Short-termist and self-defeating: assessing the EU's response to the crisis in Libya

Political instability in Libya is viewed as one of the key contributing factors to Europe's migration crisis, and the EU has taken an active role in addressing the problem. But how effective have the EU's efforts been in Libya? Based on new research, Luca Raineri highlights some key failings in the EU's approach, noting that there has been a significant disjoint between the ambitious objectives highlighted by EU leaders and their capacity and willingness to achieve these goals in practice

Imagined Libya: geopolitics of the margins

Whether referring to the artificiality of its (post-)colonial construction or to the fragmentation of its sovereignty since 2011, the weakness of Libya’s statehood is a recurrent theme in policy and scholarly discourses. Scholars of history and international politics have expanded the framework to apprehend the processes of state (de/)formation underpinning Libya’s fragilities beyond the problematic “failed state” paradigm to accommodate longue-durée and multi-scalar perspectives. Building on these advances, yet noting the need for a more consistent use of social constructivist lenses, the article adopts the perspective of critical geopolitics to explore the spatial discourses and imaginaries, both domestic and imported, that across history have shaped “Libya”, as well as its internal constituents and its external environment, through processes of identification, othering and belonging. Given the diversity of uses – and abuses – connoting geopolitics and its critical variants, the first section of the article clarifies the meaning, relevance and methodology of the critical geopolitics approach herein employed. It is argued that Libya sits at the intersection of rival geopolitical imaginaries and competing spheres of influence that overlap and collide here. The subsequent sections analyze geopolitical discourses from different sources to offer a review of some important spatial imaginaries that have contributed to representing, constituting and apprehending Libya as a subject and an object of international politics: ancient geography’s environmentalism; Italy’s imperial colonialism; Gaddafi’s pan-Arabism and, later, pan-Africanism; and Turkey’s pan-Ottomanism. Before modern colonisation, the imaginary of (today’s) Libyan territory was long apprehended through the dichotomy between urban (hadari) and rural (badawi) spaces, with the political and normative centre of gravitation oscillating from the former (during the Arab and later Ottoman hegemony) to the latter (during the rise of the Sanussi order). During the Italian colonisation, Libya was subsumed in Italy’s Mediterranean projections, whether as a necessary “fourth shore” to Italy’s expansion in its “own” Lebensraum, or as a bridge welding Europe and Africa within a unitary geopolitical entity called Eurafrica. Gaddafi’s pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism combined short-term political opportunism with a more ambitious attempt to challenge (neo-)colonial geopolitical imaginaries about the country’s identity and belonging, and its related security priorities. Yet they both contributed to the abusive manipulation of domestic ethnic cleavages, the weaponization of (the research into) the country’s history, and the progressive de-legitimation of the regime. Today, Libya has acquired a prominent role in Turkey’s geopolitical imaginary. After more than a century of substantial disregard, the rise of a pan-Ottoman geopolitical repertoire in Turkey and the nationalistic emphasis on the redeeming of the vatan (homeland) provide the key for interpreting Turkey’s resurrecting interest in Libya, and the justification of its military intervention vis-à-vis Ankara’s domestic audiences. The exploration of these prominent geopolitical imaginaries on, by and about Libya highlights the tensions, intersections, and divergences underpinning different interpretations of the same territory. The enduring legacy of competing geopolitical imaginaries points to a plausible constitutive factor laying at the root of the polarisations and conflict dynamics that endanger the stability and survival of the Libyan state. Unearthing the competing geopolitical imaginaries on Libya can thus help illuminate the divergent approaches of the international actors intervening in the country, and those of their Libyan proxies struggling for recognition, be they Turkey’s allies, or Libya’s armed actors posturing as Europe’s gatekeepers in the contemporary iterations of the ambivalent geopolitical imaginary of Eurafrica. A critical geopolitics approach thus helps challenge the obsolete yet widespread view of Libya’s marginality in the international system, by unsettling reified spatial assumptions about the partition, position and constitution of Libya’s state. It is precisely Libya’s position at the periphery of rival geopolitical imaginaries and asserted spheres of influence that makes of it a crossroad of strategic vectors, a hotspot of collisions, and therefore a centre of concern

