Basel III Framework: Net Stable Funding Ratio (Proposed Standards)

Shearman & Sterling LLP Financial Institutions Advisory & Financial Regulatory Client Publicatio

OCS Fall Recruitment Employer Forum

This forum provides students with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with many of the employers that will be participating in the Fall Recruitment Program. Employers include: American Civil Liberties Union, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Baker Botts LLP, Blank Rome LLP, Bronx County District Attorney\u27s Office, Brooklyn Legal Services, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Cooper & Dunham LLP, Covington & Burling LLP, Davis, Polk & Wardell LLP, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Desmarais LLP, Epstein Becker & Green P.C., Fox Rothschild LLP, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Jones Day, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Labaton Sucharow LLP, Legal Aid Society of New York, Milbank LLP, Mobilization for Justice, Inc., New York City Administration for Children\u27s Services, New York City Law Department, New York County District Attorney\u27s Office, New York Legal Assistance Group, Nixon Peabody LLP, Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Proskauer Rose LLP, Reed Smith LLP, Roberts & Holland LLP, Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Shearman & Sterling LLP, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, U.S. Air Force JAG Corps, U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, Venable LLP, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLPhttps://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/flyers-2017-2018/1084/thumbnail.jp

The Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical Study of New York Law Firms

Since the rapid rise in organizational forms for business associations, academics and practitioners have sought to explain the choice of form rationale. Each form contains its own set of default rules that inevitably get factored into this decision, including the extent to which each individual firm owner will be held personally liable for the collective debts and obligations of the firm. The significance of the differences in these default rules continues to be debated. Many commentators have advanced theories, most notably those based on unlimited liability, profit-sharing, and illiquidity, asserting that the partnership form provides efficiency benefits that outweigh any costs. In this article, the authors test these theories empirically by examining the choice of organizational form by New York law firms. Although the evidence indicates a strong shift from the general partnership form to the limited liability partnership form, a significant number of New York law firms remain general partnerships. The authors conclude that the prevailing theories based on unlimited liability, profit-sharing, and illiquidity are insufficient and posit that, in contrast to the beliefs of many commentators, the choice of form decision is quite complex. It depends on a variety of factors, including the behavior of other similarly situated firms that the decision makers consider competitors for prestige and clients. Nonetheless, it is apparent that unlimited liability is generally considered burdensome, and it is the authors’ prediction that, at some point in time, nearly all the firms in their sample will choose to file as limited liability partnerships. The general partnership form, with its unlimited liability, will operate only as a penalty default that punishes parties who fail to sufficiently define their organization, forcing firm members to reveal relevant information to courts and interested third parties

Rebalancing the geographies of financial services power : the role of sovereign wealth funds.

As part of debates about the causes, consequences and political ramifications of the credit crisis and ensuing recession (for a summary of which see Engelen and Faulconbridge, 2009), questions about the changing geographies of power in the financial services sector have elicited interest both in academic and media circles in recent years. Aalbers (2009, 39) suggests that we are witnessing a change in the powerfulness of incumbent financial centres such as London and New York as a multi-polar world emerges in which the Middle East – the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar etc. – and Asia – China in particular – and their respective financial centres increasingly play bigger and bigger roles in financial services activities. Similarly the newspaper of the City of London – City AM – reported that a shifting balance of power as a result of the financial crisis and the simultaneous growth of new financial centres means the City can no-longer be sure that its preeminent position in the global ‘pecking order’ is secure (see Hazelhurst, 2009). Indeed, in the 2009 edition of the annual Global Financial Centres Report (see City of London Corporation, 2009) it was reported that, whilst London remained atop of the rankings of financial centres, new challengers had quickly risen up the table in the period 2008 to 2009. Challengers include Singapore (32 places rise in ranking), Shanghai (117 places rise), Beijing (135 places rise), Dubai (37 places rise), Seoul (114 places rise) and Qatar (51 places rise) alongside some significant new entries into the top 75 including Riyadh. In this context, studying sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) can tell us a lot about the financial services sector. Specifically, in this commentary I suggest that studying the reactions of financial service providers, such as asset managers but also the broader complex of professional services such as accounting and law that ‘lubricate’ (Dicken, 2007) the financial system, to the growing importance of SWFs reveals much about the dynamics of the changing geographies of power in the financial services sector and the implications for incumbent financial centres such as London and New York. I make two main points. First, I suggest that the growing importance of SWFs does indeed mean that financial centres such as Doha, Dubai and Shanghai will become increasingly powerful over the coming years, in particular as financial service providers such as asset managers and related professional service firms such as law race to establish new and grow existing operations in these centres. Second, however, I also contend that this rebalancing of power relations will not be a zero sum game that necessarily leads to the erosion of the power and importance of incumbent centres such as London and New York. By taking a relational approach to understanding the geography of financial centres (on which see Beaverstock et al., 2006; Faulconbridge, 2004) that recognises the complementary nature of coexisting centres (on which see Clark, 2002) I illustrate the way that incumbent centres are actually likely to benefit from the activities of SWFs and the growing importance and power of centres such as Doha, Dubai and Shanghai

Government Guarantees of Bank Securities: Issues under the U.S. Federal Securities Laws and the Prospectus Directive

Client Publication: Capital Market

Governmental Assistance to the Financial Sector: an Overview of the Global Responses

Client Publicatio