the inequality of mobility chances will conduce to a greater differentiation in terms of socio-political outlook and propensities for action is a key issue in the question of class formation. Although we do not pretend to have an answer to this question, we hope our findings have paved the way for such an inquiry; indeed, we would further argue that any discussion of class formation (say of the Hong Kong middle class) must have as its objective starting point the characteristics - 'numbers, preparedness and capacity for action' - of the class structure.

Education and Class: meritocracy and related issues in Hong Kong

There are two major issues in the study of 'origins and destinations' (as exemplified in the British political arithmetic tradition) or the status attainment studies, characteristic of the American tradition of social stratification studies. The first one asks how important one's class background, as compared with one's own educational achievements, is in determining one's class position or occupational status. This is the classic meritocracy question. The second issue concerns the equality of opportunities for education, and the corollary question of the occupational pay-off (say income) of education. In the following, we present findings bearing on these issues, and we would argue that although they are basically about inequalities at the individual level, they would also have implications for the class structure and for class formation.

First, we want to ascertain the relative significance of the respondent's class background and his education in determining his chance of entering the service classes. The class background variable is, of course, the father's class position when the respondent was 14 years old; here it is simplified into the three-folded scheme (FCLASS). The other independent variable - respondent's education (RED) - is collapsed into four categories: 1 (no schooling, as reference), 2 (up to lower secondary level), 3 (upper secondary and above), 4 (university degree level and above). The dependent variable - entry into service classes (RCLASS) - is turned into a categorical one of either being in the service classes or not. Log-linear analyses are then undertaken, with contrast and covariate subcommands instituted to derive parameter estimates of RED and FCLASS with the lowest category of each acting as base line reference (See Heath *et.al.*, 1989; Rosenthal 1978, for details on statistical procedures). The results are as follows (Table 26):

Table 26: Education and Class Background: Fitting Log-linear Models

Design Models	L-square	df	Sig
1. RCLASS, RCLASS BY RED, RCLASS BY FCLASS	8.22	6	>0.2
2. RCLASS, RCLASS BY RED, RCLASS BY COV*	8.11	7	>0.3

* Design 2 is different from 1 in the way it treats the effect of FCLASS. It is a row-effects model, where we are interested in the ordinal effect of FCLASS, treated here as a column effect. We see that both models fit the data fairly well. In the following, we only present the parameter estimates for Design 1.

The parameter estimates are:

Constant:		-0.783
RED	4 (highest, degree & above):	5.22
	3 (upper secondary & above):	3.15
	2 (lower secondary):	1.90
	1 (as reference):	0.00
FCLASS	3 (service class):	1.10
	2 (intermediate):	0.48
	1 (working class, as reference):	0.00

The above parameter estimates show the net chance (or fitted log-odds) of entering the service class relative to the lowest category of the variable in question ('lowest' purely in the sense of having the poorest chances). The relationship between educational qualifications and membership of the service class is evidently very strong. One's own educational achievements are useful and important in determining one's upper class positions; in a sense, then, there is

some congruence between efforts and outcome. But after controlling for qualifications, we can see that there is still some significant relationship (1.10) with social origins, i.e. FCLASS. In other words, even among people with similar educational levels, those from service class origins are more likely to be found in the service class themselves than are those from working class origins. Hong Kong is by no means a pure meritocracy.

We have also distinguished the dependent variable service class into the salaried and the self-employed segment, viz. roughly the professional employees and the entrepreneurial capitalists, and run a logistic regression with respondent's education and class origins on it. We have found that educational credentials are much more important than class background in accounting for the entry into the salaried service class. The odds of climbing into this position for one having little or no education, and having a non-manual father is similar to one having the same level of education, but coming from a manual class background. However, the odds increased dramatically by a factor of 4, when the education changed from little or none to upper secondary level: the odds for *both* non-manual and manual background respondents is 9. Thus as far as the salaried service class segment is concerned, much hinges on the respondent's success in the educational/credential hierarchy. On the other hand, the probability of entering the entrepreneurial/capitalist segment is dependent on a different set of factors. Here neither education nor father's occupation/class makes much difference. (The details of our argument could be found in a forthcoming paper on the relations between economic/entrepreneurial motivation and class.)

In a previous section, we argued that the non-manual and the manual division still represents some important barrier or break in the class structure of Hong Kong. It would thus be instructive to compare the chances of making to non-manual occupations, rather than to manual ones, between those coming from manual class background and those from non-manual one. By running a logistic regression on respondent's occupation (ROCC: dummy variable,

whether in the non-manual or not) with respondent's education (RED) and father's occupation (FOCC: whether in the non-manual or not), we arrive at the following. (For the sake of simplicity, we would leave out the -2 log likelihood and regression coefficients.

Looking first at those coming from manual class background, if the respondent attained a degree-level education, the odds of his getting a non-manual occupation is 7.7 (probability is 0.89; log-odds is 2.04). If the respondent only has lower secondary education, the log-odds is -0.45. The difference is 2.49; this being the advantage (or increased likelihood in terms of log-odds) conferred by a higher level of education on making to non-manual occupations. In contrast, for a respondent coming from non-manual class background, the log-odds for one with degree level education is 2.2; this gives him a not too great advantage of 0.16 over his manual background counterpart. For one equipped with a lower secondary education, the log-odds of having a non-manual job is 0.12. Again, the advantage over his counterpart coming from a manual class background is not great. These findings suggest perhaps that education is far more important than FOCC (father being in manual or non-manual class) in determining the likelihood of attaining a non-manual occupational status.

