On the Depth of Deep Neural Networks: A Theoretical View

People believe that depth plays an important role in success of deep neural networks (DNN). However, this belief lacks solid theoretical justifications as far as we know. We investigate role of depth from perspective of margin bound. In margin bound, expected error is upper bounded by empirical margin error plus Rademacher Average (RA) based capacity term. First, we derive an upper bound for RA of DNN, and show that it increases with increasing depth. This indicates negative impact of depth on test performance. Second, we show that deeper networks tend to have larger representation power (measured by Betti numbers based complexity) than shallower networks in multi-class setting, and thus can lead to smaller empirical margin error. This implies positive impact of depth. The combination of these two results shows that for DNN with restricted number of hidden units, increasing depth is not always good since there is a tradeoff between positive and negative impacts. These results inspire us to seek alternative ways to achieve positive impact of depth, e.g., imposing margin-based penalty terms to cross entropy loss so as to reduce empirical margin error without increasing depth. Our experiments show that in this way, we achieve significantly better test performance.Comment: AAAI 201

A Game-theoretic Machine Learning Approach for Revenue Maximization in Sponsored Search

Sponsored search is an important monetization channel for search engines, in which an auction mechanism is used to select the ads shown to users and determine the prices charged from advertisers. There have been several pieces of work in the literature that investigate how to design an auction mechanism in order to optimize the revenue of the search engine. However, due to some unrealistic assumptions used, the practical values of these studies are not very clear. In this paper, we propose a novel \emph{game-theoretic machine learning} approach, which naturally combines machine learning and game theory, and learns the auction mechanism using a bilevel optimization framework. In particular, we first learn a Markov model from historical data to describe how advertisers change their bids in response to an auction mechanism, and then for any given auction mechanism, we use the learnt model to predict its corresponding future bid sequences. Next we learn the auction mechanism through empirical revenue maximization on the predicted bid sequences. We show that the empirical revenue will converge when the prediction period approaches infinity, and a Genetic Programming algorithm can effectively optimize this empirical revenue. Our experiments indicate that the proposed approach is able to produce a much more effective auction mechanism than several baselines.Comment: Twenty-third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013