Does Contract Law Need Morality?

In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman sets out an ambitious market theory of contract, which he argues is a superior normative foundation for contract law than either the moralist or economic justifications that currently dominate contract theory. In doing so, he sets out a robust defense of commerce and the market-place as contributing to human flourishing that is a refreshing and welcome contribution in an era of market alarmism. But the mar-ket theory ultimately falls short as either a normative or prescriptive theory of contract. The extent to which law, public policy, and the-ory should account for values other than economic efficiency is a longstanding debate. Whatever the merits of that debate, we conclude that contract law does not need morality as envisioned by Oman—a fluid, subjective, and seemingly instinctual approach to the morality of markets

Evolution of magnetic properties in the vicinity of the Verwey transition in Fe3O4 thin films

We have systematically studied the evolution of magnetic properties, especially the coercivity and the remanence ratio in the vicinity of the Verwey transition temperature (TV ), of high-quality epitaxial Fe3O4 thin films grown on MgO (001), MgAl2O4 (MAO) (001), and SrTiO3 (STO) (001) substrates. We observed rapid change of magnetization, coercivity, and remanence ratio at TV , which are consistent with the behaviors of resistivity versus temperature [\r{ho}(T )] curves for the different thin films. In particular, we found quite different magnetic behaviors for the thin films onMgOfrom those onMAOand STO, inwhich the domain size and the strain state play very important roles. The coercivity is mainly determined by the domain size but the demagnetization process is mainly dependent on the strain state. Furthermore, we observed a reversal of remanence ratio at TV with thickness for the thin films grown on MgO: from a rapid enhancement for 40-nm- to a sharp drop for 200-nm-thick film, and the critical thickness is about 80 nm. Finally, we found an obvious hysteretic loop of coercivity (or remanence ratio) with temperature around TV , corresponding to the hysteretic loop of the \r{ho}(T ) curve, in Fe3O4 thin film grown on MgO

MoS2 Dual-Gate MOSFET with Atomic-Layer-Deposited Al2O3 as Top-Gate Dielectric

We demonstrate atomic-layer-deposited (ALD) high-k dielectric integration on two-dimensional (2D) layer-structured molybdenum disulfide (MoS2) crystals and MoS2 dual-gate n-channel MOSFETs with ALD Al2O3 as top-gate dielectric. Our C-V study of MOSFET structures shows good interface between 2D MoS2 crystal and ALD Al2O3. Maximum drain currents using back-gates and top-gates are measured to be 7.07mA/mm and 6.42mA/mm at Vds=2V with a channel width of 3 {\mu}m, a channel length of 9 {\mu}m, and a top-gate length of 3 {\mu}m. We achieve the highest field-effect mobility of electrons using back-gate control to be 517 cm^2/Vs. The highest current on/off ratio is over 10^8.Comment: submitted to IEEE Electron Device Letter

The Volcker Rule: A Brief Political History

Today, more than five years after Dodd-Frank was first signed into law, uncertainty surrounds many aspects of the Volcker Rule’s application and ultimate impact on financial markets and bank stability. Many more years will likely pass before that uncertainty is resolved. We demonstrate through a quantitative and qualitative analysis that these difficulties were presaged by the Volcker Rule’s political history. The Volcker Rule -- originally rejected by Congressional lawmakers and economists within the Obama administration as unworkable -- arose as a political concession designed to quiet critics who contended that Dodd-Frank did not do enough to control risky bank activity. But deep divisions about the proper scope of the rule persisted even as the statute was signed into law, ensuring that these debates continued into the rulemaking phase. Efforts to influence the Volcker Rule at the agency level began immediately after presidential signing and persisted until enactment of the final rule. Those expressing an opinion on the rule included affected industry members, academics, public interest groups, private individuals, and state and foreign governments, among others. Systematic analyses of meeting logs and comment letters reveal that much of this activity involved the market making exemption. Specifically, commenters disputed how broadly the exemption should be interpreted and applied, the extent to which limitations on banks’ abilities to make markets would reduce market liquidity, and the likely costs of any such reduction, should it occur