Given, then, the importance of education, how open and equal is the access to educational opportunities? Let us examine first the effects of the level of parents' education on educational attainment of the respondent. A logistic regression analysis on respondent's education (RED) shows that the chances of attaining higher education (of matriculation level and above) are influenced much more by father's educational level than by mother's by a ratio of 3.3 to 1. And the odds of attaining that level of education is slightly enhanced by having highly educated parents (university degree level) than in the case of having parents with only secondary education: the ratio is 1.2:1. We regard such inequalities as not particularly steep. Incidentally, though there is a general dearth of studies of educational opportunities in Hong Kong, a recent study has concluded

that there evolved over time a greater equality (now reaching near parity) between the white collar and blue collar classes, 'in terms of the likelihood of finishing primary school, in terms of beginning secondary school, and in terms of finishing secondary school.' (Pong and Post, 1991:261)

Indeed, if we take into account an array of background factors and compare respondents coming from two markedly different sets of background, the resulting inequalities in having control over this particular life-chance resource are real, though fairly small. In order to carry out this analysis⁴¹, we contrast two groups of respondents, one coming from an 'urban' background (respondent and his family were already in Hong Kong, when he was 14 years old), having fathers in non-manual occupations, and with parents having a medium level of education, and the other group coming from mainland China⁴², with poorly educated parents and fathers in manual jobs. How did the chance of attaining a secondary level of education differ with regard to these two backgrounds? The difference in log-odds is 3.17. Since we do not have a baseline, it is difficult to say how small or insignificant this difference or inequality is. But on the whole we think it is fair to say that the chances of obtaining a medium level of education in Hong Kong are basically open and equal.

In order to understand further the effects of background variables on educational achievement (R, into 4 levels), we undertook a log-linear analysis of the variables of Father's class (O, for class origin, into the 3-folded classification), educational level of Father and Mother (F, 4 levels, and M, 2 levels, respectively).⁴³ The results are in the following:

Table 27: Models of Respondents' Educational Attainment

Model number	Marginals fitted*	Adjusted L-square	df	p-value
1	(R) (OFM)**	157.5	61	<0.001
2	(RO)	104.8	55	<0.001
3	(RF)	82.8	52	<0.005
4	(RM)	128.8	58	<0.001
5	(RO) (RF)	59.2	46	>0.05
6	(RO) (RM)	86.2	52	<0.005
7	(RF) (RM)	74.9	49	<0.05
8	(RO) (RF) (RM)	51.3	43	>0.1

* R=Respondent's educational attainment; O=Father's class; F=Father's educational attainment; M=Mother's educational attainment.

** R is conceptualized as the dependent variable to be explained by the other background variables. The marginal table of associations among the independent variables is regarded as fixed and is thus fitted under every model tested. Following conventional notation (see Knoke and Burke 1980), the letters in parentheses refer to the marginals or combinations of marginals fitted; thus model 8 has the effects of O, F and M analyzed by way of seeing how far their distributions could explain (or help to reproduce) the observed frequencies of R in the various classifications.

We can see from Table 27 that model 8 fits the data fairly well. In effect, it means class background and parents' education are important for accounting for one's education. But as we have argued earlier, the inequalities are, in our view, not particularly steep, especially with regard to the attainment of a medium level (say, finishing secondary school) of education. What is interesting from the

above table is that it confirms our earlier point about the relative insignificance of Mother's education. If we compare a model in which the variable M is present with one where it is absent, we can find that the dimension of mother's education does not add significantly to the prediction of Respondent's education. Table 28 shows the contribution of the various background variables; the baseline model is model 8, where all effects are present.

Table 28: Testing for Contributions to Model Containing all Effects

		L-square	df	p*
Model 6 vs. 8	RF	34.9	9	<0.001
Model 5 vs. 8	RM	7.8	3	>0.05
Model 7 vs. 8	RO	23.3	6	<0.001

* The difference between the L-squares is distributed as chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the difference of the df of the models compared.

Lastly, let us examine the material pay-off of education.⁴⁴ By treating the class position of fathers as an independent ordinal variable (FCLASS, into the three-folded scheme), and by assuming that there is no correlation between it and the respondent's educational attainment (RED)⁴⁵, we ran a multiple regression analysis on the respondent's monthly income (RINCOME), focusing only on those respondents under the age of 45. The betas for RED and FCLASS are respectively 0.44 and 0.13, with RED explaining about one-fifth (R-square 0.22) of the variation in RINCOME, and FCLASS very little (R-square 0.017). The ratio is 9:1.

Next, we choose HK\$6,000 as the watershed in RINCOME, and did a logistic regression on RINCOME, with the independent variables of

RED and FOCC (fathers with non-manual or manual occupations) (Table 29).

Table 29: Probability of Earning \$6,000 a Month

Respondent's education	Father's occupation	
	Non-manual	Manual
Univ. degree level	0.92	0.90
Upper secondary	0.80	0.75
Lower secondary	0.58	0.51

For one with upper secondary level education, and having a father in non-manual occupations, the odds of earning more than 6,000 dollars a month is 4 (the probability is a high 0.8). If the education is increased to one of university degree level, with other factors unchanged, the probability goes up to 0.92, the odds 12 (0.92 divided by 0.08), i.e. an increase by a factor of 3. On the other hand, having upper secondary level education, but coming from a manual class background, the probability of earning more than \$6,000 a month is 0.75, barely different from one coming from a non-manual background. The odds of having this level of income drops, again quite regardless of father's occupation, if the education goes down to lower secondary: 0.58 for manual father, and 0.51 for non-manual father. It becomes more a matter of luck whether the respondent will have a higher income or not. These findings thus suggest that there is great material pay-off from educational credentials, with the latter as exerting much greater effect than class background characteristics. They also further support our earlier argument that educational level is much more pertinent and important for accounting for the variation in income or income inequality.

