Gassendi and Hobbes

Gassendi and Hobbes knew each other, and their approaches to philosophy often seem similar. They both criticized the Cartesian epistemology of clear and distinct perception. Gassendi engaged at length with skepticism, and also rejected the Aristotelian notion of scientia, arguing instead for a probabilistic view that shows us how we can move on in the absence of certain and evident knowledge. Hobbes, in contrast, retained the notion of scientia, which is the best sort of knowledge and involves causal explanation. He thought, however, that this sort of knowledge was only available in geometry and political philosophy

Early Modern Accounts of Epicureanism

We look at some interesting and important episodes in the life of early modern Epicureanism, focusing on natural philosophy. We begin with two early moderns who had a great deal to say about ancient Epicureanism: Pierre Gassendi and Ralph Cudworth. Looking at how Gassendi and Cudworth conceived of Epicureanism gives us a sense of what the early moderns considered important in the ancient tradition. It also points us towards three main themes of early modern Epicureanism in natural philosophy, which we then discuss at greater length: atomism, materialism about the mind or soul, and the denial of providence, which was often accompanied by deflationary explanations of religious belief

Jonathan Edwards's Monism

The 18th-century American philosopher Jonathan Edwards argues that nothing endures through time. I analyze his argument, paying particular attention to a central principle it relies on, namely that “nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing”. I also consider what I supposed to follow from the conclusion that nothing endures. Edwards is sometimes read as the first four-dimensionalist. I argue that this is wrong. Edwards does not conclude that things persist by having different temporal parts; he concludes that nothing persists

Revisiting the Early Modern Philosophical Canon

I reflect critically on the early modern philosophical canon in light of the entrenchment and homogeneity of the line up of seven core figures: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant. After distinguishing three elements of a philosophical canon -- a causal story, a set of core philosophical questions and a set of distinctively philosophical works -- I argue that recent efforts contextualizing the history of philosophy within the history of science subtly shift the central philosophical questions and allow for a greater range of figures to be philosophically central. However, the history of science is but one context in which to situate philosophical works. Looking at the historical context of 17th century philosophy of mind, one that weaves together questions of consciousness, rationality, and education, does more than shift the central questions -- it brings new ones to light. It also shows that a range of genres can to be properly philosophical, and seamlessly diversifies the central philosophers of the period