Currency Baskets and Real Effective Exchange Rates

With the major currencies continuously moving (if not floating freely) against each other, a country that does not choose to float must decide what to peg to. If it pegs to the SDR it floats against all currencies. Thus in the system begun in the early 1970s the very concept of a fixed exchange rate is unclear. In this situation many countries have chosen to peg their currencies to a basket, or a weighted average of other currencies. The analysis of this paper is focused on fluctuations in real exchange rates. We first show that pegging to a currency basket is the same as holding constant a real effective exchange rate that uses a specific set of weights depending on a chosen policy target. We also show the weights that correspond to particular targets for stabilization policy. Next we discuss several problems involved in choosing and computing optimal weights or the equivalent real effective rate. It is shown that the index formula itself aggregates countries that are in a currency area, so that monetary authorities should use weights based on trade with countries rather than on currency denomination of trade. Finally, we report on an initial empirical investigation of pegging practices in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. These are all countries that have moved to basket pegs, with geographically diversified trade. We present initial estimates of the implicit weights in their baskets, and find that all three countries experienced real appreciation relative to the basket during the l970s.

Discrete Devaluation as a Signal to Price Setters

The central hypothesis of this paper is that both the extent and speed of adjustment of the real exchange rate is affected by the way the central bank manages the nominal exchange rate. Specifically, a large discrete adjustment of the nominal exchange rate is more likely to result in fast adjustment of prices as opposed to a policy of smooth and continuous crawling peg. In the context of a monopolistic price adjustment framework, it is shown that a discrete and unexpected devaluation of the exchange rate shortens implicit price contracts and increases the rate of price adjustment in the nontraded goods sector, because firms tend to strengthen their expectations about an overall increase in costs and about an aggregate as opposed to a local shift in the demand curve for the firm's output. A discrete change in the exchange rate acts as an "information signal" that leads to fast overall adjustment of nontraded goods prices. The hypothesis is tested and not rejected at the macro, sectoral and firm level using macro and microdata on Greek prices prior to and after the January 1983 discrete devaluation.

Adjustment to Variations in Imported Input Prices: The Role of Economic Structure

This paper introduces an imported input into a model of art open economy with developed financial markets, a flexible exchange rate, and some degree of market power on the export side. The model is designed to investigate the impact of an increase in imported input prices on the exchange rate, domestic interest rate, income and nontraded-goods prices. The analysis reveals that changes in various structural parameters, such as the degree of market power or the extent of demand-side openness" or "financial openness," alter the transmission of foreign price disturbances to the domestic economy.