On the whole, therefore, it would be fair to say that in Hong Kong society, there is a good deal of open and equal competition as far as educational opportunities and their material benefits are concerned. At the same time, however, it is not a pure meritocracy, especially when it comes to the entry into the upper classes. This is in line with our analysis of the class structure and the process of class formation: an advantageous class background still counts, and the more entrenched the advantaged positions are, the more capable are the upper (service) classes in transmitting their advantages to their offspring. The differentials in mobility chances (as discussed earlier) should warn us against any exaggeration or generalization of the notion of equality of competition/opportunity and its implications for an ideological legitimization of the status quo.

Conclusions

If forced to put our conclusion into one sentence, we can say that: in Hong Kong society, there are opportunities and openness, just as there are inequalities. Not a statement that would make the headlines, and certainly not a great empirical discovery. Yet, we hope that we have provided a sense of 'proportion and relation' to the iniquities and to the openness, to the fixity and the mobility alike, in the society. We have tried to delineate the areas where greater rigidity or greater flux could be found in the class structure, and we have also compared the relative chances - either of general mobility chance or the more specific one of attaining a certain level of education or income - of people differing in social origins and their mobility experiences. For instance, we have argued that though there are many cases of 'from rags to riches', there are also many instances of 'from rags to rags', and that the upper classes have shown some tendencies towards rigidity (although 'closure' would be too strong - and premature - a word). There is some truth to the Hong Kong dream, which, alas, has to be seen alongside the reality of differentials of resources and mobility chance. Also, our understanding of the class structure stresses the nascent, even inchoate, nature of class formation. Goldthorpe's great insight about class formation, namely that class formation should be understood through an examination of the demographic and socio-political continuity of class, and that social mobility provides an entry point into this problematic, we have followed here. And we believe that the characteristics of heterogeneity and the plethora of 'linkages and residues' in mobility experience are particularly relevant to the study of the Hong Kong middle classes and any political battles that may be waged on behalf of them.

We hope these findings have vindicated, in a far more rigorous and convincing way than our programmatics, the relevance and immediacy of class studies to a whole range of issues and concerns. The latter could be part of 'exogenous sociology', where sociologists (or laymen) take note of the changes in the society, make their own

responses to them, and thus contribute to the making of a new mode of social consciousness. Issues like: what is the Hong Kong middle class? has it 'come of age'? has it attained a distinct socio-political outlook? are issues of doing 'exogenous sociology'. Or the issues and concerns could be fed from endogenous sources, taken from the development of the subject (social stratification studies) itself: is class as concept and as reality *passé* in Hong Kong; how important is one's achievement, as compared with one's ascribed qualities, in determining one's class position and life-chances; which is more acceptable, from the viewpoint of social justice or from the vantage point of social conflict: inequality of conditions or inequality of opportunities? We believe we have provided in the above sections our preliminary answers to these questions. Of course, there is much to be done (and our forthcoming efforts will proffer continuation and expansion of our analyses), but, at the risk of sounding immodest, what is to be done must begin from where we leave.

Notes

1. We do not imply by this argument that the underlying socio-political interests constitute ideological commitment as such; nor do we think the debates and developments of the theory and methodology in social stratification and mobility studies are simply a result of the wrangling of ideological camps. There is a variety of the socio-political interests, some liberal and others more radical in their hue. And to say that class and social mobility studies are perhaps much more engaged than other areas in sociological research by their underlying socio-political interests is not to say a review of the inquiries is simply a review of ideological polemics. As Goldthorpe (1980) argued, there is no necessary relation between an ideological attachment and a research interest in social mobility.
2. Another dimension to these debates of course surrounds the theory of industrial society. (See Goldthorpe 1972, 1985)
3. Jencks's study 'Inequality: a Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America', 1972.
4. As it will become clear in the following sections, it is only in the last few years that some attempts have been made by scholars, partly stimulated by the middle class debates, to undertake quantitative and qualitative studies of inequality, class and mobility. (See collection in Cheung *et.al.* 1988; Lui and Chan 1989; Tsang 1990; Chan 1991; Pong and Post 1991.)
5. We might include Scott's treatise on legitimacy and political crisis, and Lau's recent forays into the relationship between politics and class in the leadup to 1997.
6. We could not, obviously, provide an adequate answer to this question here. In our forthcoming paper, 'A Survey of Hong

Kong Studies: Programmatic and Prognosis', we will argue at greater length on this issue.

