Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries

More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.Fil: Ronconi, Lucas. Centro de Investigación y Acción Social; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Discriminación y redes sociales: Popularidad entre los estudiantes de bachillerato en Argentina

El objetivo de este trabajo es adquirir un mejor entendimiento del fenómeno de la popularidad de compañeros de clase durante la adolescencia y detectar señales de discriminación. En Argentina, estudiantes de secundaria seleccionan y clasifican a 10 compañeros de clase con los que les gustaría formar equipo. Se descubrió que los estudiantes físicamente atractivos y de alto rendimiento académico son altamente cotizados por sus compañeros de clase, pero sólo en planteles mixtos, lo que hace pensar que eso responde principalmente al emparejamiento. Otros rasgos, tales como el color de la piel, la nacionalidad y el nivel socioeconómico de los padres, no inciden en la popularidad entre los compañeros de clase, aunque el origen étnico y la formación académica de los padres son estadísticamente significativos en algunos casos. Da la impresión de que el tratamiento desigual basado en la raza, riqueza económica y nacionalidad que hay presente en otros entornos sociales de Argentina no se observa entre los adolescentes que asisten a la escuela.

Minimum wage policy and inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean

In this chapter we review the literature and inform policy debates about the effects of minimum wages (MW) on income inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Earnings are the primary source of income among families, especially in the lower part of the earnings and household income distribution. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect increases in the minimum wage to have a significant impact on earnings and income inequality

The Economic Effects of Unions in Latin America: Teachers' Unions and Education in Argentina

This paper considers the effects of trade unions on the education sector in Argentina. We have provided a substantial amount of new information and we have found useful preliminary results on some of the channels of union influence on the performance of this crucial sector. We find that those provinces where teacher unionism is fragmented, where union density is higher and where political relations with the governor are more conflictual, have more strikes (fewer class days). Based on estimates of education production functions both in this paper and elsewhere, we expect this to translate into lower student performance. We then find a number of weak conclusions related to the impact that unions have on several variables that affect students’ performance (i. e. , teachers’ tenure, job satisfaction, class size, education budget and teachers’ salaries). Reviewing these results, we conclude that the impact of unions on students’ performance depends on the channel and kind of political market where unions operate, but not on the existence of unions per se.

¿Cada voto cuenta igual?: Una medición de irregularidades en los telegramas de la elección presidencial de 2011 en Argentina

Este trabajo presenta los resultados que surgen al analizar una muestra aleatoria de más de seis mil telegramas de votación de mesas ubicadas en el conurbano bonaerense durante la elección presidencial de 2011. En más de un tercio de las mesas se observan irregularidades, que si bien no implican necesariamente la existencia de errores en el cómputo oficial de votos, son indicio indirecto del problema. Adicionalmente, se observa que las irregularidades son particularmente frecuentes en los municipios más pobres, lo cual sugiere que la voluntad política de un ciudadano de bajo ingreso es menos factible de ser respetada que la de un ciudadano rico.This paper analyses a random sample of more than 6,000 ballot boxes located in the Buenos Aires conurbation during the 2011 presidential election. We find irregularities in more than a third of the ballot boxes. These irregularities do not necessarily imply misrecording of votes, but can be considered a proxy. Irregularities are more likely to occur in poorer municipalities, suggesting than the political will of a citizen of low income is less likely to be respected than a wealthy citizen.Fil: Zarazaga, Rodrigo Esteban. Centro de Investigación y Acción Social; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Ronconi, Lucas. Centro de Investigación y Acción Social; Argentin

Poverty and Employability Effects of Workfare Programs in Argentina

In 1993 Argentina began implementing workfare programs, and workfare has become a central public policy starting 2002 when the government increased the number of beneficiaries from 100,000 to 2 million people in a country of 38 million. We explore targeting, poverty and employability effects of workfare before 2002 based on the permanent household survey (EPH). We find that the program was pro-poor although more than one third of participants did not satisfy the eligibility criteria. Our estimates suggest that the income of participants increased during treatment - particularly for women - indicating beneficial short run poverty effects. However, the long run effects of the program are not obvious due to selection on treatment completion. We present evidence suggesting that -for a large fraction of participants- the program generated dependency and did not increase their human capital.Workfare, evaluation, Argentina

Globalization, Domestic Institutions and Enforcement of Labor Law: Evidence from Latin America

This paper provides new measures of government enforcement of labor regulations in Latin America and explores how it is affected by external and domestic factors. Using a panel of presidential terms in 18 Latin American countries between 1985 and 2009, I find that trade openness has a negative effect on inspection resources and activities, and that parties on the left of the political spectrum increase enforcement when they are in power. I also find that FDI penetration has a positive effect on inspection activities, but the relation is more imprecise.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78283/1/ipc-112-ronconi-globalization-domestic-institutions-enforcement-labor-law-latin-america.pd

¿Cada voto cuenta igual? Una medición de irregularidades en los telegramas de la elección presidencial de 2011 en Argentina.

Este trabajo presenta los resultados que surgen al analizar una muestra aleatoria de más de seis mil telegramas de votación de mesas ubicadas en el conurbano bonaerense durante la elección presidencial de 2011. En más de un tercio de las mesas se observan irregularidades, que si bien no implican necesariamente la existencia de errores en el cómputo oficial de votos, son indicio indirecto del problema. Adicionalmente, se observa que las irregularidades son particularmente frecuentes en los municipios más pobres, lo cual sugiere que la voluntad política de un ciudadano de bajo ingreso es menos factible de ser respetada que la de un ciudadanorico

Poverty and employability effects of workfare programs in Argentina

Background of INCASI Project H2020-MSCA-RISE-2015 GA 691004. WP1: CompilationIn 1993 Argentina began implementing workfare programs, and workfare has become a central public policy starting 2002 when the government increased the number of beneficiaries from 100.000 to 2 milion people in a country of 38 milion. We explore targeting, poverty and employability effects of workfare before 2002 based on the permanent household survey (EPH). We find tha the programm was pro-poor although more than one third of participants did not satisfy the eligibility criteria. Our estimates suggest that the income of participants increased during treatment - particulary for women - indicating beneficial short run poverty effects. However, the long effects of the program are not obvious due to selection on treatment completion. We present evidence suggesting that - for a large fraction of participants - the program generated dependency and did not increase their human capita