Ambivalence and decisional conflict as a cause of psychological discomfort: feeling tense before jumping off the fence

"It has long been assumed that people experience evaluative conflict or ambivalence as unpleasant. In three studies we provide direct evidence for the assumption that ambivalence is unpleasant, but only when one has to commit to one side of the issue. In those situations ambivalence will be related to outcome uncertainty and feelings of discomfort. We examined this prediction using both self-reports and physiological measures. In a first study we manipulated ambivalence and whether or not participants had to take a clear stand vis-a vis the attitudinal issue and choose a position for or against it. Results indicate ambivalence was only related to physiological arousal when a choice had to be made. Feeling ambivalent about an issue without the necessity to choose did not result in higher levels of arousal. A second study replicated and extended these findings by including a measure of subjective uncertainty about the decision. Results showed the same pattern as in Study 1, and indicate that the relation between ambivalence and arousal is mediated by uncertainty about decisional outcomes. In the third and final study these findings are corroborated using self-report measures; these indicated that ambivalence-induced discomfort is related to specific (negative) emotions." [author's abstract

Lay People's Beliefs About Creativity: Evidence for an Insight Bias

Research finds that creative ideas are generated by two cognitive pathways: insight and persistence. However, emerging research suggests people’s lay beliefs may not adequately reflect both routes. We propose that people exhibit an insight bias, such that they undervalue persistence and overvalue insight in the creative process

The Creative Cliff Illusion

Across eight studies, we tested whether people understand the time course of their own creativity. Prior literature finds that creativity tends to improve across an ideation session. Here we compared people’s beliefs against their actual creative performance. Consistent with prior research, we found that people’s creativity, on aggregate, remained constant or improved across an ideation session. However, people’s beliefs did not match this reality. We consistently found that people expected their creativity to decline over time. We refer to this misprediction as the creative cliff illusion. Study 1 found initial evidence of this effect across an ideation task. We found further evidence in a sample with high domain-relevant knowledge (study 2), when creativity judgments were elicited retrospectively (study 3), and across a multiday study (study 5). We theorized the effect occurs because people mistakenly associate creativity (the novelty and usefulness of an idea) with idea production (the ability to generate an idea). Study 4 found evidence consistent with this mechanism. The creative cliff illusion was attenuated among those with high levels of everyday creative experience (study 6) and after a knowledge intervention that increased awareness of the effect (study 7). Demonstrating the impact of creativity beliefs on downstream performance, study 8 found that declining creativity beliefs negatively influenced task persistence and creative performance, suggesting that people underinvest in ideation. This research contributes to work on prediction in the creative domain and demonstrates the importance of understanding creativity beliefs for predicting creative performance

The Devil Is in the Deliberation: Thinking Too Much Reduces Preference Consistency

In five experiments we found that deliberation reduces preference consistency. In experiments 1 and 2, participants who deliberated on their preferences were less consistent in their evaluations compared to those who did not deliberate. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this effect is due to the impediment of deliberation and not to the benefit of nondeliberation. We hypothesized that deliberation leads to the inconsistent weighting of information, especially when the information is complex. As such, we predicted and found in experiments 4 and 5 that the extent to which deliberation decreases preference consistency depends upon the complexity of the information. (c) 2008 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc..

The Creative Cliff Illusion

Across eight studies we tested whether people understand the timecourse of their own creativity. Prior literature finds that creativity tends to improve across an ideation session. Here we compared people’s beliefs against their actual creative performance. Consistent with prior research, we found that people’s creativity, on aggregate, remained constant or improved across an ideation session. However, people’s beliefs did not match this reality. We consistently found that people expected their creativity to decline over time. We refer to this misprediction as the creative cliff illusion. Study 1 found initial evidence of this effect across an ideation task. We found further evidence in a sample with high domain-relevant knowledge (Study 2), when creativity judgments were elicited retrospectively (Study 3), and across a multi-day study (Study 5). We theorized the effect occurs because people mistakenly associate creativity (the novelty and usefulness of an idea) with idea production (the ability to generate an idea). Study 4 found evidence consistent with this mechanism. The creative cliff illusion was attenuated among those with high levels of everyday creative experience (Study 6) and after a knowledge intervention that increased awareness of the effect (Study 7). Demonstrating the impact of creativity beliefs on downstream performance, Study 8 found that declining creativity beliefs negatively influenced task persistence and creative performance, suggesting that people to underinvest in ideation. This research contributes to work on prediction in the creative domain and demonstrates the importance of understanding creativity beliefs for predicting creative performance

The relativity of bad decisions: Social comparison as a means to alleviate regret

In two studies, we examined the role of social comparisons in regret management. In the first study, participants received a (relatively) negative outcome after which they were presented with base-rate information about the performance of other participants in the experiment. Results showed that experienced regret decreased as a result of base-rate information showing that most others made even worse decisions than oneself. In the second study, we investigated whether people actively seek this kind of consensual information to validate their decision. After inducing regret by means of a manipulated outcome in a trivia quiz, participants could obtain information about the outcomes of previous participants or about the type of items used in the quiz. Participants' preference was determined by whether or not they believed that they would be given a second chance. In case of a negative and final outcome, participants preferred information about the prevalence of others who had an even worse outcome. When the outcome was non-final, participants preferred information about the type of items used in the test. Both strategies were accompanied with a decrease in regret. Implications for research on regret and decision making are discussed. 'Comparison, more than reality, makes men happy or wretched' Thomas Fuller (1732)

Torture in the Eyes of the Beholder

This Article draws upon recent social psychological research to demonstrate the psychological difficulty of distinguishing between torture and enhanced interrogation. We critique the accuracy of evaluations made under the current torture standard using two constructs--reliability and validity--that are employed in the social sciences to assess the quality of a construct or metric. We argue that evaluations of interrogation tactics using the current standard are both unreliable and invalid. We first argue that the torture standard is unreliable because of the marked variation in the manner in which different jurisdictions interpret and employ it. Next, we draw on recent social psychological research to demonstrate the standard\u27s invalidity. We identify the existence of two separate systematic psychological biases that impede objective application of the torture standard. First, the self-serving bias--a bias that motivates evaluators to interpret facts or rules in a way that suits their interests--leads administrators to promote narrower interpretations of torture when faced with a perceived threat to their own, as compared with other nations, security. Thus, the threshold for torture is tendentiously raised during exactly the periods of time when torture is most likely to be used. Second, our own research on the hot-cold empathy gap suggests that an assessment of an interrogation tactic\u27s severity is influenced by the momentary visceral state of the evaluator. People who are not currently experiencing a visceral state--such as pain, hunger, or fear--tend to systematically underestimate the severity of the visceral state. We argue that, because the people who evaluate interrogation tactics are unlikely to be in the visceral state induced by the tactic when making their evaluations, the hot-cold empathy gap results in systematic underestimation of the severity of tactics. Therefore, the hot-cold empathy gap leads to the application of an under inclusive conception of torture in domestic interrogation policy and international torture law