7. One observer in the 1960s proffered a different approach, but the conclusion is similar: 'by government and psychology, they are at each other's throat... and yet, there is this unlooked-for harmony'. (Gleason 1967:34)
8. Here we have focused on Lau's works, and we are aware that we could be criticized for not including other studies. Our point, however, is that possibly with the exception of the historical sociology of Lethbridge, other studies could either be found as subscribing to this framework, perhaps unwittingly, or that they have not contained an alternative framework for understanding the social structure of Hong Kong society.
9. For a critical discussion of the categorical rebuttal of the relevance and reality of social class in Hong Kong society, see Wong 1988.
10. We would be taking up a Herculean task --- from which we would be the first to avert -- if it is said that we intend to 'invent new wisdom for a new age'. '(But) in the mean time we must, if we are to do any good, appear unorthodox, troublesome, dangerous, disobedient to them that begat us.' (Keynes, 'Am I a Liberal?', 1925)
11. We generally let the household decide who the household head (hu-zhu) is, although the underlying criteria involved in such selection could vary, ranging from seniority, role in decision-making, economic preeminence, etc. We however believe, on the basis of the interview experience and other findings, that our 'male household head' normally refers primarily to the 'principal earner/administrator of household', not necessarily the male person most senior in age or in the family line. Our 'definition' is thus close to that used by the Household

Expenditure Surveys carried out by the Hong Kong government since the early 1960s.

Given the fact the issue of unit of class analysis has generated much controversy and debate in the literature (Goldthorpe, 1983; Heath and Britten, 1984; Goldthorpe, 1984; McRae, 1990; Dex, 1990; Marshall, 1990; Goldthorpe, 1990), we think it best to spell out our assumptions underlying our choice of the male household head as the 'class-assignee'. Firstly, we are of the view that, in a generally conjugal family context, the husband is still the dominant partner, partly or wholly by virtue of his role as the main bread-earner. Secondly, we think it is reasonable to assume that in his role as the main bread-earner, the male household head has a greater commitment, and thereby continuity, in the labour market or occupational structure. Given the nature of our class schema (occupational *qua* class structure), it is only natural that we focus on the male partner. Thirdly, and most importantly, we believe that a major part of the *raison d'etre* of (Goldthorpe's and ours) class analysis is its role in illuminating class formation, both at the level of demographic continuity or maturity, and of socio-cultural identity. With this more specific, and theoretical, consideration in mind, we hold that, firstly, while the class position is established by allocating it to the male household head, it is in fact the family that is the unit involved in the class formation processes, and, secondly, in so far as the class position (and its trajectory) of the male household head adequately (vindicated by the first two of our assumptions) establishes the class and mobility profile of the family, then the class position of the wife is of little concern. But obviously, the issue does not rest here. We concede that at least two questions need to be raised. Most directly, instead of repeating the oft-quoted finding that the time and duration of women's participation in the labour market are fundamentally shaped by that of the husband, or family needs, one could well ask: does the wife's employment make a difference to that of the

husband (the latter seen as a series of career-stages), and thus consequently the class position? This bears directly on the sexual inequality question, and it forces us to think if such inequalities of women employment result in 'privileging' men/husbands. Secondly, are women's socio-cultural and socio-political orientations or participation necessarily molded (or some would say, restricted) by those of the husband? Couldn't one see the family's socio-cultural identity as an amalgam of the experience and preferences of both husband and wife, notwithstanding the occupational preeminence of the former? These two questions bear respectively on the demographic and the socio-cultural level of class formation, with both taking the family as the unit in question, and thus seem to have raised doubts about the adequacy of relying solely on the male household head as the (operational) unit of our class analysis. To take one example: if there is indication that working daughters play an important economic role in the formative stages of the lower classes families in Hong Kong, then one would be led to wonder if, and how, such working experience affects the socio-cultural identity of the 'prospective'wives. But we must hasten to add that we do not have any empirical data to adjudge the pertinence and primacy of these challenges. That we have followed Goldthorpe's theoretical choice, the conventional approach (taking the family as the unit of analysis, rather than the individuals), is thus less a weakness on our part, than a sad indicator of the numerous gaping holes in our understanding of HK society. The complex relations among occupation, family and class formation in Hong Kong are yet to be taken as a big agenda, for which studies utilizing diverse methods and time-frames are now urgently required.

But, as Marshall has pointed out, there is another aspect to this issue of unit of analysis, one which is more general and abstract in nature. Marshall (1990) made the point that as part of the legitimate purpose (or scope) of class analysis, the sexual

inequality problem cannot be excluded. At any rate, he argued, it is part of the many mechanisms giving rise to demographic class formation. (Marshall, 1990:60-61) We concede this point, in so far as it raises the issue of the aim or purpose of class analysis (*viz.* class formation), which, in our view, is consistent with that of Goldthorpe's. But at the same time, Goldthorpe's rejoinder is that there has not accumulated much evidence that women's class position does make a difference to the demographic class formation, or more importantly, that it helps to chart a different socio-cultural/socio-political outlook of classes. If anything, the evidence seems to confirm the fact that the wife's orientations are very much tied to the husband's class position. Moreover, the proponents of the individual approach seem to have shyed away from the empirical implications of the joint-classification schema. (Goldthorpe, 1990:408-10) Scope is therefore one thing, and adequate operationalization and the willingness to face up to the empirical implications of one's theoretical or conceptual choice is another. We do not believe that it is possible for us to resolve this matter here. Suffice it for us to say that future studies must not only fill the empirical gaps (described above) but also address this more general issue of the relations between theory and tools.