Perceptions about the EU’s Crisis Response in Libya

Within the EU’s approach to crisis management, it is crucial to consider the point of view of all stakeholders to ensure that the crisis response is in line with European commitments towards local ownership and conflict sensitivity. This EUNPACK Policy Brief discusses the perceptions of those who have been exposed to the EU’s responses to the crisis unfolding in Libya. It is based on the results of a survey completed in the summer of 2017 by 228 respondents. It highlights, on the one hand, that while the EU is the most widely-known international actor involved in crisis response in Libya, the impact of its initiatives is less visible, thereby prompting a certain degree of dissatisfaction, if not of scepticism. This reaction is particularly pronounced remarkable among ethnic minorities living in peripheral regions. On the other hand, the EU is particularly praised for its initiatives in the fields of humanitarian assistance and capacity building, targeting most notably the most vulnerable social groups

Jihadism in Mali and the Sahel: evolving dynamics and patterns

The Sahel is a crisis polygon. Following the French intervention in Mali in 2013, this vast and sparsely inhabited region has seen the gradual resurgence and the realignment of jihadist armed groups that have extended their operational range further south – across northwest African borders, where they interfere in and interact with already existing conflicts – and increased the challenges for regional stability. Growing levels of insecurity and banditry, partly triggered also by Bamako’s playing realignment and repositioning games among local groups, are ultimately beneficial to jihadists. By sitting on the fence, jihadists can appear as an effective alternative source of assistance, protection and dispute resolution – both political and economic – to disempowered segments of the population

Policy brief: Perceptions about the EU’s Crisis Response in Libya

Within the EU’s approach to crisis management, it is crucial to consider the point of view of all stakeholders to ensure that the crisis response is in line with European commitments towards local ownership and conflict sensitivity. This EUNPACK Policy Brief discusses the perceptions of those who have been exposed to the EU’s responses to the crisis unfolding in Libya. It is based on the results of a survey completed in the summer of 2017 by 228 respondents. It highlights, on the one hand, that while the EU is the most widely-known international actor involved in crisis response in Libya, the impact of its initiatives is less visible, thereby prompting a certain degree of dissatisfaction, if not of scepticism. This reaction is particularly pronounced remarkable among ethnic minorities living in peripheral regions. On the other hand, the EU is particularly praised for its initiatives in the fields of humanitarian assistance and capacity building, targeting most notably the most vulnerable social groups. To make sure that the EU’s crisis response in Libya achieves the highest degree of conflict sensitivity, appropriateness and effectiveness, the EU should: 1. Pay greater attention to security sector reform (SSR) as a pillar of crisis response in Libya. 2. Avoid undermining the positive image of the EU’s humanitarian commitment by engaging in contradictory policies. 3. Ensure that crisis-response initiatives are coherent with the needs of all Libyan social groups, including ethnic minorities. 4. Improve the monitoring and evaluation of its crisis response towards achieving its stated goals. 5. Invest more resources in conflict-sensitive crisis response

The Security-Migration-Development Nexus in the Sahel: A Reality Check

Policymakers and experts have increasingly emphasized the nexus between migration, security and development in the Sahel, one of the world’s poorest regions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, higher levels of economic and human development do not result automatically in a reduction of migratory flows – sometimes the opposite is the case. Similarly, it would be wise to nuance the view that armed conflicts automatically provoke huge migration flows. Policy frameworks sponsored and designed by foreign actors in the region, such as the European Union and the United States, seem to understand the need for a multi-layered approach but are sometimes stretched to meet inconsistent political demands. There is an urgent need for coherent, more evidence-based and less fear-based policy-making, along with local co-ownership in the implementation of policies, if further harmful effects of migration are to be avoided