Under the radar : the effects of monitoring firms on tax compliance

This paper analyzes the effects on tax compliance of monitoring the information trails generated by firms’ activities. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in Spain, which monitors firms with more than 6 million euros in reported revenue. Firms strategically bunch below this threshold in order to avoid stricter tax enforcement. This response is stronger in sectors where transactions leave more paper trail, implying that monitoring effort and the traceability of information reported by firms are complements. We calculate that there would be substantial welfare gains from extending stricter tax monitoring to smaller businesses

Indoor Massive MIMO Deployments for Uniformly High Wireless Capacity

Providing consistently high wireless capacity is becoming increasingly important to support the applications required by future digital enterprises. In this paper, we propose Eigen-direction-aware ZF (EDA-ZF) with partial coordination among base stations (BSs) and distributed interference suppression as a practical approach to achieve this objective. We compare our solution with Zero Forcing (ZF), entailing neither BS coordination or inter-cell interference mitigation, and Network MIMO (NeMIMO), where full BS coordination enables centralized inter-cell interference management. We also evaluate the performance of said schemes for three sub-6 GHz deployments with varying BS densities -- sparse, intermediate, and dense -- all with fixed total number of antennas and radiated power. Extensive simulations show that: (i) indoor massive MIMO implementing the proposed EDA-ZF provides uniformly good rates for all users; (ii) indoor network densification is detrimental unless full coordination is implemented; (iii) deploying NeMIMO pays off under strong outdoor interference, especially for cell-edge users

O&M Models for Ocean Energy Converters: Calibrating through Real Sea Data

Of the cost centres that combine to result in Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE), O&M costs play a significant part. Several developers have calculated component costs, demonstrating how they can become commercially competitive with other forms of renewable energy. However, there are uncertainties relating to the O&M figures that can only be reduced through lessons learned at sea. This work presents an O&M model calibrated with data from real sea experience of a wave energy device deployed at the Biscay Marine energy Platform (BiMEP): the OPERA O&M Model. Two additional case studies, utilising two other O&M calculation methodologies, are presented for comparison with the OPERA O&M Model. The second case study assumes the inexistence of an O&M model, utilising a Simplified Approach. The third case study applies DTOcean’s (a design tool for ocean energy arrays) O&M module. The results illustrate the potential advantages of utilising real sea data for the calibration and development of an O&M model. The Simplified Approach was observed to overestimate LCOE when compared to the OPERA O&M Model. This work also shows that O&M models can be used for the definition of optimal maintenance plans to assist with OPEX reduction.The authors are grateful to the European commission for funding the OPERA and EnFAIT projects as part of the Horizon 2020 framework. The authors also thankful to Oceantec-Idom for providing feedback to OPERA model’s inputs. A special thanks to Shona Pennock and Donald Noble for their diligent proofreading of this paper

The Political Economy of In-Kind Redistribution

Why do politicians redistribute resources through in-kind rather than cash transfers? This paper examines political incentives for in-kind government redistribution. By analyzing the political game between o¢ ce-motivated politicians and self-interested citizens, I �rst show that in economies with competitive markets in-kind transfers are not required. Politicians can win elections targeting groups of voters with differential cash transfers. However, in-kind transfers arise in the presence of externalities in consumption. In that case, targeting groups of voters with in-kind rather than cash transfers allows politicians to attract simultaneously voters in additional groups with the same amount of resources. Politicians undertake political redistribution depending on the expected electoral returns obtained from targeting both cash and in-kind transfers into di¤erent groups. Furthermore, electoral competition leads the economy to achieve Pareto efficient allocations that markets cannot reach. Politicians internalize the presence of external effects when competing for marginal voters who could swing their vote

The scope of political redistribution with proportional income taxation

This paper investigates the politicians �incentives to pursue income redistribution when governments are constrained to levy taxes on labor income and this creates distortions. Politicians who strive to be elected may strategically redistribute through in-kind rather than cash transfers and overprovide consumption of goods. I show that the overprovision of in-kind transfers reduces the disincentive effects of taxation in labor effort and enlarges the pool of resources for political redistribution. As a result, politicians are able to implement larger redistributive transfers and improve the well-being of swing voters. Hence, electoral competition for pivotal voters provides politicians incentives to implement redistributive schedules that reduce distortions in labor markets and improve the efficiency of the taxation system

The scope of political redistribution with proportional income taxation

This paper investigates the politicians �incentives to pursue income redistribution when governments are constrained to levy taxes on labor income and this creates distortions. Politicians who strive to be elected may strategically redistribute through in-kind rather than cash transfers and overprovide consumption of goods. I show that the overprovision of in-kind transfers reduces the disincentive effects of taxation in labor effort and enlarges the pool of resources for political redistribution. As a result, politicians are able to implement larger redistributive transfers and improve the well-being of swing voters. Hence, electoral competition for pivotal voters provides politicians incentives to implement redistributive schedules that reduce distortions in labor markets and improve the efficiency of the taxation system