12. Readers interested in the details of our sample could write to us, and we will be happy to provide the information.
13. As a matter of fact, there are three issues involved here, to which our present endeavour could not address all at once: first, occupation is a major determinant of positions on other dimensions of social life (e.g. it still is the main source of income, and thus affecting consumption and consumption-related behaviour); second, an analysis of occupational mobility could well make an important contribution to the development of a more general model of social mobility, but it does not in itself constitute such a model; third, to make that

contribution, the idea of ranking or status must enter into the scheme of things, and, as it were, 'tighten up' the link between occupation and social position. A classic treatment of this latter reation is Goldthorpe and Hope's discussion of 'social grading of occupations', and the Hope-Goldthorpe scale. (Goldthorpe and Hope 1974) Though we agree to the gist of their critique of conventional notions of 'occupational prestige', we cannot possibly in our benchmark study introduce the elements of 'deference' or 'authority' into our occupational-class scheme. However, we feel it should be pointed out that in Goldthorpe's class schema, the subjective component has largely been left out, although the class categories are based on the 36-fold version of the Hope-Golthorpe scale. One would have thought that the class schema would also roughly follow the scale value ranking as achieved through the construction of the H-G occupational categories. But the criteria used in collapsing the 36 categories into the 7-folded class schema take little, if any, account of the scale value order. (cf. similar argument by Marshall *et.al.*, 1988, coda). Instead the main criteria are objective ones such as conditions of employment (economic returns, security, promotion prospects); relations to bureaucracy/management (degree and type of control and monitoring by the management group, with for instance, managers as having little 'staff' status, while lower employees are deeply incorporated); and application of discretion (in carrying out the work tasks) and room of autonomy. The corresponding range of scale value (the prestige of the occupations for each class) for the 7 classes is as follows:

Class	Range of Scale Value (HG's 'prestige')
I	82 - 52
II	66 - 48
III	47 - 35
IV	58 - 18 (18 being the lowest value)
V	54 - 37
VI	40 - 33
VII	36 - 18

Some observations are in order here. It is clear that for Class I, II and IV, the range of scale value is extremely broad, and as a consequence, compromise their class discreteness. If occupational prestige (which is what the H-G scale and categories are about in the first place) is still anything, such broad ranges of occupational prestige seem to defeat the purpose of a class schema. If one further looks into the occupational categories (totalling 36) and their constituent categories (totalling 124) subsumed by each class, then it is quite obvious that both Class I and II are too heterogeneous. (In this sense, perhaps the broad range of scale value -- the grading results of the graders -- already suggests, or better, betrays, such heterogeneity.) The sub-category 'Large proprietors' of Class I is simply too heterogeneous and overlaps greatly with categories of Class II. Thus even if one grants that the two Service Classes (I and II) are relationally, relatively speaking, discrete, their *internal composition* is still too heterogeneous. In contrast, the boundaries between Class V and VI, and between VI and VII, are quite discrete and follow roughly the scale value ordering. Finally, to turn from the subjective aspects to the objective criteria, one could even raise a general query concerning the extent to which the occupational categories (and the constituent classes) could really provide a high degree of differentiation in terms of occupational function. Take, for example, Class III. This class includes occupations as diverse as clerks, cooks, photographers, and shop salesmen. In terms of occupational function or tasks,

are these occupations really comparable? How does one make sense, if indeed one could do so, of the hierarchical nature of the class schema? We do not attempt to deal with these questions here, important though they are. We have discussed these issue at greater length in two mimeographed papers (notes, rather) entitled 'Models and Methods: Constructing the Occupational Scheme', and 'Towards a Meaningful Hong Kong Occupational Classification'. At the same time, we do not think these problems will spell utter uselessness of the Goldthorpe schema.

Of course, Goldthorpe has made it quite clear that 'the aggregation of categories of the H-G scale in order to form the classes was carried out without reference to the position of categories in the ordering of the scale' (1980:43). Subsequent communication with Goldthorpe has shown that our point on constructing a necessary connection between the H-G scale of occupational prestige and the later class schema is somewhat misplaced. In other words, as Goldthorpe himself puts it, 'there is no reason whatever why categories of the schema should be homogeneous in terms of their prestige scores'. See also Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) for a full discussion of the schema.

14. There are, in our view, two main tasks involved in the making of a meaningful occupational scheme. First, the horizontal one of mapping groups of individuals onto the various occupational categories one has chosen to define (however defined); in other words, seeing individuals as distributed in certain proportions over the range of occupations of occupational categories. The second task is coming to grips with the vertical dimension of interlarding. This is of course the most controversial and difficult part. The ambiguities of the concepts 'status' and 'prestige', and the generally unsatisfactory nature of synthetic empirical surrogate measures ('socio-economic status', etc.) point to the heart of the problem. In this context, the

sociological meaning of interlarding is the problem of making occupational differentiation bear on both technical and social division of labour. Other secondary problems include for instance, changes in the skill levels required by particular occupations, the shrinking of certain occupations, the internal differentiation of certain occupations into more specialized 'tasks', etc. Again, our occupation-class scheme cannot aim to solve all these problems. But first, it has tried to tackle the interlarding (social division of labour) aspect by emphasizing both occupational function and employment conditions; second, in contrast with the 'socio-economic status/index' method, our measures avoid the difficulty of combining various components (education, income..) without taking into account the different variance or skewness of the components themselves. (cf. Hope on his proposal for a geometrical model of social stratification)

15. In Wright's approach, 'authority' in the work context is approached via a set of dimensions involving autonomy in decision-making, supervisory power, management over things as versus over people, and others. Practically, this makes for rather tiresome probing; more importantly, theoretically, 'authority' is combined with 'property' (and the separation of ownership and control) to give rise to different class positions', or rather more specifically, 'contradictory class positions'. It is true that in our framework, work situation ('authority' in a weak sense, if you will) is combined with market situation (basically, employment status) to form our classes. We see this as less problematic primarily because, in the Weberian approach, both 'work situation' and 'market situation' are tied to one single object, that of occupation, whereas in the neo-Marxist framework, it is linked to both property and occupation. It seems as if in order to come to terms with the whole array of problems haunting the Marxist project (lack of proletarianization, the middle class, etc.), the neo-Marxist is letting 'essence' (property) being compromised by 'epiphenomenon' (occupation, job nature, etc.). One is reminded

of the pithy sarcasm of Parkin: that inside every neo-Marxist, a Weberian is struggling to come out.

