Inflation targeting rules and welfare in an asymmetric currency area

This paper studies the effect on monetary policy of a non-homogeneous degree of competition across the (two) members of a monetary union. In particular, we assess the welfare loss brought about by the use of a simple interest rate rule that does not take into account such structural differences. Our results show that, ceteris paribus, the welfare-maximizing central bank should react more aggressively to the inflation pressure generated by the more competitive economy. We extend the results of Benigno (2003) in two ways. First, we show that, if the degree of competition differs across countries, the optimal rule could involve a larger weight on the more "flexible" country. Second, we allow for a non-unitelastic demand for import. We show that this can alter Benigno's results even under asymmetric degree of competition. Our study suggests that the size of the welfare losses due to the neglect of these asymmetries crucially depends on their actual combination. Furthermore, we show that if information on the true extent of the asymmetries is incomplete, the symmetric rule could outperform the optimal rule. --currency area,asymmetries,monetary policy rules,imperfect competition,sticky prices,second-order approximation

On the trade balance response to monetary shocks: the Marshall-Lerner conditions reconsidered

This paper shows that, by disentangling the degree of monopolistic distortion from the elasticity of substitution between domestic and im-ported goods, we can obtain a negative response of the trade balance to positive monetary shocks, without introducing capital accumula-tion. This result could reconcile the class of models à la Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, ch. 10) with the stylized fact of counter-cyclical trade balances.trade balance; Marshall-Lerner conditions; elasticity of substitution; monetary shocks; transfer problem

On the Trade Balance Response to Monetary Shocks: the Marshall-Lerner Conditions Reconsidered

This paper studies the applicability of the Marshall-Lerner condition to the "basic" Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) model. It shows that the Marshall-Lerner condition does apply to this class of models with homothetic preferences when product differentiation across countries is imposed. This paper also shows that, in certain cases, the intertemporal substitution and the dynamic income effect can make the mere elasticity of substitution an insufficient indicator of the response of the current account to monetary shocks.Trade Balance, Marshall-Lerner Conditions, Elasticity of Substitution, Monetary Shocks, Transfer Problem

Computing second-order-accurate solutions for rational expectation models using linear solution methods

This paper shows how to compute a second-order accurate solution of a non-linear rational expectation model using algorithms developed for the solution of linear rational expectation models. The result is a state-space representation for the realized values of the variables of the model. This state-space representation can easily be used to compute impulse responses as well as conditional and unconditional forecasts. JEL Classification: C63, E0Second order approximation, Solution method for rational expectation models

Computing Second-Order-Accurate Solutions for Rational Expectation Models Using Linear Solution Methods

This paper shows how to compute a second-order accurate solution of a non-linear rational expectation model using algorithms developed for the solution of linear rational expectation models. This result is a state-space representation for the realized values of the variables of the model. This state-space representation can easily be used to compute impulse responses as well as conditional and unconditional forecasts.Second-order approximation; solution method for rational expectation models.

Welfare implications of Calvo vs. Rotemberg pricing assumptions

This paper compares the welfare implications of two widely used pricing assumptions in the New-Keynesian literature: Calvo-pricing vs. Rotemberg-pricing. We show that despite the strong similarities between the two assumptions to a first order of approximation, in general they might entail different welfare costs at higher order of approximation. In the special case of non-distorted steady state, the two pricing assumptions imply identical welfare losses to a second order of approximation. JEL Classification: E3, E5Calvo price adjustment, inflation, Rotemberg price adjustment, second-order approximation, Welfare

Policy instrument choice and non-coordinated monetary in interdependent economies

Non-coordinated monetary policy is analysed in a stochastic two-country general equilibrium model. Non-coordinated equilibria are compared in two cases: one where policy is set in terms of state-contingent money supply rules and one where policy is set in terms of state-contingent nominal interest rate rules. In general the non-coordinated equilibrium differs between the two types of policy rule but a number of special cases are identified where the equilibria are identical. The endogenous choice of policy instrument is analysed and the Nash equilibrium in the choice of policy instrument is shown to depend on the interest elasticity of money demand. --Monetary policy,money supply rules,interest rate rules

Financial frictions and optimal monetary policy in an open economy

A growing number of papers have studied positive and normative implications of financial frictions in DSGE models. We contribute to this literature by studying the welfare-based monetary policy in a two-country model characterized by financial frictions, alongside a number of key features, like capital accumulation, non-traded goods and foreign-currency debt denomination. We compare the cooperative Ramsey monetary policy with standard policy benchmarks (e.g. PPI stability) as well as with the optimal Ramsey policy in a currency area. We show that the two-country perspective offers new insights on the trade-offs faced by the monetary authority. Our main results are the following. First, strict PPI targeting (nearly optimal in our model if credit frictions are absent) becomes excessively procyclical in response to positive productivity shocks in the presence of financial frictions. The related welfare losses are non-negligible, especially if financial imperfections interact with nontradable production. Second, (asymmetric) foreign currency debt denomination affects the optimal monetary policy and has important implications for exchange rate regimes. In particular, the larger the variance of domestic productivity shocks relative to foreign, the closer the PPI-stability policy is to the optimal policy and the farther is the currency union case. Third, we find that central banks should allow for deviations from price stability to offset the effects of balance sheet shocks. Finally, while financial frictions substantially decrease attractiveness of all price targeting regimes, they do not have a significant effect on the performance of a monetary union agreement. JEL Classification: E52, E61, E44, F36, F41Financial Frictions, open economy, optimal monetary polic

Openness and optimal monetary policy

We show that the composition of imports has important implications for the optimal volatility of the exchange rate. Using input-output data for 25 countries we document substantial differences in the import and non-tradable content of final demand components, and in the role played by imported inputs in domestic production. We build a business cycle model of a small open economy to discuss how the problem of the optimizing policy-maker changes endogenously as the composition of imports and of final demand is altered. Contrary to models where steady state trade openness is entirely characterized by home bias, we find that trade openness is a very poor proxy of the welfare impact of alternative monetary policies. Finally, we quantify the loss from an exchange rate peg relative to the Ramsey policy conditional on the composition of imports, using parameter values that are estimated from OECD input-output tables data. We find that the main determinant of the losses is the share of non-traded goods in final demand. JEL Classification: E52, E31, F02, F41Exchange Rate Regimes, international trade, Non-tradable Goods, Optimal Policy

Financial frictions and optimal monetary policy in an open economy

A growing number of papers have studied positive and normative implications of financial frictions in DSGE models. We contribute to this literature by studying the welfare-based monetary policy in a two-country model characterized by financial frictions, alongside a number of key features, like capital accumulation, non-traded goods and foreign-currency debt denomination. We compare the cooperative Ramsey monetary policy with standard policy benchmarks (e.g. PPI stability) as well as with the optimal Ramsey policy in a currency area. We show that the two-country perspective offers new insights on the trade-offs faced by the monetary authority. Our main results are the following. First, strict PPI targeting (nearly optimal in our model if credit frictions are absent) becomes excessively procyclical in response to positive productivity shocks in the presence of financial frictions. The related welfare losses are non-negligible, especially if financial imperfections interact with nontradable production. Second, (asymmetric) foreign currency debt denomination affects the optimal monetary policy and has important implications for exchange rate regimes. In particular, the larger the variance of domestic productivity shocks relative to foreign, the closer the PPI-stability policy is to the optimal policy and the farther is the currency union case. Third, we find that central banks should allow for deviations from price stability to offset the effects of balance sheet shocks. Finally, while financial frictions substantially decrease attractiveness of all price targeting regimes, they do not have a significant effect on the performance of a monetary union agreement.financial frictions, open economy, optimal monetary policy