Making Peace with War: Adaptation and the Soviet Political Economy in the Blockade of Leningrad

War demands the capacity of state elites and officials, and institutions, to adapt to challenges. One constant refrain in Western accounts was the inability of the Soviet command economy to adapt—yet that command economy contributed to survival and eventual victory. To what extent could and did economic actors and institutions adapt to new circumstances, versus following tried-and-true policies of the 1930s? In this article, we use the case of Leningrad in late 1941 and 1942, when the Blockade provided severe challenges and became more than a fleeting military event. One of the most important challenge (if not the most important) was the supply and distribution of food to maintain the operation of the city and military production. The massive death toll revealed the degree of the challenge, the force of the German siege, and the lack of sufficient preparation beforehand. Yet the regime did implement innovations and adaptations in obtaining and provisioning. We focus on one set of formal policies: the streamlining of food distribution and the expansion of podsobnoe khoziaistvo (successes), and the possibility of using fish (a failure). These policies were grounded in existing institutional templates and knowledge; however, fishing policies revealed contradictions between civilian and military actors. More radical innovations would require informality; but the Soviet regime could adapt

Seeing like a Starving State: The Soviet Political Economy of Death in the Blockade of Leningrad

State elites and officials “see” their polities and societies through ideological and symbolic lenses that shape what they seek and perceive as they devise policies. But what happens to that sight and vision during moments of challenge and duress, and with what effect on policies? This article uses the example of the Blockade of Leningrad to begin an exploration of this subject. The pre-war Soviet state and Communist Party had a “double vision”, seeing Soviet society as an object for utopian plans and projects (a “high modernist” vision), and as an amorphous source of constant potential risk (e. g. counter-revolution). Extreme duress and challenges to survival from the Blockade challenged both facets of this double vision. What began to emerge was a more pragmatic vision centered on maintaining state authority and political order. We use state perception of and policies towards death and, as an extension, defending (civilian) life. Brief explorations of how state elites and officials perceived death, disposal labor (coping with corpses), and life (mothers) reveals a more realistic pragmatism, less deferent to ideology, beginning to emerge. We conclude that this points to a possible “Blockade Bolshevism” as a shifting formula of rule and possibilities of a “NEP reboot” lost to high Stalinism after the war

Seeing like a Starving State: The Soviet Political Economy of Death in the Blockade of Leningrad.

State elites and officials ``see” their polities and societies through ideological and symbolic lenses that shape what they seek and perceive as they devise policies. But what happens to that sight and vision during moments of challenge and duress, and with what effect on policies? This article uses the example of the Blockade of Leningrad to begin an exploration of this subject. The pre-war Soviet state and Communist Party had a “double vision”, seeing Soviet society as an object for utopian plans and projects (a “high modernist” vision), and as an amorphous source of constant potential risk (e. g. counter-revolution). Extreme duress and challenges to survival from the Blockade challenged both facets of this double vision. What began to emerge was a more pragmatic vision centered on maintaining state authority and political order. We use state perception of and policies towards death and, as an extension, defending (civilian) life. Brief explorations of how state elites and officials perceived death, disposal labor (coping with corpses), and life (mothers) reveals a more realistic pragmatism, less deferrent to ideology, beginning to emerge. We conclude that this points to a possible “Blockade Bolshevism \u27\u27 as a shifting formula of rule and possibilities of a “NEP reboot” lost to high Stalinism after the war

Making Peace with War: Adaptation and the Soviet Political Economy in the Blockade of Leningrad

War demands the capacity of state elites and officials, and institutions, to adapt to challenges. One constant refrain in Western accounts was the inability of the Soviet command economy to adapt—yet that com- mand economy contributed to survival and eventual victory. To what extent could and did economic actors and institutions adapt to new circumstances, versus following tried-and-true policies of the 1930s? In this article, we use the case of Leningrad in late 1941 and 1942, when the Blockade provided severe challenges and became more than a fleeting military event. One of the most important challenge (if not the most important) was the sup- ply and distribution of food to maintain the operation of the city and military production. The massive death toll revealed the degree of the challenge, the force of the German siege, and the lack of sufficient preparation before- hand. Yet the regime did implement innovations and adaptations in obtaining and provisioning. We focus on one set of formal policies: the streamlining of food distribution and the expansion of podsobnoe khoziaistvo (success- es), and the possibility of using fish (a failure). These policies were grounded in existing institutional templates and knowledge; however, fishing policies revealed contradictions between civilian and military actors. More radical innovations would require informality; but the Soviet regime could adapt