16. Cf. Sorensen 1991 for a reformulation of the Marxist notion of class. To him, the element of exploitation or interdependent inequality is essential to the concept. It is the fundamental insight and the justification for a Marxist, or class, analysis. We however choose to follow Weber, and Goldthorpe.
17. Here we have basically followed Goldthorpe's argument (1984). However, we do not intend to take his view to the hilt. We do not think that in all cases, the demographic (mobility, etc.) must precede the socio-political or cultural level of analysis; important insights could be derived from the latter level of undertaking without always harking back to inflow and outflow ratios. But in the present context, where the lack of any mobility data is felt particularly unfortunate, we would concentrate on the (broadly) demographic and social level, hoping that, informed speculation on the question of politics and culture will be a welcome bonus to our undertaking.
18. In our search for an appropriate occupational classification scheme, we have surveyed a lot of such schemes, both local and foreign. The requirements we adopt include (a) the groundplan or master scheme must be detailed enough to allow for meaningful and important differentiation of job nature to be possible; and so must be the occupational descriptions; (b) following this, it must be classified with some reference to broad divisions in, say, type of industry, level of skill, nonmanual vs. manual, etc.; (c) it must make the distinction between different employment statuses, e.g. managers could be proprietor or employee; (d) it is also desirable to have the distinction between the job as a set of technical, routine duties or as involving problem-solving or intellectual expertise; (e) lastly, the job descriptions of the occupations must be clear as to the managerial or supervisory duties of the job; at the very

least, the descriptions must give one some idea of whether it is a case of working with things or tools, or one of working with/controlling people. The above requirements simply follow from our emphasis on 'market situation' and 'work situation'. The classification schemes we have surveyed and finally rejected include the CODOT, the HK Census scheme, the Preliminary proposed scheme for the 1991 HK census, the HK Vocational Training schemes and some combinations of them, the ISCO, the British Registrar-General scheme, .. We must also point out that we have not tinkered in any major way with the OPCS scheme and Goldthorpe's class schema. We have anticipated that some occupations perhaps unique to Hong Kong, e.g. the Chinese herbal doctor, the rickshaw coolie, could not be coded to the OPCS list; in such cases (which are extremely few, we might add) we have not added to the list; we tried instead to fit them into the classification. We have also added the employment status of 'self-employed with less than 20 employees' for the small factory owner-manager occupation, for which in our coding exercise, we have found quite a number.

19. It is true that, in a sense, our class scheme is as good as the occupational classification scheme allows it to be. but we must also add a few remarks. First, all the coding is done by the researchers themselves, with cross-checking done on the first 150 cases. Secondly, the descriptive basis of the occupations has followed the, so to speak, true-and-true criteria of work and market situation, and that by initially coding the information into the highly detailed and refined categories, we have been able to preserve as much raw occupational information as possible, which in turn makes it possible for us to maximize flexibility in recoding and, if such needs arise, scale construction. (cf. Treiman, 1978:39, for general views on classification schemes and scale construction) Thirdly, there is no denying that our class structure is more a 'relational' structure, viz. if we regard it in the context of class formation,

then it is the potential of cohesiveness (demographic, socio-cultural,..) that matters. If we are primarily interested in social ascent-descent and status attainment, obviously we need to have a more rigorous mapping of the scheme to status scores or prestige ranks or their likes.

20. In any case, our service classes do include capitalist entrepreneurs. The issue at stake is rather this: is the notion of 'service class', with its characteristic elements of 'code of service', authority and autonomy, and general market and work situations, an adequate, and broad enough, concept to capture and encompass (or, if there be such a need, to distinguish it from) the capitalist entrepreneurs and owners? We are not at this stage prepared to adjudge this issue. Suffice it to say that we regard Goldthorpe's position viable and that his defence of his position justified. See Goldthorpe, 1982; Marshall, 1988, for a brief description of Goldthorpe's position.
21. The principles are basically the ones we have adopted with regard to our social mobility study. Obviously, the exercise with the census data is ridden with insoluble problems, of which the fundamental one is the lack of detailed descriptions of the occupational titles in the census classification of occupations. We were told by the Census and Statistics Department that such descriptions did not exist, although a few briefing papers were available to the coders. Given this, we cannot possibly distinguish the skill levels among the manual workers; the supervisory duties of some occupations are simply deduced by a straight-forward understanding of the occupational titles; and so on. The census occupational classification scheme and the categories of activity status can be easily found in the coding manual accompanying the census tapes. The details of our recoding, and our combination of the activity status with the occupations to form the classes, are available upon request.

22. But see a splattering of studies by Salaff, Rosen, Mitchell, P. Ng (on fertility), and forthcoming publications of M.K. Lee and C. H. Ng.
23. We are not unaware that the terms (and the reality) 'openness', 'equality of opportunity' are not always captured by the mobility table analysis we undertake in this paper. (Sorensen 1991) However, we do think that such analysis provides some preliminary, however inadequate, measure of the 'flux' in the society, and that any discussion of the issue of class formation can ill afford to ignore this particular backdrop information.
24. In gauging the amount and pattern of social mobility in Hong Kong, we must bear in mind its particular recency and rapidity of development. In a sense, our respondents represented only the second generation of post-war Hong Kong's development. But the rapidity of changes also mean that it would be instructive to examine the mass mobility trends by carrying out an age-cohort-specific analysis of mobility. The details of this analysis must await a separate treatment; only the gist of our findings can be reported here. Notwithstanding the defects of using age cohorts as the basis for charting longitudinal societal changes, we have divided our respondents into 4 age cohorts (55 to 64 years old; 45 to 54; 35 to 44; and 25 to 34), and by cross-tabulating the respondent's occupation/class when he had entered the labour market for ten years (i.e. his occupation 10 years after his first job) with that of his father when he was 14 years old, we find that for the first two cohorts, roughly corresponding to the mid-1920's to the late '40s, the intergenerational downward mobility is greater than upward mobility, with the gross mobility rates ranging from 56% to 59%. It is only with our third age cohort (35 - 44 years old) that upward mobility exceeds downward mobility. In other words it was with those who were born in the '40s and early '50s, and who benefited from the expansion of

opportunities brought by the development of the '60s and early '70s, that Hong Kong first established a generally upward mobility regime in its post-ward experience.

Age cohort	Time period	Upward mobility(%)	Downward mobility(%)
55-64	1925-1934	15.9	40.2
45-54	1935-1944	22.4	36.2
35-44	1945-1954	30.9	24.6
25-34	1955-1964	26.5	25.2

25. Which, we understand, is ultimately unsatisfactory due to the fact that our population of the fathers cannot be a representative sample of the 'father generation' (of which many could have died or migrated or what-not in 1989), and that class differences in fertility may have meant that say we tend to have more sons with working class background. The same defect applies to the age cohort analysis discussed in notes 24.
26. As compared to the other classes, except class IV (petty bourgeoisie), the service classes have a greater discrepancy between the inflow and the outflow rate. The percentage of people of class I background who remained in class I is greater than the percentage of class I people who came from class I background. We are grateful to Mr. Chan Tak Wing for helping us to elucidate this point.
27. See T.W. Chan (1991) unpublished M. Phil thesis (Oxford). We must add that we do not agree with all the conclusions detailed therein, and that a collaboration with Chan is now undertaken by the present authors, with a view to clarifying the

differences, and publishing a paper on comparative social mobility in East Asia.

28. We realize, as we have alluded to this point earlier, that equality of opportunity involves something more than the ease (or difficulty) of moving from one position to another as generated from the mobility table analysis. As Sorensen has argued, quite rightly too, equality of opportunity has more to do with a congruence between the efforts one puts in and the outcome of such efforts. Without going into this issue, and the methodological protocols, we would hold that mobility table analysis still have something to offer.
29. We hope it is clear to the readers that terms like 'succession' or 'self-recruitment', and their rates and patterns, must be considered and interpreted carefully, depending on whether it is the 'inflows' or 'outflows' context.
30. That the magnitude (and the problem it gives rise to interpretation) of the index of association is affected by the marginal distributions we realize and concede. However, as a benchmark study, we don't see much harm will be done if the index is used with awareness of its limitations.
31. If we treat the percentage inflow distribution for a particular class as the probabilities of an individual in this class being from each of the possible (seven, in our case) classes of origin, and then compare these probabilities with the theoretical probability (where there is equal probability for members of the particular class as coming from each class of origin), we could come up with a set of indices of homogeneity of classes (see Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992:218f for rationale and procedure). The larger the value (expressed here as the percentage of the theoretical minimum of equal probability), viz. the greater the probabilities for a class 'deviating' from the heterogeneity-generating theoretical case of equal probability,

the greater the homogeneity. In addition, we could construct measures of intergenerational class 'retentiveness', i.e. the percentage of men of a given class origin who were found in that class at the time of enquiry. In other words, we could simply take the percentage distribution of the diagonal cells in the outflow table. The following table shows the indices of homogeneity of classes and the retentiveness:

Class	Homogeneity(%)	Retentiveness (%)
I	150 (intermediate)	31 (high)
II	129 (low)	29 (high)
III	136 (low)	21 (intermediate)
IV	193 (high)	17 (intermediate)
V	157 (intermediate)	18 (intermediate)
VI	156 (intermediate)	22 (intermediate)
VII	207 (high)	32 (high)

It should be noted that the indices of homogeneity take as their reference the theoretical case of equal probability, and that a larger value for a particular class suggests that its members come from a lesser number of classes of origin, quite irrespective of what those classes are. Such indices make possible comparison of the classes, and thus serve a somewhat different purpose from simple descriptions of the inflow and outflow tables, valuable though the latter are. Moreover, taken in conjunction with the measures of retentiveness (or class stability), they give us, in the words of Erikson and Goldthorpe, the 'profile' of mobility characteristic of the individual classes. Thus, for instance, while the high degree of retentiveness of the service classes (class I and II) may suggest fairly strong inheritance effect, which, in turn, is conducive to closure and class formation, this is somewhat offset by the low/intermediate degree of homogeneity in these two classes.

On the other hand, the unskilled working class (VII) evinced comparatively high homogeneity *and* high retentiveness, a combination which bespeaks a greater degree of demographic and social unity. But such 'profiles' are at best suggestive. In the following section, where we address the question of class structure and class formation, we would return to this issue of mobility characteristics and class structure (its rigidity or invidiousness), and the relation between class positions and socio-economic orientations.

32. We believe that these ideas should provide interesting leads for further, and more intensive, studies of the reality and the mechanisms of the ways these advantages are manifested and transmitted. By asking direct questions about the specific empirical reality of Hong Kong society, they, as it were, force one to discover and judge the degree of inequalities and injustice of the class/mobility regime, and the implications they have for issues of group formation, politics and conflicts. It is for this reason that we are slightly wary of the otherwise excellent comparative endeavours of Chan (1991), where core models derived from the mobility data of Western (and Japan) industrial nations are fitted into the Hong Kong data. As our primary goal is to understand the nature of the Hong Kong class structure and its changes (and not to confirm or refute any particular 'industrial society' thesis), we would hold that how unequal or invidious the Hong Kong mobility regime is must be judged with regard to the historical and societal characteristics of the society itself.
33. What we are analyzing here is the relationships between mobility status and a host of socio-economic characteristics. We are not unaware that in these analyses, a lot of intervening and interesting variables have been left out. (see Hout 1983) But as our aim is simply to draw out the general characteristics of those 'born to succeed' and those 'self-made' men, and not

making strong statements, we feel we are not overinterpreting the data.

34. If we consider the service classes (class I and II) as consisting of the salaried professional employees and the self-employed, entrepreneurial capitalist segments, we find that the educational experience of these two segments is quite different. More than 65% of the latter segment attained only lower secondary education, while it is 30% for the salaried group. Conversely, 65% of the salaried segment had upper secondary and above education, with more than half of it having degree and above qualifications; in contrast, less than 30% of the entrepreneurial segment achieved upper secondary and above level. ($p < 0.05$) With regard to the socio-political orientations of these two class segments, we find the salaried professionals more liberal and assertive on political issues (e.g. professed having a greater sense of political efficacy, seeing democracy and stability as equally important, etc.). The entrepreneurial class segment, in comparison, is more conservative and cautious in their socio-political outlook. These differences are no doubt related in some way to their divergent market and work situations, but at the same time, they point to the sources of the internal differentiation of the service classes.
35. Admittedly, the sense of political potency or power is something difficult to gauge. One may argue that it is something that cannot be measured at all. Anyhow, we do not feel it necessary to arbitrate on these issues. The reader is advised to take note of the question put to the respondent, and come up with his own --- be it generous or rejecting --- interpretation.
36. We may further add that this general pattern, where present class position and orientations seem to overweigh the effects of diverse class background, applies equally (but broadly) to intra-generational mobility. Those who started off with

working class jobs and ended up (in 1989) in service class occupations tend to have more similarities in regard to these areas of orientations with those 'plain sailing' service class members than with the less successful counterparts.

37. For a less quantitative treatment of this line of argument, see Wong 1991.
38. Here we follow Goldthorpe's argument on social inequality and social integration. (Goldthorpe 1974, 1988)
39. In the absence of substantive finding, one often has to turn to observations (which, alas, could not be anything more than excellent and stimulating leads) made by cultural anthropologists or historians. The following excerpts from the earliest (and probably still the best from a theoretical, though not empirical, standpoint) collection (Jarvie & Agassi 1969) of these studies may give the reader some ideas of their view of the Hong Kong social structure in the 1960s: "In the absence of traditional methods of acquiring status and leadership they (the Hong Kong Chinese) have come to rest largely on wealth and the ability to command wealth....The rich do not form a self-conscious class group. Since opportunities for making and losing money in speculative activities are considerable, the ranks of the rich can change. (Reminding us of the main thrust of Schumpeter's argument on social classis -- TW and LTL).....Many Chinese have told me (Topley) that they 'do not like to make friends'. By this they usually mean that they do not want to have their own interests and those of their family thwarted by the economic obligations which such friendships still imply.' (Topley 1969:186-91) And '...for the great mass of immigrants Hong Kong meant either no lowering of standards of living or only a temporary one...(T)he greatest factor for social mobility...is no doubt education...considerable number of children of skilled workers and of the lower middle classes are sent to secondary schools at great sacrifice. There exists

enormous pressure for success in the many examinations, as school certificates and diplomas are the recognized means for social betterment.' (Agassi, 1969;74-5)

40. Our mobility table analyses have generally adopted log-linear methods. (Hout 1983, 1989; Knoke and Burke 1980; Gilbert 1981)
41. We have followed closely Ishida's (1990) comparative analysis of Japan. Though our findings are really not that comparable to his, our analysis and method are similar.
42. We realize that this does not signify necessarily a rural background; what we have here is just broad, approximate and rough comparison measures.
43. There are many studies utilizing the log-linear analysis for dichotomous/dichotomized and polytomous/polytomized variables. See, e.g., Rosenfeld (1978), for an analysis of U.S. women's intergenerational occupational mobility.
44. Again, our method of analysis follows Ishida (1990).
45. Thus we are somewhat violating some of the assumptions of multiple regression analyses.

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《階級分析再定位：香港社會的結構性及發展性分析》

(中文摘要)

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呂大樂

港處程局就
香真謙困，
後認究的力
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